This article examines violations of the employer sanctions provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 as a case study in white-collar crime. Using interviews with 103 “immigrant-dependent” employers in three southern California counties, the study reveals that employer sanctions violations are numerous and that violators feel relatively protected from detection and punishment. It then traces both the prevalence of this crime and the impunity felt by violators beyond a simple cost/benefit analysis on the part of employers to the nature of the law itself. The study shows how legislative and implementation processes produced a low-risk crime, indicating that the shape the law took from the beginning ensured that its effect would be primarily symbolic and that violations would be widespread. This pattern suggests that the symbolic nature of the law and subsequent violations are dialectically linked and that both stem from contradictions inherent in immigration lawmaking. The article concludes that lawmaking and lawbreaking, while analytically distinct processes, must be seen as connecting pieces of the same theoretical puzzle.

A legal impact study represents an attempt to ascertain how a particular law affects the conduct and attitudes of those individuals, groups or other relevant units located in jurisdictions where that law is in force. By its very nature such a study involves one essential comparison; the comparison between actual behavior patterns in jurisdictions having the law in question and the behavior patterns which would have existed in those same jurisdictions had the law in question never been enacted. Since this comparison is one which by definition cannot actually be made, the problem for the legal impact theorist is how to estimate best what the behavior patterns would have been in a certain jurisdiction had the law in question never existed there. The legislator or court seeking to determine the actual or probable effects of a law faces a similar problem.

This article examines the contextual factors driving legal mobilization of workers in the United States through an analysis of national origin discrimination charges under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (2000–2005). Consistent with previous studies, this analysis confirms that high unemployment levels and weak labor protections promote legal mobilization. The findings also highlight the positive role that civil society may play in promoting claims-making. I argue that nongovernmental organizations fill the gap in places where organized labor is weak, and may help support claims-making particularly in places with a larger vulnerable workforce. The article concludes by offering suggestions for a renewed sociolegal research agenda that examines the role of 501c(3) civil society organizations for the legal mobilization of an increasingly non-unionized and immigrant workforce.

Official and unofficial forms of social control are usually considered substitutable responses to individual acts of deviance. This analysis of the lynching and execution of blacks in North Carolina indicates that these two forms of social control, one official and the other unofficial, served not simply as substitutes, but also as complements during much of the latter part of the nineteenth century. Only after the disenfranchisement of the black population did the relationship between official and unofficial killing begin to imply substitution. This relationship, and its transformation following disenfranchisement, are more easily understood from a social conflict perspective than from an approach that emphasizes social control as a response to individual deviance. These results imply that future inquiries into relations among forms of social control might profit from an increased sensitivity to the dynamics of macrosocial conflict.

While Native American treaty rights are one of the strongest instances of legally protected rights to social and cultural particularity in the United States and internationally, treaties and treaty litigation are also deeply racializing forms of legal discourse. This essay explores the dynamics between law and culture in the United States and the contradictory role played by federal Indian law in the transformation of indigenous identities by examining a current treaty rights case: United States v. Oregon, Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Plaintiff-Intervenor. The essay sets the Colvilles' litigation into its historical and legal context through an analysis of the relationship between the group names, of legal and nonlegal origin, by which Colvilles identify themselves and about which this litigation is centrally concerned. The Colville Tribes have consistently layered their social identities onto a map of permanent places through intra- and intergenerational naming formulas that are used to establish identity and to negotiate historical change and colonization. Federal Indian law has consistently constructed identity in its naming of indigenous groups by decontextualizing and remapping identity to a fixed map of race. Thus, federal legal discourse precludes a consideration of the very aspects of Colville identity that are central to the recognition of the claims put forth in their current litigation.

Only a small fraction of the criminal cases in the United States are decided by adversary trial processes. The vast majority are settled by guilty pleas; many of these pleas occur after some form of plea bargaining — either explicit negotiations over the entry of a guilty plea in exchange for a reduced charge or a lenient sentence, or tacit bargaining, as when the defendant pleads guilty in anticipation of lenient sentencing. The most frequently cited reason for plea bargaining is administrative expediency or “its utility in disposing of large numbers of cases in a quick and simple way” (Enker, 1967: 112). While caseload pressures are doubtlessly important, they may be overemphasized in the current literature.' Frequently both the prosecutor and the defendant want to avoid a full jury trial because of the risk and uncertainty involved. The prosecutor is under administrative and/or political pressure not to lose his case; a negotiated plea of guilty, even if on a reduced charge, is a sure conviction, while conviction by trial is never certain. The defendant's risk at trial is that his sentence on conviction may be much stiffer than if he had pleaded guilty.

Through presentation of ethnographic research findings on court-appointed defense attorneys, this article examines plea bargaining as a component of a recursive process for deciding whether a case should be settled immediately or proceed further. The decisionmaking process has three types of activities: assessing the offer for a guilty plea, negotiating the terms of a plea bargain, and counseling the defendant and deciding on a course of action. Until a criminal case is actually settled either through a final plea agreement or a jury trial, this decisionmaking process occurs over and over again. Viewed as a component of this recursive process, plea bargaining encompasses multiple episodes of negotiating behavior as well as a wide range of formal litigation proceedings. Perhaps more important, plea bargaining and trial procedures can actually be seen to converge. I conclude that this mode of plea bargaining is not merely an effective method for representing defendants but perhaps equally or more effective than trial. Some important limitations of the findings are also discussed.

Political scientists now agree that the Supreme Court is a major institutional policy maker in the American political system. But they have done little to relate that conclusion to democratic theory. Nor have they bothered to draw the implications for structural reform of the Court that seem to flow from such a relationship. Specifically, we have been less concerned with holding Supreme Court justices accountable to those they govern than seeing to it that legislators and executives provide acceptable policies. Such a discrepancy becomes increasingly diffiult to justify as we dilute the traditional role distinctions between judicial and other policy making institutions of government.

Generally speaking, accountability is promoted through two devices. The first is access to the policy maker—i.e., the opportunity to be heard, to express oneself, to communicate one's preferences effectively to those whose policy actions are directly relevant. If these preferences are not sufficiently heeded, then we reserve the right to replace the incumbent with one who will provide greater satisfaction in that regard. For executives and legislators, free expression and frequent elections are appropriate means to insure accountability. But since Supreme Court justices are appointed for life (formally “good behavior,” but in fact for life), access to Court review becomes crucial.

Since most crimes investigated by police result from notification by victims, crime victims can be viewed as the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system. This paper describes the results of a series of studies which employed multiple methodologies to investigate the decisions of property crime victims to notify the police. The four methods used in this research included (a) an archival analysis of police records, (b) interviews with crime victims, (c) simulation studies using college students, and (d) experiments in a field laboratory. Two convergent findings emerged from the data. Social influence was found to be an important determinant of both the decision to call the police and the delay in such notification. If others advised the victim to call the police, the crime was more likely to be reported, but, ironically, the greater the number of people consulted, the longer the delay in reporting the crime. The second convergent finding was that situational factors played a stronger role in affecting delay in notification than did characteristics of the victim. Situational factors included the type of crime and the time of day when it was discovered, as well as the number of others talked to and the type of advice received from them. Several divergent findings across methods raised questions about the relative adequacy of each method for the problems being investigated, and helped identify sources of similarities and differences in the conceptual and operational definitions employed.

On the basis of a case study of a U.S. Attorney's office, I sketch differences in the prosecution of white-collar and common crime in order to draw out implications for equality in current proposals to reform plea bargaining. The extent to which the powers of investigation and prosecution are empirically distinct differs with the two categories of crime. Because of greater social distance between prosecutor and investigator in the enforcement of laws against common crimes, formal records give a misleading impression that legitimate prosecutorial power is being bargained away. Because there is relatively little social distance between the prosecutorial and investigative functions in the prosecution of white-collar crime, the formal record greatly underrepresents the exercise of the power not to prosecute. Reforms that would make bargaining over formal dispositions more consistent with legality or “due” process appear likely to discourage lenience in the prosecution of common crimes while leaving largely unaffected the low visibility exercise of the power not to prosecute white-collar crime.

Research concerning law and social change has almost always treated time as a universal constant and a baseline against which variations in behavior can be measured. Yet a significant literature exists demonstrating that researchers can also regard time as a socially constructed phenomenon requiring analytic interpretation in its own right. This article explores two aspects of the human experience of time that were especially important for the residents of a rural American community: the sense of time's iterative character and its linear or irreversible quality. These two ways of experiencing and conceptualizing time played a significant part in efforts by residents of Sander County, Illinois, to define their community and interpret the social, cultural, and economic transformations it was undergoing. They were also important in the residents' efforts to frame and define conflict within the community and to determine when law should or should not be invoked. The article examines some ways in which the analysis of varying conceptions of time within a community can enhance understanding of expectations, perceptions, and values concerning law in a changing society.

In this article, I analyze two cases where the Turkish Constitutional Court dissolved political parties during the 1990s. Specifically, I examine the cases against the Islamist Refah (Welfare/Well-Being) Party and the pro-Kurdish Halkin Emek Partisi (People's Labor Party). While the former was charged with threatening the secular basis of the national social order, the charges against the latter were around its allegedly separatist character. I engage in an in-depth analysis of the lines of argument in the indictments, arguments of defense deployed by the parties, and their ultimate contestations as they appeared in the final decisions by the Court. I see the Court as engaging with a medley of themes and tendencies, [trying to resolve them for the case at hand]. I argue that despite the differences in the construction of the alleged threats, in both cases the Court deployed a similar image of the ways in which social, political, and judicial terrains interact. A rather arbitrary boundary between the political and cultural domains informs these decisions. The Court operates with the understanding that once this boundary is transgressed, what may be harmless when an issue is cultural—such as the use of the headscarf or of the Kurdish language—may turn into a political symbol threatening the basis of the united, democratic, and progressive nation-state. In this vision, the concepts of democracy, progress, and unity are intimately tied together such that the threat to one of these concepts almost simultaneously constitutes a threat to the other two. The Court imagines itself as protecting the boundary between the political and cultural domains in an effort to uphold the right of a democracy to protect itself. This line of thought also enables the court's rather routine involvement in the political domain—which has brought about eighteen decisions for political party dissolution since 1980.

Although the Supreme Court repeatedly cautioned that youthfulness adversely affects juveniles' ability to exercise Miranda rights or make voluntary statements, it endorsed the adult waiver standard—knowing, intelligent, and voluntary—to gauge juveniles' Miranda waivers. By contrast, developmental psychologists question whether young people understand or possess the competence necessary to exercise Miranda rights. This article analyzes quantitative and qualitative data of interrogations of three hundred and seven (307) sixteen- and seventeen-year old youths charged with felony offenses. It reports how police secure Miranda waivers, the tactics they use to elicit information, and the evidence youths provide. The findings bear on three policy issues—procedural safeguards for youths, time limits for interrogations, and mandatory recording of interrogations.

We attempt to make sense of the law enforcement response to the savings and loan debacle and the larger pattern of white-collar crime enforcement of which it is a part. Drawing from government documents and in-depth interviews with federal regulators and enforcement officials, we argue that the current response to savings and loan fraud is unprecedented both in terms of the extensive resources committed and the prosecution of thousands of white-collar offenders. Pointing out that this at first seems inconsistent with the government's relative tolerance of corporate crime cited in other white-collar crime studies, we borrow from state theory to explain this “crackdown.” By bringing together two traditions that have usually remained distinct—white-collar crime research and state theory—this analysis may contribute both to a better understanding of the government response to white-collar crime and to a more empirically grounded approach to the state.

This paper asks what crime prevention looks like for residents in informal settlements in Khayelitsha, a black township on the outskirts of Cape Town. It engages with the idea of vigilantism and hybrid policing formations, analyzing the overlaps and intersections between legal community-based crime prevention initiatives, and local ‘punitive practices’. The focus is not on the intensely violent spectacle of ‘mob justice’, where suspects are killed, but on the more ubiquitous, hybrid formations that also fall on the vigilantism continuum. These include coercive practices such as banishment, corporal punishment, retrieval of stolen goods by local policing formations and, trials conducted by street committees. The core argument I make is that, at times, particularly in poor areas where the state is absent and encourages citizens to take responsibility for their own crime prevention, the boundary between legality and coercive illegality collapses in on itself. Thus, the notion of voluntarism, that is so important to official discourse on crime, is particularly problematic when applied in poor communities with high rates of unemployment and high crime rates. As such, the state's encouraging of citizens to take responsibility for their own safety, alongside a punitive state discourse on crime and criminality, creates the space for illegal vigilante style actions to emerge in the shadow of legal crime prevention initiatives.

This paper examines the hypothesis that litigants' perceived procedural justice is positively associated with their trust in judges. We argue that although this association might seem quite robust, it can vary across contexts. In particular, we suggest that the nature and magnitude of the association between procedural justice and trust in judges depends on outcome concerns, and other sociolegal moderators such as outcome importance and prior court experience. We tested our predictions in three different types of law cases among 483 litigants at court hearings of the district court of the Mid-Netherlands. As predicted, our results indicate that perceived procedural justice was positively associated with trust in judges when outcomes were relatively favorable, and that this association was even stronger when outcomes were relatively unfavorable. The courtroom context studied here enabled us to explore how other sociolegal variables moderated these relationships.

Each term 4,000 or more cases arrive at the doorstep of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court narrows the field of decision from all possible choices to a smaller set of the most plausible ones; in a typical term, the Conference places 20 to 30 percent (around 500) of the cases filed on its “discuss list,” only 150 or so of which will be selected for plenary review. Here we investigate the composition, sources, and implications of the Court's discuss list. What criteria do the justices use in creating the list of cases for discussion in conference? Do these criteria differ from those ultimately applied in the decision to grant or deny a writ of certiorari? What, if any, implications does the operation of the discuss list hold for the composition of the agenda and the outcome of decisions on the merits in the Supreme Court?

We test two chief sets of hypotheses: (1) the justices weigh the various formal and informal criteria differently across the two stages of agenda building, and (2) despite differences in weighting, the justices rely on briefs amicus curiae as well as ideological predispositions to help them both to identify logical candidates for discussion and to decide whether to grant certiorari. We explain the variation in the weighting of the criteria as being largely due to the cost and accuracy of information and the different risk of errors during the two phases of choice.

Using the case of adolescent fertility, we ask the questions of whether and when national laws have an effect on outcomes above and beyond the effects of international law and global organizing. To answer these questions, we utilize a fixed-effect time-series regression model to analyze the impact of minimum-age-of-marriage laws in 115 poor- and middle-income countries from 1989 to 2007. We find that countries with strict laws setting the minimum age of marriage at 18 experienced the most dramatic decline in rates of adolescent fertility. Trends in countries that set this age at 18 but allowed exceptions (for example, marriage with parental consent) were indistinguishable from countries that had no such minimum-age-of-marriage law. Thus, policies that adhere strictly to global norms are more likely to elicit desired outcomes. The article concludes with a discussion of what national law means in a diffuse global system where multiple actors and institutions make the independent effect of law difficult to identify.