We often ask why the Japanese are nonlitigious and look into the unique culture that may explain it. It is more appropriate to ask why Japan has maintained a complex industrialized society without much reliance on law. For the nonlitigious society does not come about spontaneously. Instead, it was made possible only by careful management. I elaborate this process of management through the detailed analysis of automobile accident compensation disputes in Japan.

Ever since coming under colonial rule, Africans in South Africa have operated informal courts which the state courts have not recognized. Using fieldwork data, we contrast two such nonstate judicial structures in Cape Town. We describe the street committees, constituted by the older generation as a subsidiary form of local government coexisting uncomfortably alongside formal apartheid authorities. We then show the explosive consequences of the development from 1985 of youth-run people's courts, which attempted to redefine community values. We conclude with a discussion of our findings in the context of existing theoretical work on informal justice and draw some tentative conclusions on possible developments in a post-apartheid era.

The Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Dutch Supreme Court), founded in 1838, has grown from an insignificant body to a politically important institution in Dutch society. Partisan politics, however, does not influence appointments of justices, although the formal procedure of appointments gives the lower house of Parliament ample opportunity to exercise such influence. This nonpolitical appointment to a highly politically active highest court is unique among highest courts in Western democracies. In this article, I examine the history of both the decisionmaking of the Court and the appointments of justices and suggest explanations for the disparity between the political role of the Court and the nonpolitical appointments. I also compare the Dutch exception to the practice of highest courts in other Western democracies, concluding that there is evidence that partisan political interference in appointments to the Dutch Supreme Court will grow in the future.

The image of courts as impartial and independent sources of authority is considered a prerequisite if they are to play a legitimizing role. Yet many studies suggest that courts systematically support and uphold state-sponsored policies. I ask how courts can support dominant political interests and at the same time appear impartial. A solution is suggested by looking at highly publicized judicial decisions by Israel's High Court of Justice in which state policies concerning the Israeli occupied territories were overruled. Such cases, while rare, nevertheless reinforce the legitimacy of courts. Consequently, decisions that counter some governmental practices allow courts to confer legitimacy on other and sometimes similar governmental policies. Finally, I place the findings in a comparative context and outline a possible explanation for the circumstances under which landmark decisions are reached.

Each term 4,000 or more cases arrive at the doorstep of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court narrows the field of decision from all possible choices to a smaller set of the most plausible ones; in a typical term, the Conference places 20 to 30 percent (around 500) of the cases filed on its “discuss list,” only 150 or so of which will be selected for plenary review. Here we investigate the composition, sources, and implications of the Court's discuss list. What criteria do the justices use in creating the list of cases for discussion in conference? Do these criteria differ from those ultimately applied in the decision to grant or deny a writ of certiorari? What, if any, implications does the operation of the discuss list hold for the composition of the agenda and the outcome of decisions on the merits in the Supreme Court?

We test two chief sets of hypotheses: (1) the justices weigh the various formal and informal criteria differently across the two stages of agenda building, and (2) despite differences in weighting, the justices rely on briefs amicus curiae as well as ideological predispositions to help them both to identify logical candidates for discussion and to decide whether to grant certiorari. We explain the variation in the weighting of the criteria as being largely due to the cost and accuracy of information and the different risk of errors during the two phases of choice.

We propose that significant others and conscience function as agents of social control in a manner similar to the State. All three pose possible threats or costs that are more or less certain and severe which actors take into account in considering whether or not to violate the law. State-imposed costs, which have been addressed in the literature on deterrence, are material deprivations in the form of fines and incarceration. Socially imposed costs are the embarrassment or loss of respect actors might experience when they violate norms which significant others support. Self-imposed costs are shame or guilt feelings which actors might impose upon themselves when they offend their own conscience by engaging in behaviors they consider morally wrong. The threats of shame and embarrassment, like the threat of legal sanctions, affect the expected utility of crime and, thus, the likelihood that crime will occur. In the research reported here, parallel measures are developed of the perceived threats of each of these three kinds of punishment for three illegal behaviors (tax cheating, petty theft, drunk driving). The effects of these perceived threats on people's intentions to violate the law are then examined in a random sample of adults. Threats of shame and of legal sanctions inhibit the inclination to commit each of the three offenses, but the findings for embarrassment appear less compatible with the expected utility model.