In four empirical studies, we showed that laypeople apply the ignorance of the law defense differently depending on the perceived morality of the defendant's course of conduct at the time of the illegal act. Moral and neutral defendants who pled ignorance of the law were afforded leniency, whereas immoral defendants were sentenced as though they were not ignorant, even when defendants in all three conditions violated identical laws. These findings suggest that laypeople adopt a just deserts approach to criminal law, which influences their responsiveness to a criminal defendant's claim to be ignorant of the law. We discuss the implications of these findings for criminal law and argue that legal doctrine should reflect laypeople's moral intuitions.

We explore the influential claim that “legal origin”—the historical origin of a given national legal system in the common law or civil law—accounts for a significant degree of cross-national diversity in economic regulation and development. We show that the claim is undermined by problems in index construction and by a misreading of the implications of the common law/civil law divide for the respective roles of courts and legislatures in law making. We argue that a critical factor, instead, was the timing of industrialization in relation to the emergence of legal institutions associated with the modern business enterprise (the employment relationship and the joint stock company). We also show how distinctive “legal cultures” of the common law and civil law have played a part in setting national systems on separate pathways to economic development.

Understanding the source of voting changes by appellate judges provides an important window into the factors that shape the votes of the judges more generally. We argue that membership changes, by altering the collegial context in which judges make their choices, affect the information environment, long-term collegial considerations, and short-term strategic calculations. As a result, membership change should lead to greater uncertainty and more frequent voting changes among continuing justices in the term following a replacement. We test this proposition by looking at vote change by justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in two separate analyses: justices' votes on search-and-seizure cases since Mapp v. Ohio (1961) and on the progeny of Miranda v. Arizona (1966). Our results support the argument that the collegial context helps explain changes in voting choices. Our analysis suggests that collegial considerations are an important component of judges' behavior and merit further evaluation in a cross-national context.

This article examines whether states shirked enforcement responsibilities in their principal-agent relationship with the federal government when implementing a delegated environmental program. It evaluates determinants of environmental enforcement stringency, particularly whether penalties were less when imposed by states than by the federal government. It analyzes 6,048 hazardous waste administrative penalties across 32 states and all U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Regions over 14 years. It finds that state penalties are typically substantially lower than federal penalties, and that penalty amounts are typically also related to the partisan composition of elected officials and the characteristics of enforcement actions, such as the type, seriousness, and number of violations. Factors such as the influence of organized interest groups, agency sensitivity to economic conditions or the economic importance of regulated industries, and environmentalist preferences of elected officials and the public are typically unrelated to enforcement stringency.