In an era of supposed judicial imperialism, the decline of judicial involvement in an important policy area raises questions about the dynamics of legal change. In the past thirty-five years, despite large increases in the volume of loans and delinquent debts, there has been a sharp decline in contested debt cases in state supreme courts and an apparent decline in trial courts as well. In seeking an explanation, this article concludes that for both creditors and debtors, litigation has become more costly in relation to alternative courses of action such as renegotiating payment terms, declaring bankruptcy, or writing off unpaid debts. The attractiveness of nonlitigational alternatives is attributed to (a) the “legal rationalization” of credit transactions by institutional lenders, (b) increased litigation costs stemming from enhanced debtors' rights, and most importantly, (c) “systemic stabilization”—welfare state measures, economic regulation, insurance arrangements, and market diversification that facilitates the attenuation and spreading of financial losses.

The growth of state interventionism, especially in the post-war era, has been associated with the proliferation of legal innovations. This paper examines the development of novel hybridizations of civil and criminal forms, developed largely to facilitate state regulation. Such hybrids, referred to here as civil offenses, combine civil proceedings, often referred to as prosecutions, with notions of convictions for which penalties are imposed. The advantages accruing to the state from such “ambiguous” forms include favorable standards of proof, rules of interpretation, extending responsibility, retroactivity, suspension of mens rea, and a wide array of novel sanctions.

Despite a number of valuable scholarly contributions made in recent years, we still lack a precise understanding of the determinants of voter choice in low salience nonpartisan judicial elections. Utilizing a multivariate technique that controls for the varying numbers of candidates frequently found in judicial elections, this analysis examines the contributions of incumbency, occupational ballot labels, campaign spending, newspaper and bar association endorsements, voter information pamphlets, and the ethnic and sexual voting cues provided by candidate surnames to the outcomes of the 123 contested primary and run-off elections held for California's major trial court from 1976 to 1980.

The results suggest that the determinants of voter choice are quite different in the relatively well-publicized run-off elections than they are in the low visibility primary races. Additionally, judicial voters in the less populated California counties were found to rely upon different guides to voting than voters in California's metropolitan counties. The reasons for and implications of these differences are explored.

Data from 300 homicides involving an aggravating felony were examined to determine what factors influence the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty. It was found that the race of the victim was significantly related to the decision to seek the death penalty even when several legally relevant factors were taken into account. The data also revealed that black killers of whites were more likely and black killers of blacks less likely to have the death penalty requested. A breakdown of homicides into those involving a single aggravating felony and those involving multiple felonies revealed that racial effects were stronger in the former category. There was some evidence that this difference in the effects of race reflected a different threshold of tolerance for white and black murders. Black victim homicides resulted in a death request only when they crossed a threshold of aggravation that was higher than that found for white deaths.

In this paper, we examine factors that affect whether the police are summoned to incidents of spousal violence. The actions of bystanders are distinguished from the actions of victims, and we find that victims and bystanders are moved by somewhat different influences. We also find that the immediate features of the situation dominate the decision to call the police and that many legitimate concerns are salient (e.g., whether there are injuries). In addition, however, some extralegal influences are important so that different offenders engaged in the same crime do not necessarily face the same risks of apprehension. For example, other things equal, bystanders are less likely to call the police if the offender and victim are living together.