In explaining crime, some criminological theories emphasize time-stable individual differences in propensity to offend while others emphasize more proximate and situational factors. Using scenario data from a sample of college undergraduates we have found evidence to support both positions. A measure of criminal propensity (poor self-control) was found to be significantly related to self-reported decisions to commit three offenses (drunk driving, theft, and sexual assault). Even after considering differences in self-control, there was evidence to suggest that the attractiveness of the crime target, the ease of committing the crime with minimum risk, and perceptions of the costs and benefits of committing the crime were all significantly related to offending decisions. Our results suggest that theories of criminal offending should include notions pertaining to persistent individual differences in criminal propensity and choice-relevant variables.

Many employers create internal procedures for the resolution of discrimination complaints. We examine internal complaint handlers' conceptions of civil rights law and the implications of those conceptions for their approach to dispute resolution. Drawing on interview data, we find that complaint handlers tend to subsume legal rights under managerial interests. They construct civil rights law as a diffuse standard of fairness, consistent with general norms of good management. Although they seek to resolve complaints to restore smooth employment relations, they tend to recast discrimination claims as typical managerial problems. While the assimilation of law into the management realm may extend the reach of law, it may also undermine legal rights by deemphasizing and depoliticizing workplace discrimination.

In 1983, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were modified to mandate sanctions against attorneys who filed frivolous pleadings or motions or who failed to make reasonable efforts to verify facts or statements of law made in pleadings or motions. There is substantial variation among federal judicial districts in the use of this Rule 11 provision. To what degree can these variations be explained by situational or legal factors? Does one need to use a concept such as local legal culture to account for at least some of the variation? These are the questions addressed by this article. We find that variations in most Rule 11-related activities can be explained by structural and situational factors. We conclude that beyond the expectations created by specific structural and legal factors, one does not need to resort to local legal culture to explain Rule 11-related phenomena. We suggest that the conditions that make local legal culture a useful construct in the context of the criminal courts may not apply in the civil justice system.

Using insights from poststructuralist literary theories, writings on ideology, and theories of practice, this article develops an interpretive perspective on political tolerance for nonconformity. Viewing Supreme Court expression doctrine as ideology, it suggests that legal discourse, in combination with intersecting social, political, and scientific discourses, socially constructs political difference and constitutes a political spectrum. Research indicating differences in tolerance between elites and the public is interpreted as arising from dual ideological strands within legal discourse that are appropriated depending on one's location in social relations. The theoretical approach is used to situate law and legal institutions in American culture and extend previous work on legal doctrine as ideology emerging from the Critical Legal Studies movement.

Tyler and Rasinski (1991) challenge Gibson's (1989) contention that perceptions of procedural justice do not influence citizens' compliance with unpopular Supreme Court rulings. Noting a significant correlation between procedural justice and institutional legitimacy, Tyler and Rasinski argue that perceptions of procedural justice exert indirect influence on compliance. In response, Gibson (1991) questions Tyler and Rasinski's interpretation of the causal relationship linking institutional legitimacy and perceptions of procedural justice. Although both sides in this dispute offer persuasive discussion, neither can advance conclusive empirical evidence regarding the question of causality. This note presents a reexamination of the relationship between institutional legitimacy and procedural justice, with data drawn from an experiment designed specifically to address the question of causality. Results do not enable conclusive assessment of the Gibson hypothesis. However, in contrast to the Tyler-Rasinski hypothesis, no evidence is found supporting the contention that perceptions of procedural justice influence perceptions of institutional legitimacy.