A good deal of scholarly evidence suggests that the decisionmaking of the U.S. Supreme Court is affected by legal argument. At the same time, it seems clear that in a great many cases the justices have enduring, strongly held views. In such cases, they should be impervious to the effects of advocacy. When are the justices apt to be influenced by the Court's legal community, and when will lawyers be less relevant? The answer, we think, has to do with the salience of the issue before the Court. We suspect that in nonsalient cases the justices have less-intense preferences and therefore are open to the persuasion of lawyers. In salient cases, by contrast, the content of legal policy matters much more to the justices. As a result, they are less amenable to legal argument and adhere more strictly to their personal policy preferences. Our empirical tests support this orientation.

This article examines the impact of lawyer capability on the decisionmaking of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). Extending prior attorney capability studies of U.S. judicial decisionmaking, we test three lawyer variables: prior litigation experience, litigation team size, and Queen's Counsel designation. We find that the first two variables have a statistically significant and positive relationship with the SCC's decisions in non-reference-question cases from 1988 to 2000. Moreover, this relationship persists even after controlling for party capability, issue area, and judicial policy preferences.

In 1993, the Cuban government significantly expanded the scope of legal self-employment on the island. The change has not been uncontroversial, and cuentapropistas have frequently been held up, both in Cuba and in the United States, as the symbol of Cuba's transition to a free-market economy. In framing cuentapropistas as the vanguards of capitalism, observers have adopted a concept of “transition” which is both rigidly ideological and teleological. This article argues that by employing a sociolegal approach toward cuentapropismo—examining close-up not only the Cuban government's regulation of self-employment, but also how the operation of law is mediated through cuentapropistas' own self-perceptions—we can develop a richer and more complex understanding of transitional periods. Rather than conceptualizing “transition” as a straight line from communism to capitalism, a sociolegal analysis draws attention to the complex relationship between law, identity, and work in the renegotiation of citizenship, and the constitutive role that evolving conceptions of citizenship may have for the shape and character of a transitional period.

This article reconsiders the conventional wisdom that the Supreme Court definitively abandoned the freedmen to their former masters through the “state action” decisions of the 1870s and 1880s. Arguing that anachronisms distort our understanding of this critical period, I offer an historical institutional analysis of state action doctrine by recovering the legal categories, assumptions, and distinctions that constituted judicial discourse about the state action rule. Showing that federal power to protect blacks was more intact than scholars realize, I also add a perspective from the sociology of knowledge. By examining a series of modern developments that erased the contexts of the state action decisions, I show how institutional practices gave rise to the anachronisms that this article seeks to correct.

Although tensions between substantive and formal rationality in the adult criminal justice system have received a great deal of attention, the existence of these tensions in the juvenile justice system has received little scholarly consideration. I seek to remedy this gap by exploring how punitive policies associated with the war on crime impact the formal and informal process of justice, the court community and work group, and the exercise of discretion in the juvenile courts. Drawing on qualitative data collected in three juvenile courts in Southern California, I identify the mechanisms by which prosecutors divert judicial discretion from the traditional rehabilitation-oriented bench officers to bench officers who are more accepting of the criminalization of juveniles. In addition, I investigate how and why rehabilitation-oriented bench officers at times abdicate their decisionmaking authority and make rulings that contradict their own assessments. My findings suggest that as the war on crime is extended to youth, the juvenile courts increasingly share the criminal courts' emphasis on offense rather than offender, enhanced prosecutorial power, and adversarial relationships within the court.

In rendering a decision in a particular case, judges are not limited to finding simply for the appellant or for the respondent. Rather, in many cases, they have the option to find for the former on one or more issues and for the latter on one or more other issues. By thus “splitting the difference,” judges can render a judgment that favors both litigants to some degree. What accounts for such mixed outcomes? Several theoretical perspectives provide potential explanations for this phenomenon. First, Galanter (1974) suggests that litigants with greater resources will achieve more favorable outcomes in the courts. Where two high-resource, repeat-player litigants meet in the appeals courts, these more sophisticated and successful parties may be able to persuade the court to render decisions with mixed outcomes that at least partially favor each party. Second, split outcomes may result from strategic interactions among the appeals court judges on the decisionmaking panel. Where majority opinion writers seek to accommodate other judges on the panel, split outcomes have the potential to serve as an inducement for more ideologically extreme judges to join the majority opinion. Finally, Shapiro and Stone Sweet (Stone Sweet 2000; Shapiro & Stone Sweet 2002) propose that courts will sometimes split the difference in order to enhance their legitimacy (and ultimately enhance compliance by losing parties). For example, in highly salient cases, where noncompliance would more clearly threaten court legitimacy, judges may be more likely to split the difference in order to mollify even the losing party. We develop an empirical model of mixed outcomes to test these propositions using data available from the U. S. Courts of Appeals Database and find evidence supportive of all three theoretical perspectives.

A key concern within democracies is effectively regulating the behavior of societies' agents of social control, who have coercive power and considerable discretion over their use of that power. This can result in failures to adhere to the rules, policies, and laws dictating appropriate and lawful behavior. This article explores the effectiveness of motivating rule adherence among law enforcement officers and soldiers by focusing upon whether they believe that organizational authorities are legitimate or that rules and policies are morally right or wrong. The results suggest that both values have an important influence upon rule adherence. Further, aspects of organizational culture that encourage such values are identified and shown to be influential in this setting. Results show that the procedural justice of the organization is central to rule adherence. These findings support the argument that encouraging self-regulation via appeals to the values of law enforcement officers and soldiers is a viable strategy for minimizing misconduct, and they suggest how to effectively implement such approaches.