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Quantifying Burdens of Proof

A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2024

Rita James Simon  and
Linda Mahan
Rita James Simon
Affiliation:
University of Illinois
Linda Mahan
Affiliation:
University of Illinois
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This paper is the third in a series of articles describing the results of efforts to investigate ways in which the burdens of proof applicable in criminal and civil trials could be defined more precisely and more objectively. The burden of proof for determining guilt in criminal trials in American courts is the presentation of evidence which would lead “a reasonable man” to believe “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the defendant did indeed commit the act for which he was charged. This standard is applicable to all criminal acts irrespective of their heinousness or the circumstances under which they were committed. In civil actions the burden of proof necessary for determining negligence on the part of the defendant is “by preponderance of the evidence.”

Type
Research Article
Information
Law & Society Review , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , February 1971 , pp. 319 - 330
Copyright
Copyright © 1971 The Law and Society Association.

Footnotes

AUTHORS' NOTE: Funds for this research were obtained from the National Institute of Mental Health (Grant USPH, MH 15780). Several years ago, the husband of one of the authors suggested to her that she investigate how juries, judges, and other groups translate burdens of proof into probability estimates. This paper is one of several that resulted from his suggestion.

References

SIMON, R. J. (forthcoming) “Judges' translations of burdens of proof into statements of probability.” Trial Lawyers's Guide.Google Scholar
SIMON, R. J. (1970) “Beyond a reasonable doubt.” J. of Applied Behavioral Sci. 6 (April-June): 203–209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar