In Donald Black's Moral Time (2011), the key concept—social time—is akin to the holy grail of conflict theory. Social time explains all conflict, causes all conflict, and is ever-present. The concept of social time, as the dynamic dimension of social space is formulated in terms of fluctuations in/of relational, vertical, and cultural dimensions. Although Black's analysis of conflict is confined to a micro realm, as his examples focus on conflict between individuals, social time is presented as a grand theory of conflict.
While Donald Black's Moral Time is a thought-provoking piece of scholarship, the strengths of this work are overshadowed by some serious shortcomings. These include failing to engage in conversation with other conflict scholars, methodological concerns, and an inability to test the theory that is presented. These issues take root in the frequent use of ambiguous concepts and terms.
Black states that “social time is moral time” (emphasis in original) and that “social time is likewise inseparable from social space” (pp. 3–5). The implication here is that social time, moral time, and social space are synonymous, and Black uses the terms interchangeably throughout the book. Yet, these terms are only defined in relation to each other. Defining these terms as one another does not help the reader understand the differences—if any—between these terms. Similarly, further explanation is needed in regards to the relationship between morality and conflict. By titling the book Moral Time and aiming to provide a grand theory of conflict, Black suggests that conflict and morality are interrelated, yet never explicitly says this or explains why the two concepts should be considered as such.
In addition to inadequately defining key concepts, this piece ignores variables that are particularly important for understanding conflict; notably, power. This suggests that Moral Time is not in conversation with other conflict theorists. For example, Black contends that rape is a “drastic movement of relational time, a radical and rapid increase of intimacy: sexual intercourse without consent. It is overintimacy” (2011, p. 7). However, the notion of “overintimacy” does not consider the feminist literature which examines rape as a way to exert “power, control, domination, and violence” (Reference PalmerPalmer 1988, p. 515). Thus, rape is more than being too intimate with someone; it is a means of exercising power and domination over someone else. Moral Time makes no reference to the vast literature on rape nor expands on the notion that rape, by definition, is involuntary (Black 2011, p. 25), which implies a dominating and a dominated party, and thus, a power imbalance. A discussion of why rape should be considered a crime of intimacy rather than power would bolster Black's argument, especially if he confronts literature that counters his arguments.
A consideration of power relationships is also needed in discussing delinquency and discrimination. Moral Time speaks of juvenile delinquency as a “movement of vertical time” (p. 75) and discrimination as a result of overdiversity (pp. 108–109); however, this method of explaining conflict ignores differences in material conditions, such as resources, as well as how power relationships impact conflict. For instance, Black could utilize Reference AgnewAgnew's (1992) general strain theory in addressing juvenile delinquency and the literature on white flight in the discussion of discrimination. These additions would allow for a discussion of power that would strengthen Moral Time and would help the reader navigate Black's argument more efficiently.
Methodologically, Moral Time offers a bivariate analysis—“one thing varies with another”—which is fairly rudimentary. Multivariate ideas are mentioned, but a third variable is never introduced. Conflict is always too much or too little of one dimension (relational, vertical, or cultural) at any given point in time, but Moral Time never examines combinations of factors; for instance, too much diversity combined with too much stratification. Such an analysis would be complex but would strengthen this work. Moreover, Moral Time presents everything as a zero-sum game – either total acceptance or total rejection. For example, Black states that, “I cannot be both a believer and an atheist or a Christian and a Jew” (p. 120). Despite this insinuation, there are people who self-identify as both irreligious and as belonging to a religion—e.g., “I am a non-practicing Catholic.” Contrary to the assumptions inherent in Moral Time, the world does not operate as a purely binary system, with only polar opposites existing.
Finally, Moral Time offers no methodology or way to measure key concepts. In the preface, Black writes, “The purpose of the theory of moral time is scientific: to explain conflict” (p. xii). For something to be scientific, it must be falsifiable. Moral Time offers a novel way of examining conflict, but is not a theory in and of itself. We are given no way of measuring, operationalizing, or testing the key concepts. As it stands, one cannot test the theory of Moral Time due to the aforementioned issues. While Black's intentions are admirable, this work falls short of the threshold for being a truly scientific theory.
