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Legislating Organizational Probation: State Capacity, Business Power, and Corporate Crime Control
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 April 2024
Abstract
This study examines the development of organizational probation. That this sanction emerged from the long process of developing organizational sentencing guidelines as a clearly specified, widely available, and often binding sanction represents an unexpected statutory outcome: an interventionist, nonmarket sanction during a time of deregulatory free market policy and ideology. This outcome is explained through a multi-theoretical framework emphasizing the structural capacity of the primary lawmaking agency, the United States Sentencing Commission, the role of middle-level state workers, and the bounded rationality of strategic decisions made by business strategists and lobbyists.
- Type
- The Production of Law in Dictatorship and Democracy
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1993 by The Law and Society Association
Footnotes
An earlier version of this article was presented at the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Annual Meetings, Pittsburgh, March 1992. I thank Valerie Hans, Gerry Turkel, Dave Ermann, Pan Hao, Gilbert Geis, and several anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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