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Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in Washington
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2024
Abstract
Despite the widespread perception that lawyers exercise considerable influence over national policy making in the United States, their participation in the process has previously received little systematic empirical analysis. Based on a variety of evidence gathered in interviews with more than eight hundred Washington representatives, including data on their work, careers, contacts with government agencies, networks of acquaintance, and relationships with clients, we argue that lawyers are not as prevalent, active, or influential in national policy making as the popular image suggests. Rather, the findings indicate that lawyers occupy a relatively specialized niche in the system of interest representation, one that allows them to command substantial economic rewards and to maintain a measure of independence and autonomy in their work, but that limits their influence in policy formation.
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- Copyright © 1988 by The Law and Society Association
Footnotes
This research was supported by grants from the American Bar Foundation and the National Science Foundation's Panels on Sociology and on Law and Social Sciences, Grant SES-8320275. We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Tony Tarn, who performed most of the statistical analyses contained here, as well as the valuable research assistance of Marilyn Krogh, Andrew Shapiro, Frank Iaffaldano, and James Curtin. Several colleagues and friends provided helpful comments on earlier drafts: Richard Abel, Robert Bell, Jonathan Casper, John Chubb, Richard Danzig, Kermit Hall, Mark Hansen, Herbert Jacob, Laura Kalman, Thomas Merrill, Michael Powell, Susan Shapiro, Wesley Skogan, Arthur Stinchcombe, and two anonymous reviewers.
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