Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 April 2024
Despite the great varieties of imperial relationships, most scholarship has focused on law as an instrument of imperial domination. This article invites greater attention to the motives and actions of the subject population. In the Middle East, the pattern of legal change suggests that imperial control affected the outcome of elite efforts but did not supplant them. In Egypt, legal reform was largely the fruit of efforts undertaken by a centralizing elite that sought to circumscribe foreign influence even when it collaborated with it. This elite used law to preempt imperial penetration and strengthen the administrative capacity of the Egyptian state. The Egyptian population subject to the new legal system shaped its development still further.
I thank Judith Kohn Brown, Dina Khoury, the editors, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful advice. This research was supported with grants from The George Washington University Facilitating Fund and the United States Institute of Peace. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of GWU or the USIP.