Hostname: page-component-669899f699-g7b4s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-05-04T00:42:46.059Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Influence of Congressional Preferences on Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Alicia Uribe ,
James F. Spriggs II  and
Thomas G. Hansford
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Studies of Court–Congress relations assume that Congress overrides Court decisions based on legislative preferences, but no empirical evidence supports this claim. Our first goal is to show that Congress is more likely to pass override legislation the further ideologically removed a decision is from pivotal legislative actors. Second, we seek to determine whether Congress rationally anticipates Court rejection of override legislation, avoiding legislation when the current Court is likely to strike it down. Third, most studies argue that Congress only overrides statutory decisions. We contend that Congress has an incentive to override all Court decisions with which it disagrees, regardless of their legal basis. Using data on congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions between 1946 and 1990, we show that Congress overrides Court decisions with which it ideologically disagrees, is not less likely to override when it anticipates that the Court will reject override legislation, and acts on preferences regardless of the legal basis of a decision. We therefore empirically substantiate a core part of separation-of-powers models of Court–Congress relations, as well as speak to the relative power of Congress and the Court on the ultimate content of policy.

Type
Articles
Information
Law & Society Review , Volume 48 , Issue 4 , December 2014 , pp. 921 - 945
Copyright
© 2014 Law and Society Association.

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

We presented a previous version of this paper at the 2013 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, April 11–14, 2013, Chicago, IL. We thank Eve Ringquist and Nate Monroe for helpful comments. Research assistance was provided by Ben Goodhue, Adam Kook, Chris Nanamura, Coell Simmons, Madison Simmons, and Anthony Valenti. Hansford recognizes funding from a UC Merced Academic Senate Faculty Research Grant. Spriggs recognizes funding from the National Science Foundation (Law and Social Science, SES-0550451).

References

Aldrich, John H., & Rohde, David W. (2000) “The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee,” 62 J. of Politics 1–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arnold, R. Douglas (1990) The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.Google Scholar
Baumgartner, Frank R., & Jones, Bryan D. (2013) “Congressional Hearings Policy Agendas Project,” Policy Agendas Project. Available at: http://www.policyagendas.org/page/datasets-codebooks#congressional_hearings (accessed 30 March 2013).Google Scholar
Black, Ryan C., & Spriggs, James F. II (2008) “An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions,” 45 Houston Law Rev. 621–82.Google Scholar
Black, Ryan C., & Spriggs, James F. II (2013) “The Citation and Depreciation of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent,” 10 J. of Empirical Legal Studies 325–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blackstone, Bethany (2013) “An Analysis of Policy-Based Congressional Responses to the US Supreme Court's Constitutional Decisions,” 47 Law & Society Rev. 199–228.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., & Jones, Brad S. (2004) Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists. New York, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caldeira, Gregory A., & Gibson, James L. (1992) “The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court,” 36 American J. of Political Science 635–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carrubba, Cliff, et al. (2011) “Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions,” 56 American J. of Political Science 400–12.Google Scholar
Chutkow, Dawn M. (2008) “Jurisdiction Stripping: Litigation, Ideology, and Congressional Control of the Courts,” 70 J. of Politics 1053–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, John A., & McGuire, Kevin T. (1996) “Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Flag,” 49 Political Research Q. 771–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, Tom S. (2011) The Limits of Judicial Independence. New York, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press.Google Scholar
Clausen, Aage R. (1973) How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus. New York: St. Martin's.Google Scholar
Cox, Gary W., & McCubbins, Mathew D. (2005) Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, Gary W., & McCubbins, Mathew D. (2007) Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Curry, Brett. (2007) “Institutions, Interests, and Judicial Outcomes: The Politics of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction,” 60 Political Research Q. 454–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dahl, Robert A. (1957) “Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policymaker,” 6 J. of Public Law 279–95.Google Scholar
Dickerson v. U.S. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).Google Scholar
Epstein, Lee, & Knight, Jack (1998) The Choices Justice Make. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.Google Scholar
Epstein, Lee, Knight, Jack, & Martin, Andrew D. (2001) “The Supreme Court as Strategic National Policymaker,” 50 Emory Law J. 583–612.Google Scholar
Epstein, Lee, Segal, Jeffrey A., & Victor, Jennifer Nicoll (2002) “Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment,” 39 Harvard J. on Legislation 395–433.Google Scholar
Epstein, Lee, et al. (2007) “The Judicial Common Space,” 23 J. of Law, Economics, and Organization 303–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eskridge, William N. Jr (1991a) “Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,” 101 The Yale Law J. 31–455.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eskridge, William N. Jr (1991b) “Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game,” 79 California Law Rev. 613–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fenno, Richard F. (1973) Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Fisher, Louis (1998) Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.Google Scholar
Fowler, James H., et al. (2007) “Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court,” 5 Political Analysis 324–46.Google Scholar
Friedman, Barry (2009) The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution. Farrar Straus & Giroux.Google Scholar
Gely, Rafael, & Spiller, Pablo T. (1990) “A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Decision Making with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases,” 6 J. of Law, Economics, and Organization 263–300.Google Scholar
Gibson, James L., & Caldeira, Gregory A. (2011) “Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?” 45 Law & Society Rev. 195–219.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibson, James L., Caldeira, Gregory A., & Spence, Lester Kenyatta (2003) “The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?” 33 British J. of Political Science 535–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansford, Thomas G., & Damore, David F. (2000) “Congressional Preferences, Perceptions of Threat, and Supreme Court Decision Making,” 28 American Politics Q. 490–510.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansford, Thomas G., & Spriggs, James F. II (2006) The Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harvey, Anna, & Friedman, Barry (2009) “Ducking Trouble: Congressionally Induced Selection Bias in the Supreme Court's Agenda,” 71 J. of Politics 574–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hausegger, Lori, & Baum, Lawrence (1999) “Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation,” 43 American J. of Political Science 62–185.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henschen, Beth. (1983) “Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressional Response,” 11 American Politics Research 441–58.Google Scholar
Hettinger, Virginia A., & Zorn, Christopher (2005) “Explaining the Incidence and Timing of Congressional Responses to the US Supreme Court,” 30 Legislative Studies Q. 5–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ignagni, Joseph, & Meernik, James (1994) “Explaining Congressional Attempts to Reverse Supreme Court Decisions,” 47 Political Research Q. 353–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ignagni, Joseph, Meernik, James, & Lynn King, Kimi (1998) “Statutory Construction and Congressional Response,” 26 American Politics Research 459–84.Google Scholar
Johnson, Timothy R., & Roberts, Jason M. (2005) “Pivotal Politics, Presidential Capital, and Supreme Court Nominations.” Congress and the Presidency 32(1):31–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
King, Chad. (2007) “Strategic Selection of Legal Instruments on the U.S. Supreme Court,” 35 American Politics Research 621–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
King, Gary, Tomz, Michael, & Wittenberg, Jason (2000) “Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation,” 44 American J. of Political Science 341–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith. (1991) Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith. (1998) Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Langer, Laura, & Brace, Paul (2005) “The Preemptive Power of State Supreme Courts: Adoption of Abortion and Death Penalty Legislation,” 33 Policy Studies J. 317–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lawrence, Eric D., Maltzman, Forrest, & Smith, Steven S. (2006) “Who Wins: Party Effects in Legislative Voting.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 31(Feb.):33–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, Andrew D. (2001) “Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers,” 95 American Political Science Rev. 361–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayhew, David R. (1974) Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.Google Scholar
Meernik, James, & Ignagni, Joseph (1995) “Congressional Attacks on Supreme Court Rulings Involving Unconstitutional State Laws,” 48 Political Research Q. 43–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meernik, James, & Ignagni, Joseph (1997) “Judicial Review and Coordinate Construction of the Constitution,” 41 American J. of Political Science 447–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Owens, Ryan J. (2010) “The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting,” 54 American J. of Political Science 412–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pickerill, J. Mitchell. (2004) Constitutional Deliberation in Congress. Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press.Google Scholar
Poole, Keith T. (1989) “Estimating a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales,” 42 American J. of Political Science 954–93.Google Scholar
Poole, Keith T., & Rosenthal, Howard (2007) Ideology and Congress. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.Google Scholar
Rogers, James R. (2001) “Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction,” 45 American J. of Political Science 84–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rogers, James R., & Vanberg, Georg (2002) “Judicial Advisory Opinions and Legislative Outcomes in Comparative Perspective,” 46 American J. of Political Science 379–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sala, Brian R., & Spriggs, James F. II (2004) “Designing Tests of the Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers,” 57 Political Research Q. 197–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Segal, Jeffrey A. (1997) “Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts,” 91 American Political Science Rev. 28–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Segal, Jeffrey A., Westerland, Chad, & Lindquist, Stefanie A. (2011) “Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model,” 55 American J. of Political Science 89–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shipan, Charles R. (1997) Designing Judicial Review: Interest Groups, Congress, and Communications Policy. Ann Arbor, MI: Univ. of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Spaeth, Harold J., et al. (2012) The Supreme Court Database. Available at: http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php (accessed 15 Sep 2014).Google Scholar
Spiller, Pablo T., & Gely, Rafael (1992) “Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988,” 23 RAND J. of Economics 463–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Staudt, Nancy, Lindstadt, Rene, & O'Connor, Jason (2007) “Judicial Decisions as Legislation: Congressional Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954-2005,” 82 New York University Law Rev. 1340–402.Google Scholar
Stone, Alec. (1992) The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.Google Scholar
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Toma, Euguenia Froedge (1991) “Congressional Influence and the Supreme Court: The Budget as a Signaling Device,” 20 The J. of Legal Studies 131–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
U.S. v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).Google Scholar
Vanberg, Georg. (2000) “Establishing Judicial Independence in West Germany: The Impact of Opinion Leadership and the Separation of Powers,” 32 Comparative Politics 333–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vanberg, Georg. (2001) “Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review,” 45 American J. of Political Science 346–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vanberg, Georg. (2005) The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.Google Scholar