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Family Gatherings and a Dirty Little Secret of the Law and Society Association

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2024

Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt
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Whenever I attend a Law and Society Association function, I get the image of a family gathering. Whether it is the annual meeting, or a “birthday” celebration such as this symposium commemorating the 25th anniversary of Marc Galanter's classic work “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead” (Galanter 1974), the occasions always take on an air of kinship, with people engaging their academic forebears, siblings, and progeny in discussions about their latest projects. Although the family embraces many diverse lineages, clearly the black sheep of the family are the economists. The few brave economists who dare to attend can usually be found off in a group, amusing themselves with some recent empirical work or the latest development in game theory. In presenting our work on panels, we are often (but not always) met with polite silence or with questions asking us to defend some part of Richard Posner's work, even if our own work is critical of the traditional economic analysis of law. Occasionally at one of these family gatherings, someone even presents a paper that suggests it might be dangerous to associate with economists (Rostain 1998).

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Information
Law & Society Review , Volume 33 , Issue 4: Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead? , 1999 , pp. 1081 - 1087
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Law and Society Association

Footnotes

I would like to thank the organizers of this symposium for inviting me to comment on the presented papers. I would also like to thank Jeffrey Stake and Lynne Henderson for comments on this comment.

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