Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2024
Much of the judicial process literature assumes that appellate courts routinely publish all decisions they make. In fact, even with the proliferation of case law in the United States, since the 1970s many appeals court decisions have not been published. In England, however, selective publication of appellate decisions has always been an integral part of how courts interact with the broader legal and political system. This article explores some theoretical implications of selective reporting of appellate decisions within common law systems that rely on the published appellate ruling as a primary mechanism of communication between courts and the broader legal and political environments. The focus is on how appellate decisions are selected for publication, especially in the English Court of Appeal. The author proposes an empirical model that conceptualizes reporting as a communications process. He hypothesizes that the basis of selection can be viewed in the context of a cue theory that dichotomizes the communication of passive and dynamic cues between senders in the Court of Appeal and receivers within the community of law reporters.
This article is a revision of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 13–15 April 1989. The research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-86-7878) and by grants from the Florida State University Foundation. I wish to thank Florida State University for extending to me the use of its facilities at its London Study Center. I would like to express gratitude to Mr. Stuart Cole, Chief Librarian of the Supreme Court Library at the Royal Courts of Justice when the data in this paper were being assembled, for allowing me access to, and use of, the Library's materials and facilities. Mr. Cole proved to be very patient in answering my many questions about the Court of Appeal and the transcripts of its judgments. I must also acknowledge that the many hours Mr. Gavin Drewry, Professor of Public Administration, University of London, spent with me discussing the English legal system helped immeasurably in the conceptualization and execution of the project. Mr. Peter Ruckman served admirably as my research assistant through much of this project. Neither he, nor Messrs. Cole and Drewry, of course, bear responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation that I may have committed. I also wish to thank Shari Diamond and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.