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Critique of Habermas's Contribution to the Sociology of Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2024

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In his discussion of modern society, Habermas begins with Weber's thesis of a universal rationalization process within which the rationalization of law plays a central part. Thus his starting point is the classical thesis of the formal rationalization of law as advanced by Weber (1960; Schluchter, 1979). Habermas tries to show that Weber's theorizing is deficient because he underestimates the specific historical role of the materialization of law (1981, Vol. 1: 332). Additionally, such theorizing does not allow us an adequate grasp of some recent developments that proceduralize law (Teubner, 1983, 1984; Eder, 1986). From the perspective of Weber's theory of formal rationalization, the processes that materialize and proceduralize law appear to be aberrations from the normal path of modern legal development. Habermas suggests that, far from being deficient, these processes are necessary forms of law in the process of modernization. The appearance of deficiency proceeds from Weber's attempt to separate morality from law and to conceptualize a moral-free law, a corollary of Weber's plea for a value-free science. Habermas concludes that formal rationalization is an inadequate model of law operating in the modern welfare state. Thus a new model is in order.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1988 The Law and Society Association.

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