This article brings the state into constitutional theory by presenting a theory of the development of the American state from the late 19th century to the present. The focus of the theory is the ability of the national state to exercise sovereignty or public authority over civil society. The main thesis is that the Constitution did not establish a government with a level of public authority adequate to the requirements of a modem democratic state. The result was a mismatch between the demands of civil society and the competence of state institutions, causing a reorganization of the political institutions of civil society in the early 20th century and a crisis of public authority in the 1960s. The United States continues to experience the consequences of an imbalance between the state institutions established by an 18th-century constitution and 20th-century democratic politics.

For most of the 19th century, the labor movements of England and America seemed to be developing along similar lines. Then, in the decades around the turn of the century, both movements were embroiled in a common battle over the political soul of trade unionism. In England, the champions of broad, class-based social and industrial reforms prevailed. In the United States, they lost, and the winners were the voluntarists, who held that labor should steer clear of politics as much as possible. This article suggests that the key reasons for the divergence lie not in the sociology of the working class or labor movement, so much as in the character of the state and polity and the lessons trade unionists drew from experiences in those arenas. The difference between judicial supremacy in the United States and parliamentary supremacy in England combined with other differences in the two nations’ forms of government to produce sharply contrasting lessons about the value of state-based reforms.

Among legal scholars, Anthony T. Kronman and David M. Trubek have provided the leading interpretations of Weber's theory of law. Kronman and Trubek agree on two important points: Weber's theory is fundamentally contradictory, and Weber's theory relates primarily to private law subjects such as contracts. This article contests both of these points. Building on a foundation of Weber's neo-Kantian metaphysics and his sociological categories of economic action, this article shows that Weber's theory of law is not fundamentally inconsistent; rather it explores the inconsistencies that are inherent within Western society itself, including its legal systems. Furthermore, Weber's insights can be applied to modern constitutional jurisprudence. Weberian theory reveals that modern constitutional law is riddled with irreconcilable tensions between process and substance—between formal and substantive rationality. In the context of racial discrimination cases involving equal protection and the Fifteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court's acceptance of John Hart Ely's theory of representation-reinforcement demonstrates the Court's resolute pursuit of formal rationality, which insures that the substantive values and needs of minorities will remain unsatisfied.

The features of regulatory encounters that foster the evolution of cooperation often also encourage the evolution of capture and corruption. Solutions to the problems of capture and corruption—limiting discretion, multiple-industry rather than single-industry agency jurisdiction, and rotating personnel—inhibit the evolution of cooperation. Tripartism—empowering public interest groups—is advanced as a way to solve this policy dilemma. A game-theoretic analysis of capture and tripartism is juxtaposed against an empowerment theory of republican tripartism. Surprisingly, both formulations lead to the conclusion that some forms of capture are desirable. The strengths from converging the weaknesses of these two formulations show how certain forms of tripartism might prevent harmful capture, identify and encourage efficient capture, enhance the attainment of regulatory goals, and strengthen democracy. While the case we make for tripartism is purely theoretical and general in its application to all domains of business regulation, our conclusion is a call for praxis to fish out the contexts in which the theory is true or false.

Based on our research on the practice of neutrality in mediation, we deconstruct the practice of neutrality in mediation by examining both the discourse of neutrality operant in mediators’ accounts of their practice and the discourse processes in mediation sessions. We identify three key terms—justice, power, and ideology as a system of terms central to the rhetoric of neutrality. We challenge existing definitions of neutrality in and by analyzing the discourse processes in mediation practice, which allows for an alternative description of neutrality as a practice in discourse.

In contrast to Anglo-American lines of professional development, the central agent of professionalization in many Continental countries was the state bureaucracy. However, this article proposes that an understanding of the class structure of traditional society is also needed to explain the privileged position of lawyers. An historical study of lawyers in the 19th century, after Finland was annexed by Russia, demonstrates that the legal profession provided the nobility an important medium of adaptation to the new society. The importance of the legal profession initially to the state bureaucracy, and subsequently to the nobility, explains its social prominence and its future development. An analysis of the position and needs of the prominent classes in the society of Old Regimes may constitute a fruitful viewpoint in the study of early professionalization in the Continental context more generally.

This article presents a “contextual” study of Britain's Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. The article addresses the ostensibly perplexing policy question of why Britain's homeless population has almost trebled in the 14 years since the homelessness legislation was introduced. The answer is found by subjecting the legislation to a very wide-ranging contextualization process. Rather than simply focusing on the administrative arena in which the act is implemented, the article seeks explanations for its apparent inefficacy in ideological considerations preceding its enactment, in the legislative process itself, in the (im)precise wording of the emergent statute, and in subsequent government policies in various relevant constitutional and social policy areas. The article concludes that a thorough understanding of the impact of this particular law requires it to be located in a series of interrelated contexts, a conclusion that might plausibly be extended to all studies of “law in society.”