1 See, for instance, 14 “Maxims and Arrows” in Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols 24, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1968) (“Twilight”). See also Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1979) (“Ecce Homo”).Google Scholar

2 “Asking the Right Question,” 19 Law & Soc. Inquiry 605 (1994).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 “Coming Home,” 19 Law & Soc. Inquiry 599 (1994); hereinafter cited in text as “H&B” when specific page numbers are given.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 “GJ” refers to Marianne Constable, “Genealogy and Jurisprudence: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of Law,” 19 Law & Soc. Inquiry 000 (1994).Google Scholar

5 “Leading Law into the Abyss: What (If Anything) Has Sociology Done to Law?” 19 Law & Soc. Inquiry 609 (1994).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 “Passionate Kisses?” 19 Law and Soc. Inquiry 591 (1994).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Nietzsche does not make either point exactly this way, although he makes both in various ways. Regarding the former, he shows how, “as semiotics,” moral judgment reveals “the most precious realities of culture and inner worlds which did not know enough to ‘understand’ themselves” (1 “Improvers of Mankind,” Twilight 55). One could say of law and legal thought what Nietzsche says here of moral judgment. Logic, for Nietzsche, is also “a sign system,” in opposition to which he himself “challenges [or provokes] contradiction” (6 “Reason in Philosophy,”Twilight 36). See Ecce Homo.Google Scholar

8 Christine B. Harrington & Barbara Yngvesson, “Interpretive Sociolegal Research,” 15 Law & Soc. Inquiry 135, 148 (1990).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 See GJ, parts III and IV; language on 228, 237-38, 239.Google Scholar

10 Consider the work of Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Jean-Luc Nancy, for instance.Google Scholar

11 Hence when Cmiel (at 592) sees me as “sympathetic to [Unger's] superliberalism,” he presumably reports my admiration for Unger's argument rather than an acceptance of Unger's politics (or law).Google Scholar

12 Those conceptions are revealed in part through the practices of courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies (GJ at 576-80) and in part through texts that include jurisprudence (Hart, Dworkin, Rawls), positivist sociology of law (Black), empirical jury research (Kalven and Zeisel; Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington), legal opinions (Batson v. Kentucky, Balkw v. Georgia; Plyler v. Doe), critical legal studies (Unger), and interpretive sociology (Harrington and Yngvesson, Sarat and Keams). The argument (of part III) begins by claiming that Hart and Dworkin, despite their differences, are both criticized for being “unrealistic” by (1) positivist and (2) interpretivist critics (at 572-84). The remainder of part III in part explores the “reality” of more and less positivist scholarship and law (at 223-29) and more and less interpretivist scholarship (at 580-88).Google Scholar

13 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 9 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).Google Scholar

14 Id. at 7. Emphasis added.Google Scholar

15 Again, this adjective signals a kind of admiration for Rawls's argument, which is different from an endorsement of the theory.Google Scholar

16 Id. at 4.Google Scholar

17 Id. Google Scholar

18 Id. at 257.Google Scholar

19 The “same” is not the identical; sameness as similarity requires difference.Google Scholar

20 Sarat writes (at 623) in his comment: “Constable is wrong to see Donald Black as the prophet of contemporary legal scholarship. His vision is not our vision.” In this context, I note with some amusement that the only formal citation in Munger's comment is to an early work by Black that GJ does not mention.Google Scholar

21 Harrington and Brigham seem to view this aspect of the argument approvingly: “Constable's reading of jury studies is an exception” to the genealogy's “conventional political theoretical]. tendency to ignore people and their status in law…. Constable offers us the ability to comprehend the nature of law in practice, on such matters as the common law jury without appearing dim in an age illuminated by the claims of interpretation” (H&B at 203). For more on “the status of people at law,” see also Marianne Constable, “Sovereignty and Governmentality in Modern American Immigration Law,” 13 Stud. L., Pol. & Soc'y 249 (1993).Google Scholar

22 The “appearance” of the tragic artist signifies for Nietzsche “reality once more, only selected, strengthened, corrected.” 6 “Reason in Philosophy,” TWigrtt 39.Google Scholar

23 This seems to be what Sarat thinks I think Nietzsche thinks when Sarat associates me with a version of Maclntyre's Nietzsche (Sarat at 403). I don't read Nietzsche this way, though.Google Scholar

24 See sees. 43 and 48 of “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” Twilight 96-97, 101. See also Jean-Francois Lyotard & Jean-Loup Thebaud, Just Gaming 33-34, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985).Google Scholar

25 Note that I could not say “undemocratic.”Google Scholar

26 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power sec. 583, trans. Walter Kaufman & R. J. Hol-lingdale (New York: Random House, 1967).Google Scholar

27 I thank Frederick Dolan for his help in formulating this point.Google Scholar

28 Which I have said in a more long-winded fashion that does not require knowledge of Nietzsche (whose ambition was “to say in ten sentences what everyone else says in a book– what everyone else does not say,” 51 “Expeditions,”Twilight 104) in ch. 4 of my The Law of the Other: The Mixed jury and Changing Conceptions of Citizenship, Law, and Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).Google Scholar