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Professor Crespi on Chicago

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Thomas S. Ulen
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Abstract

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Type
Review Essay
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , Winter 1997 , pp. 191 - 199
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 1997 

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