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A Priest Responds to the Bean Counters: Leo Katz on Evasion, Blackmail, Fraud, and Kindred Puzzles of the Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Mark P. Gergen
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Abstract

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Type
Review Essay
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , Summer 1997 , pp. 879 - 899
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 1997 

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