Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t8hqh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T22:31:55.129Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The New Citizenship and Wars of Position

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Mark Tushnet
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Suppose Charles Reich had typed “The New Citizenship” on the first page of his article. He might have rediscovered republicanism a generation earlier than the neo-republicans of the 1980s. Perhaps he might even have understood that a right to some minimum of property, sufficient to guarantee the independence essential to the exercise of citizenship rights, could be derived from concepts of republican citizenship.

Type
Articles
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , Winter 1996 , pp. 89 - 93
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 1996 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Reich, “The New Property,” 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 David Abraham, “Liberty without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in a ‘Negative Citizenship’ Regime,” 21 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1 (1996).Google Scholar

3 See Margaret Jane Radin, “Lacking a Transformative Social Theory,” 45 Stan. L. Rev. 409 (1993).Google Scholar

4 Carl Boggs, Gramrci's Marxism 114–15 (1976).Google Scholar

5 It is worth noting that Radin's proposals are aimed at using the language of property to erode the privileges of the propertied. The present political agenda for progressives might well be the far more modest one of defending the unpropertied against further assaults. It is not at all clear to me that the language of property is well adapted to that task. To the extent that the language of citizenship reminds us of our duties to each other, it might be more helpful; to the extent, however, that it might lead to imposing even more burdens on the unpropertied, requiring them to perform their so-called civic duties, it might be worse.Google Scholar

6 “Founded on,” of course, in a quite complex way, which includes preemptive efforts by German conservatives like Bismarck.Google Scholar

7 I believe that I learned this point from Alexander Bickel, although I cannot locate the precise source.Google Scholar

8 411 U. S. 1, 36 (1973).Google Scholar

9 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202 (1982).Google Scholar

10 David Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 214–27 (1994).Google Scholar

11 For discussions, see id. at 310–14; Gerald Neuman, “Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United States and Germany,” 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 273 (1995).Google Scholar