1 169 U. S. 366 (1897). In this case, the Court upheld protective legislation for coal miners, stating that they constitute a class of workers in need of special protection due to the nature of their work.Google Scholar

2 262 U. S. 525 (1923). This case struck down a minimum wage law aimed specifically at women, and is sometimes understood by scholars to mark the height of the era of substantive due process.Google Scholar

3 I used electronic and digest sources, as well as tracking down cases cited in other cases or in briefs.Google Scholar

4 Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).Google Scholar

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8 In State v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 540 (1902), the court went on to strike down a statute protecting the rights of union members, claiming: “Without enlarging upon or debating the relative advantages or disadvantages of the labor union… it is axiomatic that an employer cannot have undivided fidelity, loyalty, and devotion to his interests from an employee who has given to an association right to control his conduct.”Google Scholar

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11 In Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, 183 (1900), the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a statute that would have stopped employers from preventing their employees from joining unions.Google Scholar

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13 Id.Google Scholar

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21 Id. Google Scholar

22 Id. Google Scholar

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37 Id. at 137.Google Scholar

38 After 1897 the Illinois Supreme Court considered two protective labor statutes for women, both of which were upheld; State v. Elerding, 254 Ill. 579 (1912) involved a ten-hour limit on hotel work; and People v. Chicago, 256 Ill. 558 (1912) limited women's work in public institutions to ten hours per day. In 1895, the Illinois Supreme Court had struck down an hours limitation for women in Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, but this ruling was overturned in the later Ritchie case (W. C. Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 518 (1910)). For an excellent discussion of how protective labor legislation came to be upheld in Illinois, see Erickson, 30 Labor Hist. 228.Google Scholar

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