1 See Nancy Matthews, Confronting Rape: The Feminist Anti-Rape Movement and the State (London: Routledge, 1994) (“Matthews, Confronting Rape”), and R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Women, Violence, and Social Change (London: Routledge, 1992), for discussions of activism in the antirape and antibattering movements.Google Scholar

2 See, e.g., Cynthia Bowman, “The Arrest Experiments: A Feminist Critique,” 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 201 (1992); Kathleen Ferraro, “Policing Women Battering,” 36 (1) Soc. Probs. 61 (1989); Lisa Frohmann, “Discrediting Victims' Allegations of Sexual Assault:Google Scholar

Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejection,” 38 Soc. Probs. 213 (1991); id., “Screening Sexual Assault Cases: Prosecutorial Decisions to File or Reject Rape Complaints” (Ph.D. thesis, UCLA, 1992) (“Frohmann, ‘Screening’“); Cassia Spohn & Julia Homey, Rape Law Reform: The Grassroots Revolution and its Impact (New York: Plenum, 1992) (“Spohn & Homey, Re-form”); Jane Larson, “‘Imagine Her Satisfaction’: The Transformative Task of Feminist Tort Work,” 33 Washburn Law]. 56 (1993); id., “Introduction: Third Wave–-Can Feminists Use the Law to Effect Social Change in the 1990s?” 87 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1252 (1993); Matthews, Con/Vonring Rape; Elizabeth Stanko, “Missing the Mark? Police Battering,” in J. Hamner, J. Radford, & E. Stanko, eds., Women, Policing, and Male Violence 46–49 (London: Routledge, 1989) (“Stanko, ‘Missing’“).Google Scholar

3 Larson (87 Nw. U.L. Rev. at 1252–53) outlines some of the concerns of this “third wave,” which she views as centrally concerned with the question of whether law can be used to effect social change in the 1990s:Google Scholar

Feminists of the Second Wave, many of whom became politically active in the movement for racial justice, early on adopted a strategy for social change that emphasized legislation and litigation. In seeking to use the law to effect social change, reformers express confidence in the law's ability to transform deeply rooted social institutions and foundational values. Given the record of the feminist law reform movement, is this confidence justified? What explains not only the successes, but also the failures and unintended consequences of this movement?Google Scholar

4 See Leigh Bienen, “Rape III–-National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation,” 6 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 170 (1980).Google Scholar

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6 M. A. Largen, “Rape Reform Law: An Analysis,” in A. W. Burgess, ed., Sexual Assault U (New York: Garland, 1988); Jeanne Marsh, Allison Geist, & Nathan Kaplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform (Boston: Auburn House, 1982) (“Marsh et al., Rape”). Google Scholar

7 Wallace D. Loh, “Q: What Has Rape Reform Legislation Wrought? A: A Truth in Criminal Labelling,” 37 J. Soc. Issues 28 (1981).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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9 See Gregory Matoesian, Reproducing Rape: Domination through Talk in the Courtroom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) (“Matoesian, Reproducing Rape”).Google Scholar

10 Kenneth Polk, “Rape Reform and Criminal Justice Processing,” 31 Crime & Delinq. 191 (1985).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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13 Julia Homey & Cassia Spohn, “Rape Laws and Instrumental Change in Six Urban Jurisdictions,” 25 Law & Soc'y Rev. 117 (1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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16 Frohmann, 38 Soc. Probs. (cited in note 2); id., “‘Hard Cases’: Prosecutorial Accounts for Filing Problematic Sexual Assault Complaints,”in H. Lopata & A. Figert, eds., 9 Current Resources on Occupations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, forthcoming).Google Scholar

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18 See also Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).Google Scholar

19 Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). See also Michelle Oberman, “Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law,” 85 J. Crim. Law & Criminobgy 15 (1994).Google Scholar

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22 Berk et al. interpret the evidence from Omaha as indicative of a deterrent effect for the subset of “good risk” offenders as well. See Richard Berk, Alec Campbell, Ruth Klap, & Bruce Western, “A Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse Abuse Experiment,” 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 170, 198 (1992).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 Id.; Anthony M. Pate et al., Metro-Dade Spouse Abuse Replication Project Draft Final Report (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1991); Lawrence Sherman, Janell Schmidt, Dennis Rogan, Douglas Smith, Patrick Gartin, Ellen Cohn, Dan Collins, & Anthony Bacich, “The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment,” 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 137, 168 (1992) (“Employed, married, high school graduate and white suspects are all less likely to have any incident of repeat violence reported to the domestic violence hotline if they are arrested than if they are not”).Google Scholar

24 Franklyn Dunford, D. Huizinga, & D. S. Elliott, “The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault: The Omaha Police Experiment,” 28 (2) Criminology 183 (1990); Franklyn Dunford, “The Measurement of Recidivism in Cases of Spouse Assault,” 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 120 (1992); J. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchison, “Female Spousal Abuse and the Police Response: The Charlotte, North Carolina Experiment,” 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 73 (1992).Google Scholar

25 Berk et al., 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology (cited in note 22); Dunford, 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology (cited in note 24); Hirschel & Hutchison, 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology (cited in note 24); Sherman et al., 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology (cited in note 23).Google Scholar

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27 For critiques of the restudies, see Joan Zorza, “The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Violence,” 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 46 (1992); Bowman, 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology (cited in note 2); Lisa Frisch, “Research that Succeeds, Policies that Fail,” 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 209 (1992); Lisa Lerman, “The Decontextualization of Domestic Violence,” 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminobgy 217 (1992). See also Dan Polsby, “Suppressing Domestic Violence with Law Reforms,” 83 ]. Crim. Law & Criminobgy 250 (1992) (arrest may work as general deterrent even if not as specific deterrent; arrest may also serve justice values apart from issues of deterrence). For critiques of the original study, see A. Binder & J. Meeker, “Experiments as Reform,” 14 J. Crim. Just. 329 (1988); D. Elliot, “Criminal Justice Procedures in Family Violence Crimes,” and J. Fagan, “Cessation of Family Violence: Deterrence and Dissuasion,” both in L. Ohlin & M. Torney, eds., Crime and justice: A Review of Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).Google Scholar

28 Kathleen Ferraro, “The Legal Response to Women Battering in the US,”in J. Hamner, J. Radford & E. Stanko, eds., Women, Policing, and Male Violence (London: Rout-ledge, 1989); id., “Policing Women Battering,” 36 (1) Soc. Probs. 61 (1989).Google Scholar

29 Stanko, “Missing” (cited in note 2).Google Scholar

30 See also B. Balos & I. Trotzky, “Enforcement of the Domestic Abuse Act in Minnesota: A Preliminary Study,” 6 Law & Inequality 83 (1988).Google Scholar

31 See also Susan L. Miller, “Unintended Side Effects of Pro-Arrest Policies and Their Race and Class Implications for Battered Women: A Cautionary Note,” 3 (3) Crim. Just. Pol'y Rev. 299 (1989), and Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response (Newbury Park, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1990) (“Buzawa & Buzawa, Domestic Violence I”), for an overview of ways police circumvent battering laws.Google Scholar

32 Ferraro, 36 (1) Soc. Probs.; Kathleen Ferraro, “Battered Women: Strategies of Survival,” in A. Cardarelli, ed., Violence among Intimate Partners: Patterns, Causes, and Effects (New York: MacMillan, forthcoming 1995); Kevin L. Hamberger, “Effects of Mandatory Arrest Law on Domestic Violence Perpetuation Counseling” (invited testimony before the Wisconsin Equal Justice Task Force, 1990); Buzawa & Buzawa, Domestic Violence 1. Google Scholar

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35 Naomi R. Cahn, “Innovative Approaches to the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Crimes: An Overview,” in E. S. Buzawa & C. G. Buzawa, eds., Domestic Violence: The Changing Criminal Justice Response (Greenwich, Conn.: Auburn House, 1992) (“Buzawa & Buzawa, Domestic Violence II”).Google Scholar

36 David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, “The Preventive Impacts of Policies for Prosecuting Wife Batters,” in Buzawa & Buzawa, Domestic Violence II.Google Scholar

37 Bowman, 83 ]. Crim. Law & Criminology, at 207 (cited in note 2).Google Scholar

38 See Peter Jaffe et d., “The Impact of Police Charges in Incidents of Wife Abuse,” 1 J. Family Violence 37, 46–48 (1986); and Bowman, 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology, at 207.Google Scholar

39 Molly Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, “Do Restraining Orders Help? Battered Women's Experience with Male Violence and the Legal Process,” in Buzawa & Buzawa, Domestic Violence II.Google Scholar

40 Id. at 264.Google Scholar

41 Bowman, 83 J. Crim. Law & Criminology, at 206; see also Martha Fineman & Rox-anne Mykitiuk, eds., The Public Nature of Private Violence (New York: Routledge, 1995).Google Scholar

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43 See generally J. Bulkley, Recommendations for Improving Legal Intervention in Intra-Family Child Sexual Abuse Cases (Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association, 1982); Gail S. Goodman, ed., “The Child Witness,” 42 (2) J. Soc. Issues (Special Issue) (1984).Google Scholar

44 See National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection, Child Sexual Abuse: Legal Issues and Approaches 8–9 (Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association, 1981).Google Scholar

45 Jean La Fontaine, Child Sexual Abuse 4–13, 22–23 (Cambridge, Mass.: Polity Press, 1990); Jean Renvoize, Innocence Destroyed: A Study of Child Sexual Abuse xi-xii (London: Routledge, 1993); Ruth Kempe & Henry Kempe, Child Abuse 3–6 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978); Ann Wolbert Burgess, A. Nicholas Groth, Lynda Lytle Holmstrom, & Suzanne M. Sgroi, Sexual Assault of Children and Adolescents xv-xxi (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978).Google Scholar

46 Christine Courteois, Healing the Incest Wound: Adult Survivors in Therapy xiii-xv (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988); Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery 1–4, 110–14 (New York: Basic Books, 1992).Google Scholar

47 Brian D. Gallagher, “Damages, Duress, and the Discovery Rule: The Statutory Right of Recovery for Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse,” 17 Sewn Hal! Legal J. 505, 509 (1993); Jocelyn B. Lamm, “Easing Access to the Courts for Incest Victims: Toward an Equitable Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule,” 100 Yale L.J. 2189, 2191 (1991).Google Scholar

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49 Bowman & Mettz, “Dangerous Direction,” and Myers, Backlash (both cited in note 42).Google Scholar

50 There has been research assessing the effects of testifying on children, some calling for legal reforms aimed at making the experience less stressful (see, e.g., Gail Goodman, Elizabeth Taub, David Jones, Patricia England, Linda Port, Leslie Rudy, & Lydia Prado, Testifying in Criminal Court, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development No. 5 (1992); Desmond Runyan, Mark Everson, Gail Edelsohn, Wanda Hunter, & Martha Coulter, “Impact of Legal Intervention on Sexually Abused Children,” 113 ]. Pediatrics 647 (1988)), and some assessing the relative suggestibility of child witnesses (see, e.g., Stephen Ceci & Maggie Bruck, “The Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Review and Synthesis,” 133 Psychol. Bull. 403 (1993); Gail Goodman & A. Clarke-Stewart, “Suggestibility in Children's Testimony: Implications for Child Sexual Abuse Investigations,” in J. L. Doris, The Suggestibility of Children's Recollections 92–105 (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1991)).Google Scholar

51 Lin Farley, Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women on the Job (1978); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979).Google Scholar

52 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3–17 (1988); for an argument for legal reform to prevent street harassment of women, see Cynthia Bowman, “Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women,” 106 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

53 There are, of course, still other areas of violence that have been addressed in legal forums–-violent attempts to prevent women from obtaining abortions, for example (see Ruth Colker, Abortion and Dialogue: Pro-Choice, Pro-Life, and American Law (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Rebecca Eisenberg, “Beyond Bray: Obtaining Federal Jurisdiction to Stop Anti-Abortion Violence, 6 Yale J. L. & Feminism 156 (1994)). And there are areas that involve violence not of individual men against women, but of male-dominated institutions–- for example, the violence involved in criminalizing aspects of women's reproductive process or in enforced temporary or permanent sterilization through use of reproductive technologies. Again, we are limited here to a brief overview of a very complicated field.Google Scholar

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56 Kristen Bumiller, “Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence against Women in Legal Culture,” 32 Int'l). Soc. L. 125 (1990); Allison Young, Femininity in Dissent (New York: Routledge, 1990).Google Scholar

57 See Marianne Constable, “Genealogy and Jurisprudence: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of Law,” 19 Law & Soc. Inquiry 551 (1994).Google Scholar

58 Hence anthropological feminist Marilyn Strathern's observation that anthropology and feminism in a sense mock one another. Marilyn Strathern, “An Awkward Relationship: The Case of Feminism and Anthropology,” 12 Signs 276 (1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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60 See on public/private, Michelle Rosaldo, “Women, Culture, and Society: A Theoretical Overview,” and on nature/culture, Sherry Ortner, “Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?” both in Michelle Rosaldo & Louise Lamphere, eds., Women, Culture, and Society 67–88 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1974)- For critiques, see Carol MacCormack & Marilyn Strathern, eds., Nature, Culture, and Gender (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Michelle Rosaldo, “The Use and Abuse of Anthropology: Reflections on Feminism and Cross-cultural Understanding,” 5 Signs 389 (1980); Marilyn Strathern, “Domesticity and the Denigration of Women,” in D. O'Brien & S. Tiffany, eds., Rethinking Women's Roles: Perspectives from the Pacific 13–31 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984)-Google Scholar

61 See, e.g., Judith Shapiro, “Anthropology and the Study of Gender,”in E. Langland & W. Gove, eds., A Feminist Perspective from the Academy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Sylvia Yanagisako & Jane Collier, “Toward a Unified Analysis of Gender and Kinship,” in Jane Collier & Sylvia Yanagisako, eds., Gender and Kinship: Essays toward a Unified Analysis 48–49 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1987) (“Collier & Yanagisako, Gender and Kinship”); Barbara Diane Miller, ed., Sex and Gender Hierarchies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); K. Poewe, Matrilineal Ideology: Male-Female Dynamics in Luapula, Zambia (London: Academic Press, 1981); Marilyn Strathern, “Introduction,”in M. Strathern, ed., Dealing with Inequality: Analysing Gender Relations in Melanesia and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).Google Scholar

62 Henrietta Moore, Feminism and Anthropology 11 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1988).Google Scholar

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65 Carol Mukhopadhyay & Patricia Higgins, “Anthropological Studies of Women's Status Revisited, 1977–1987,” 17 Ann. Rev. Anthropoio© 461, 472 (1988). See also an interesting critique by feminist anthropologists who are suspicious of the postmodern trend in anthropology that deconstructs the subject just as women and non-Western peoples generally have begun to find their voices: “To the extent that [die] dominant group has in recent years experienced a decentering as world politics and economic realities shift global power relations, postmodern theorizing can be understood as socially constructed itself, as a metaphor for the sense of the dominant that the ground has begun to shift under their feet.” Frances Mascia-Lees, Patricia Sharpe, & Colleen Ballerino Cohen, “The Postmodern Turn in Anthropology: Cautions from a Feminist Perspective,” 15 Signs 7, 15–16 (1989).Google Scholar

66 Clearly, the issues surrounding a perspectival, decentered, or language-sensitive foundation for knowing take us back to problems addressed from different vantages by Hume and Wittgenstein, just to begin a long list.Google Scholar

67 See Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen, eds., The Quality of Human Life (New York: Clarendon Press, 1993); Larson, 33 Washburn L.J. (cited in note 2); Michael Perry, “The Idea of Human Rights: Five Inquiries” (Northwestern University School of Law) (“Perry, ‘Idea’“). For examples of arguments for advantages of nonrelativist human rights approaches from vantage of indigenous and oppressed women, see Asma al-Dareer, Woman, Why Do You Weep: Circumcision and Its Consequences (London: Zed Press, 1982); Celina Romany, “Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law,” 6 Haw. Hum. Rts. J. 87 (1993); Williams, Alchemy (cited in note 54); articles in Martha Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover, eds., Women, Culture, and Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).Google Scholar

68 Writes Larson, 33 Washburn Law ., at 69–74 (cited in note 2):Google Scholar

If truths about what constitutes the core of human personhood are partly contingent, disputes over them can be resolved only through struggles over social reality like those that go in highly localized legal disputes. The common law is a social dialogue that accommodates pressures for preservation as well as for change, creating cultural space for the emergence of shared values as well as for criticism and transformation of past commitments … by the accretion of regularities in human experience over time, it gains moral and political authority, and thus provides the society with a basis for judging right from wrong.Google Scholar

69 Perry, “Idea” (cited in note 67).Google Scholar

70 Maria Lugones, “Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception,” in Anzaldúa, Making Face 390–402 (cited in note 54).Google Scholar

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73 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); id., Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Smart, Feminism (cited in note 54).Google Scholar

74 See Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns, Law in Everyday Life (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar