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Institutional Choice and Political Faith

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Thomas W. Merrill
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Type
Review Section Symposium
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 22 , Issue 4 , Fall 1997 , pp. 959 - 998
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 1997 

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