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Experts Judging Experts: The Role of Expertise in Reviewing Agency Decision Making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Banks Miller  and
Brett Curry
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Abstract

What role does judicial subject matter expertise play in the review of agency decisions? Using a data set of decisions in which the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) is reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, we investigate this question and find that greater subject matter expertise does make it more likely that a judge will vote to reverse an agency decision.

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Articles
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 38 , Issue 1 , Winter 2013 , pp. 55 - 71
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 2013 

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