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Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Linda Babcock ,
George Loewenstein  and
Samuel Issacharoff
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Abstract

Previous experimental research has found that self-Serving biases are a major cause of negotiation impasses. In this study we show that a simple intervention can mitigate such biases and promote efficient settlement of disputes.

Type
Articles
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 22 , Issue 4 , Fall 1997 , pp. 913 - 925
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 1997 

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