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Strategies of Constitutional Scholarship

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Eric A. Posner
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Type
Review Essay
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , Spring 2001 , pp. 529 - 546
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 2001 

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