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From Double Agents to Bouncers: Corporate Lawyers and the Making of the Public-Private State

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2021

Abstract

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Type
International Book Essays
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Bar Foundation

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References

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