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“Standing” before the Constitution: Membership in the Community

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2011

Extract

The “who” of a lawsuit, who can sue and who can be sued, has long been a fundamental issue of process. Lengthy discussions of the issue are found in Roman law texts of eighteen centuries ago and in succeeding centuries in texts influenced by Roman law. In Roman law texts, the “who” of a lawsuit was discussed in the same context and, most importantly, with the same seeming concern as the fundamental issues of whether the court had authority over the parties and whether the court had competence over the subject matter. The same is true for many of the texts influenced by Roman law.

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Copyright © the American Society for Legal History, Inc. 1989

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References

Notes

1. Vining, J., Legal Identity: The Coming of Age of Public Law 55 (1978)Google Scholar.

2. American Express commercial (circa 1988).

3. It would not be an exaggeration to describe the three issues in the text as jurisdictional, as we now mean that word, as fundamental to the legitimacy of judicial decision-making.

4. And, for example, “stand in judgment,” “stand accused,” and “stand charged.”

5 See Seckel, H. Heumann-E., Handlexikon zu den Quellen des Romischen Rechts (1958); H. G. Heymann, Handlexicon zum Corpus Juris Civilis 510–11 (1846); R. Mayr, Vocabularum Codicis Iustiniani (1923).Google Scholar

6. “Standing” is found in the Hebrew Bible, too. For example, in Exodus 18:13 the narrator speaks to Moses' judging the people and says, “Vayaamod haam al-mosheh,” which is translated as “and the people stood about Moses.” The Holy Scriptures 87 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publ. Soc., 1956)Google Scholar. It is suggested, in accordance with the discussion that follows this footnote, that “stand” in this context was used technically rather than simply descriptively. It is suggested that “stand” meant “appear,” as in “appear in court,” so that the translation should be “and the people appeared before Moses.” This is in contrast with Jethro's statement in Exodus 18:14, where he asked why “kol-haam nitzav alecha,” which is properly translated nontechnically as “all the people stand about thee.” It is likely that the narrator would use “stand” in its technical sense and that Jethro, unfamiliar with court proceedings, would use “stand” in a nontechnical sense.

And, for example, the writer of Psalms 1:5 says, “Al-ken lo-yakumu reshaim bamishpat vechataim baadat tsadikim,” “therefore, the evil doers shall not stand in the judgment, and the sinners in the congregation of the righteous.” See The Mishnah 397, Sanhedrin 10.3 (H. Danby ed. 1933), discussing the above verse. It is noteworthy that the Vulgate translates bamishpat as in iudicio, although it does not translate yakumu as stare or some conjugation thereof. See 1 Biblia Sacra, Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem 770, 771 (R. Osb ed. 1969). Interestingly, the Septuagint translates bamishpat as ᾽εν κρισεῖ, which might be understood as “trial.” The Septuagint Version: Greek and English (L. Brenton ed. 1986).

It is suggested that, in a manner similar to the civil, canon, and English law uses of stare in judicio that are described in this essay, these Biblical and Mishnaic uses of “stand” with “judgment” and “court” are connected with a person's entitlement to membership or position in a community. In Exodus, the community was the community of litigants. In the Psalms and the other texts, it appears, the community was the ultimate community of the righteous before God.

7. The term “jurist” and the descriptions of the Roman jurists are taken from Schulz, F., History Of Roman Legal Science 102–110 (1953)Google Scholar.

8. For Paul, see Dig. 2.6.1, 2.8.4, 2.8.16, 2.9.2, 2.10.2, 2.11.5, 2.11.7, 2.11.10. For Ulpian, see Dig. 2.4.4, 2.5.1, 2.5.3, 2.6.4, 2.8.2, 2.9.1, 2.10.1, 2.11.2.4, 2.11.4.3, 2.11.9, 2.11.11, 22.3.19.1. The Latin text is taken from 1 The Digest of Justinian (T. Mommsen, P. Krueger, & A. Watson eds. 1985) [hereinafter references to the Digest will be denoted simply as “D”].

9. See D.2.4.4.

10. See D.2.11.2.4.

11. See D.2.11.4.

12. See D.2.11.4.3.

13. See D.2.11.9.

14. D.2.11.13. The compilers of the Digest quoted Julian once more regarding a litigant's appearance. See D.2.10.3.

15. See D.2.11.13.

16. D.2.11.15.

17. See id.

18. D.2.8.5.1.; D.2.11.1; D.2.11.8.

19. G. Inst. 4.184, in The Institutes of Gaius pt. I, at 304–05 (F. Zulueta ed. 1946) (written 161) [hereinafter references to Gaius will be denoted as “G”].

20. Id. Curiously, prior to the Digest, an obscure Roman law text used stare in connection with appearance in court. The author of the text was the Autun Gaius, who is thought to have been a fifth-century (or possibly sixth-century) teacher in Autun, France. See Schulz, F., History Of Roman Legal Science 301 (1953)Google Scholar. The Autun Gaius has been described as “an illiterate scribbler.” Duff, P. W., Personality in Roman Private Law 11 n.3 (1938)Google Scholar.

The Autun Gaius used stare in a commentary or grammatical exercise on a text of Gaius. See Jolowicz, H. & Nicholas, B., Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law 458 (1972)Google Scholar (footnote omitted) (the text “is so shallow and so lacking in understanding of the law as to justify the conjecture that its author was a grammarian writing a routine commentary on a text”). With reference to Gaius's discussion of when and how a cognitor or procurator was appointed to represent a litigant in court, see G. 4.82–87; the Autun Gaius said that “sine personis legitimum [iudicium] stare non potest” Gai Institutionum Interpretations Fragmenta Augustodunensia, f. 105v 4.88, reprinted in 2 Iurisprudentiae Anteiustinianae Reliquias pt. 2, at 455 (E. Seckel & B. Kuebler eds. 1927), quoted by P. W. Duff, supra at 11 n.3. This statement was so botched as to make it unclear what the Autun Gaius was saying about a person; was he saying that for “standing in court” there was needed a person who could have rights or duties, a person who could sue or defend in court, or a person who could represent him- or herself or who needed a representative?

21. D.50.16.246.

22. See, e.g., D.2.4.4.

23. See Revised Medieval Latin Word-List (R. E. Latham ed. 1965).

24. *1 Rymer, T., Foedera *38 (1740).Google Scholar

25. Id. at *39.

26. *3 id. at *1012; see *8 id. at *527 (1408) (“quod stet Recto in Curia nostra”); *9 id. at *4 (1413) (“qui ad standum recto super hiis”). Hovedenus made a similar report for 1189. See Hovedeni, R., Annalium pars prior & posterior, in Rerum Anglicarum 655 (1601)Google Scholar (“si plegios standi ad rectum invenire possunt”), noted in 7 du Cange, C. D., Glossarum Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis (1938)Google Scholar.

27. The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England Commonly Called Glanvill 1.31, at 19 (G. Hall ed. 1965).

28. De Legibus et Consuetudinae Angliae, fol. 125, in 2 Thorne, S., Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England 352 (1968)Google Scholar.

29. Id. fol. 182b, in 3 S. Thorne, supra note 28, at 65 (1977).

30. Id. at 66.

31. Regiam Majestatem Scotiae bk. 1, c. 7, fol. 13b. 16 (J. Skene ed. 1609), taken from Glanvill, see text at note 27 supra.

32. Id. bk. 1, c. 20, fol. 24a. 11.

33. Id. bk. 2, c. 12, fol. 36a. 9.

34. Id. bk. 3, c. 1, fol. 74a. 18.

35. See id. fol. 105a. 1 (“ad standum juri”); fol. 105b.5 (“standum juri”); fol. 110b.0 (“de plegio de stando juri”); fol. 110b. 3 (“plegius ad standum juri”); fol. 115b. 3 (“ad standum legi”).

36. By “substantive policies,” I mean policies regulating conduct generally. By “adjudicatory policies,” I mean policies regulating conduct of courts and persons in court.

37. See Compendium Juris Juxta Seriem Pandectarum 103 (Lugduni [Lyons] 1688)Google Scholar (“necesse est, ut legitimam habeat personam standi in judicio: unde servi, impuberes, furiosi, prodigi, aliique similes a limine judicii repellendi sunt”). I thank Michael Hoeflich for suggesting that I examine Voet.

38. See 1 Chitty, J., A Treatise on Pleading, and Parties to Actions **448–49 (9th Am. ed. 1844)Google Scholar; Story, J., Commentaries on Equity Pleadings 59, 6575 (5th ed. 1852).Google Scholar

39. Codex Iustinianus 3.6 (P. Krueger ed. 1854). Krueger's edition comes from the second edition of the Code, the first not having survived [hereinafter references to the Code will be denoted as “C”]. See Basilicorum 7.19.1, bk. 60, series A, vol. I, p. 402 (H. J. Scheltema & N. Van der Wal eds. 1955) (νόμιμον πρόσωπον). On the authority of the Basilica, see H. Jolowicz & B. Nicholas, supra note 20, at 503.

40. See C.3.6.

41. See D.2.4.4. This passage included the words “certo loco sisti” “be present at a certain location.” Quaere whether use of loco sisti influenced the later use of locus standi.

42. See D.2.11.15.

43. See 1 Theodosiani 2.17.1, at 103 (T. Mommsen ed. 1854). We suggest that the phrase might be given as “legitimate” or “law-worthy age.”

44. The definitive Krueger edition does not have standi interpolated.

45. Codiciis Justiniani 3.6 (Lugduni [Lyons] 1519). I thank the Boston Athenaeum for a copy of this reference.

46. See Corpus Sacratissimi 538 (D. Gothofredi [Godefroy] ed. 1612) ([standi]); 2 Corpus Iuris Civilis 209 (D. Gothofredo ed. 1614) (“stand”); 2 Corpus Juris Civilis 244 (D. Godefroi ed. 1624) (“standi”); 2 Codicis Iustiniani 244 (D. Gothofredi ed. 1650) (/standi/); 2 Corporis Iuris Civilis 114 (1663) ([standi]); 2 Corpus Juris Civilis Romani 137 (D. Gothofredi ed. 1726) ([standi]); Corpus Juris Civilis 168 (Galisset, C. M. ed. 1867)Google Scholar ([standi]). Each of the above references is to Code 3.6.

47. See Codicis Dn. Iustiniana 126 Col. 1 (L. Charondae & Ant. Contio eds. 1575) (“Doest in vet. non male”).

48. See 4 Corpus Juris Civilis Justinianei 179 n.19 (Cujas, Accursius J., & Godefroy, D. eds. 1627)Google Scholar.

49. See Wesenbacii, M., Codicem D. Iustiniani Commentarius 63 (1576)Google Scholar.

50. Id.

51. See Groenewegen, S., Tractatus de Legibus Abrogatis et Inusitatis in Hollandia Vicinique Regionibus bk. 3, tit. 6, at 465 (1649)Google Scholar. I thank the Harvard Law School library for a copy of this reference. See id., bk. 3, tit. 6, at 115–16 (B. Beinart & M. L. Hewett trans. 1984) (3rd ed. 1669). I thank the Yale Law School library for a copy of this reference.

52. S. Groenewegen, supra note 51, at 465; B. Beinart & M. L. Hewett, supra note 51, at 116.

53. See id. (“damnum”).

54. See Bracton, supra note 28, fol. 415b, in 4 S. Thorne, supra note 28, at 292; Brooke, R., La Graunde Abridgement fols. 189a–190b (1576)Google Scholar. An English writer's summary of civil law also omitted stare and persona standi in connection with minors. See Wood, T., A New Institute of the Imperial or Civil Law bk. 4, p. 296 (1730)Google Scholar.

55. See D.3.1.5.

56. See D.3.3.41.

57. Id. The translation is taken from 1 The Digest of Justinian, supra note 8, at 79b.

58. See S. Groenewegen, supra note 51, at 465; B. Beinart & M. L. Hewett, supra note 51, at 115.

59. Id.

60. See 1 Grotius, H., The Jurisprudence of Holland [written 1619–1621, published 1631] ch. 4, sec. 6 (R. W. Lee trans. 1953)Google Scholar.

61. Regiam Majestatem Scotiae, supra note 31, c. 33, at 136a.

62. See 1 H. Grotius, supra note 60, at chs. 3–11. Grotius did use “standing” in a general manner, “te recht staen” “to stand trial” or “stand in defense.” Id. c. 4, sec. 1.

63. See Bracton, supra note 28, fols. 416a, 428a, in 4 S. Thorne, supra note 28, at 293, 330; R. Brooke, supra note 54, fols. 189a–190b.

64. See generally D.3.1.5–11.

65. See D.3.1.5.

66. See D.3.1.11. To compare with canon law, see 1 Corpus Iuris Canonici c. 17, C. VI, q. 1, at 558. (A. Richter & A. Friedberg eds. 1959).

67. See D.3.2.1. At canon law, an expoliatus, a “thief,” “ante iudicem stare non possit” “could not appear and sue in court.” See 1 Corpus Iuris Canonici, supra note 66, C. II, q. 2, at 449.

68. See D.48.16.1.

69. See D.48.16.2. In ancient Athens, three convictions of perjury resulted in the loss of civil rights. 2 Bonner, R. & Smith, G., The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle 263 (1938)Google Scholar.

70. II Canute 37, in Robertson, A., The Laws of the Kings of England From Edmund to Henry I 194 (1925)Google Scholar. Note the second use of stande in the full quotation: “And gyf hwa on leasre getwitnysse openlice stande [and] he oferstaeled wurde, ne stande his gewitnysse syddan for [n]aht, ac gylde dam cynge odde landrican be halsfange.”

71. Instituta Cnuti in Antiquam legum Canuti versionem (J. L. A. Kolderup-Rosenvirge ed. 1826); and Liebermann, F., Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen 339 (1903)Google Scholar; cf. Pseudo-Cnuts de Foresta 14, in F. Liebermann, id., 623; and Liebermann, F., Über Pseudo-Cnuts Constitutiones de Foresta 52 (1894)Google Scholar.

72. See I Aethelred 4.2; II Canute 33.1a.

73. Regiam Majestatem Scotiae, supra note 31, pt. 2, Roberto Primi, c. 28, at 45a–45b.

74. Id. c. 14, annotatio, vers. 5, at 21a.

75. See 7 Bacon, M., A New Abridgement of the Law 424–38 (Gwyllim, H., Wilson, B., & Bouvier, J. eds. 1860)Google Scholar (a variety of penalties, including a ban against future testimony). Morever, Aethelred and Canute notwithstanding, other early English texts did not use “standing.” See Beames, J., A Translation of Glanville ch. 19, at 67–68 (1812)Google Scholar.

76. 1 Corpus Iuris Canonici, supra note 66, cc. 16, 18, C. xi, q. 3, at 647–48.

77. 2 id. c. 7, X, de iudiciis, II, 1, at 241.

78. The use of stare notwithstanding, Gratian did not use stare or legitima often in connection with excommunicates.

79. See Logan, F. Donald, Excommunication and the Secular Arm in Medieval England 14, n. 5 (1968)Google Scholar, quoted in Vining, J., Legal Identity: The Coming of Age of Public Law 190 n.33 (1978)Google Scholar.

80. LeBlund v. DeBramber, E.S. Roll No. 20, B.3.r. (Eccl. Ct, Canterbury, 1270–1271/72), in Select Cases from the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Province of Canterbury, C. 1200–1301, p. 78 (Adams, N. & Donohue, C. eds. 1981)Google Scholar (case section).

81. However, Durandus and Lyndwood did not use stare or variants. See D. Durandi, A Sancto Porciano [1270/75] 4.18, at 346[a]–[b] (1571); Lyndwood, G., Provinciale bk. 5, tit. 17 (1679)Google Scholar.

82. M. Wesenbacii, supra note 49, at 63.

83. See Baret v. Sparewe, Y.B. 3 Edw. 2 (K.B. 1310), reprinted in 20 Selden Society 134 (1905) (submission of exception of excommunication; no usage of standi); Bracton, supra note 28, fols. 415b, 426b, 427a in 4 S. Thorne, supra note 28, at 293, 326; A. Fitzherbert, La Graunde Abridgement fol. 308b–309a (1577) (excommengement); R. Brooke, supra note 54, fol. 299b–300a (excomengement [sic]); H. Rolle, Un Abridgment … del Common Ley fols. 883–84 (1668) (excommengement); Jones, W. R., Relations of the Two Jurisdictions: Conflict and Cooperation in England During the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, in 7 Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 142–57 (1970)Google Scholar; Vodola, E., Excommunication in the Middle Ages 180–90 and appendices 1 & 2 (1986)Google Scholar.

84. D.2.11.13.

85. D.2.9.

86. See D.2.11.13.

87. See Buckland, W. W., The Roman Law Of Slavery 8284 (1908)Google Scholar.

88. See G.4.46; C.6.6.1; D.37.15.2, 6, 7, quoted by Buckland, W. W., A Text-Book of Roman Law 88 n.8 (P. Stein 3d ed. 1963)Google Scholar.

89. See G.4.37, noted by W. W. Buckland, supra note 88, at 97 n.5.

90. S. Groenewegen, supra note 51, at 465.

91. van Bynkershoek, C., Quaestionum Juris Publici, bk. 1, p. 56 (1930).Google Scholar

92. Id.

93. See S. Groenewegen, supra note 51, at 465.

94. See C. van Bynkershoek, supra note 91, at 56–57.

95. See id.

96. See id. at 51–52.

97. See Bracton, supra note 28, at fol. 427b in 4 S. Thorne, supra note 28, at 328–29; Coke, E., First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, or, A Commentary Upon Littleton sec. 198, at 129b (Hargrave, F. & Butler, C.16th ed.)Google Scholar; Bacon, M., A New Abridgment of the Law (Gwillim, H.5th ed. 1798)Google Scholar; 9 Holdsworth, W., A History of English Law 9798 (3rd ed. 1944)Google Scholar; 1 Pollock, F. & Maitland, F. W., The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I 465–66 (2d ed. 1959)Google Scholar. Note also Bracton's use of “standing” in the context of loyal subjects: “cum eo cui fecerit ligeantiam, et faciat servitium debitum ei cum quo non steterit in persona” Bracton, supra note 28, at fol. 427b., in 4 S. Thorne, supra note 28, at 329.

98. Hay & M. 141 (Adm.)

99. 1 C. Rob. 196, 201–202 (Adm.); see The “Walsingham Packet,” 2 C. Rob. 77, 80 (Adm. 1799) (“persona standi in judicio”).

100. For a history of the litigation rights of alien enemies in England, see McNair, Alien Enemy Litigants, 31 L.Q.R. 154 (1915); see also Mcnair, A. & Watts, A., The Legal Effects of War 122–23 (2d ed. 1966)Google Scholar. It might be that the inability of an alien enemy to litigate was at first a status rule and later became a capacity rule.

101. English courts did not invariably use persona standi in enemies cases. See Casseres v. Bell, 8 T.R. 166 (K.B. 1799) (no use in a discussion of the proper form of a plea of alien enemy); LeBret v. Papillon, 4 East 502 (K.B. 1804) (no use in a discussion of an alien enemy's ability to sue); Flindt v. Waters, 5 East 260 (K.B. 1812) (same).

102. It is noteworthy that at the time the rule of persona standi came to England, the English courts were using “stand” to describe the merits of a litigant's claim of right. For example, in 1754 in Ex parte Dumas, the Chancellor held that assignees of a bankrupt “stand exactly in the same situation with the bankrupt himself.” In 1797 in Sparenburgh v. Bannatyne, a justice said that an imprisoned enemy “does not… stand in the same situation as when in a state of hostility.” It is not surprising, given “stand's” connection with the merits and “standing's” connection with substantive policies, that subsequent meanings of “standing” would go beyond status, capacity, and representation and would become connected with a variety of rules about a litigant's rights, the litigant's ability to prevail upon the merits of his or her claim of right.

103. See, e.g., Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. Rep. 438 (N.Y. 1819) (Kent, Ch.).

104. See Downs, J., The Concept of Clerical Immunity cc. 24. (1941).Google Scholar

105. See id.

106. See 1 Corpus Iuris Canonici, supra note 66, C. 11, prior to q. 1, at 626; see also 2 id., cc. 4, 16, X, de judiciis, II, 1, at 240, 245.

107. See 1 id. at cc. 1–50, C. XI, q. 1, at 626–42.

108. See 1917 Code c.1652 (“[r]eligiosi sine Superiorum consensu non habeat personam standi injudicio”; see also id., c. 1653; The Code of Canon Law, c. 1505, at 972 (J. Coriden, T. Green, D. Heintschel eds. 1985).

109. See J. Downs, supra note 104, pt. 2.

110. See id. at c. 5.

111. Id. at c. 6, p. 77.

112. See id. at c. 7.