1. For example, see Gandinus, Albertus, Tractatus de maleficiis, in Albertus Gandinus und das Strafrecht der Scholastik, ed. Kantorowicz, H. 2 vols. (Berlin, 1907–1926)Google Scholar, rubric De presumptionibus et indiciis indubitatis, ex quibus condemnatio potest sequi: … quia in criminalibus causis intervenire debent et requiruntur probationes clariores luce.

2. The most recent treatment of procedure by ordeal is Bartlett, R., Trial by Fire and Water: The Medieval Judicial Ordeal (Oxford, 1986)Google Scholar.

3. On the prohibition, see Baldwin, J. W., “The Intellectual Preparation for the Canon of 1215 against Ordeals,” Speculum 36 (1961): 613–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. This principle was encapsulated in a text that had been handed down from the Lex Romana Visigothorum 9.30. interp. ad c.1 to the Decretum 2.1.2: The judge presiding over a criminal case cannot pronounce sentence before the defendant confesses that he is guilty or is convicted by unimpeachable witnesses.

5. Nörr, K. W., Zur stellung des Richters im gelehrten Prozess der Frühzeit: Iudex secundum allegata, non secundum conscientiam iudicat (Munich, 1967)Google Scholar.

6. Digest 48.19.5.

7. R. Fraher, “The Theoretical Justification for the New Criminal Law of the High Middle Ages: ‘Rei publicae interest, ne crimina remaneant impunita,’” Illinois Law Review, 1984: 577–95.

8. Langbein, J., Torture and the Law of Proof: Europe and England in the Ancien Regime (Chicago, 1977), 3–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Langbein's discussion of medieval developments relied heavily on Fiorelli, P., La tortura giudiziaria nel diritto comune 2 vols. (Milan, 1953–1954)Google Scholar.

9. Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water, 100. For an insightful treatment of the social pressures to abandon ordeals, see Hyams, P., “Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law” in On the Laws and Customs of England: Essays in Honor of Samuel E. Thorne, ed. Arnold, M. et al. (Chapel Hill, 1981) 90–126Google Scholar.

10. Esmein, A., A History of Continental Criminal Procedure, The Continental Legal History Series, vol. 5 (Boston, 1913, repr. 1968), 80Google Scholar.

11. van Caenegem, R. C., “Methods of Proof in Western Medieval Law,” Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren, an Schone Kunsten van Belgie, 45 Klasse der Letteren (1983) 108–18Google Scholar.

12. Fraher, R., “Preventing Crime in the High Middle Ages: The Medieval Lawyers' Search for Deterrence,” in Popes, Teachers, and Canon Law in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honor of Brian Tierney, ed. Chodorow, S. and Sweeney, J. (Ithaca, N.Y., in press)Google Scholar.

13. For example, see Soman, A., “Deviance and Criminal Justice in Western Europe, 1300–1800: An Essay in Structure,” Criminal Justice History 1 (1980): 3–28Google Scholar; see subsequent volumes of Criminal Justice History for recent bibliography.

14. The problem may actually be a lack of catalogued records rather than a total absence of surviving records. S. Blanshei has found significant criminal court records dating from the late thirteenth century in Perugia and Bologna. See “Crime and Law Enforcement in Medieval Bologna,” Journal of Social History 16 (1982): 121–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “Criminal Law and Politics in Medieval Bologna,” Criminal Justice History: An International Review 2 (1981): 1–30; idem, “Criminal Justice in Medieval Perugia and Bologna,” Law and History Review 1 (1983): 251–75. Other Italian archives may yet yield significant court records from the 1200s. Another potential source of thirteenthcentury criminal records is the relatively unexplored corpus of church court records.

15. The standard English-language works in this area are Esmein, History of European Criminal Procedure, and von Bar, C. L. et al. , A History of European Criminal Law, The Continental Legal History Series, vol. 6 (Boston, 1916)Google Scholar. Much more broadly researched, and much less well known, is Kuttner, S., Kanonistische Schuldlehre von Gratian bis auf die Dekretalen Gregors IX(Vatican City, 1935)Google Scholar.

16. Fraher, R., “Tancred's ‘Summula de criminibus’: A new text and a key to the Ordo iudiciarius,” Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 9 (1979): 23–35Google Scholar.

17. Bergmann, F., ed., Pillius, Tancredus, Grazia, Libri de iudiciorum ordine (repr. Aalen, 1965), 87–316Google Scholar.

18. The edition that I have used is Gulielmus Durantis, Speculum iudiciale 2 vols. (Basel, 1574; repr. Aalen, 1975)Google Scholar. On Durantis's work, see Clarence-Smith, J., Medieval Law Teachers and Writers, Civilian and Canonist (Ottowa, 1975), 54Google Scholar.

19. Clarence-Smith, Medieval Law Teachers, 73, 84.

20. Durantis, Speculum iudiciale.

21. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis.

22. F. Carl von Savigny, Geschichte des Römischen Rechts in Mittelalter, 2d ed. (1850) 5:539; Clarence-Smith, Medieval Law Teachers, 54–55.

23. Clarence-Smith, Medieval Law Teachers, 55.

24. Kantorowicz, Albertus Gandinus und das Strafrecht der Scholastik 1, passim.

25. For Tancred, see Fraher, “Tancred's ‘Summula de criminibus’,” 23; Kantorowicz insisted that Gandinus wrote four different recensions of the Tractatus de maleficiis, beginning with an opusculum that occupied only three or four leaves in folio manuscripts, and culminating in a book-length treatise that occupies one hundred thirty-eight folios of Leipzig MS 1110. Several early manuscripts attribute the earliest, shortest version of the Tractatus de maleficiis to Guido de Suzaria or to Thomas de Piperata. Given that Gandinus borrowed extensively from a Bolognese treatise on torture that might have been Guido's work, and given that Gandinus incorporated material from Thomas's treatise on fama, there is no reason to suspect that Gandinus would have hesitated to borrow a pre-existing tractatus de maleficiis. Finally, Kantorowicz argued that the “second recension” of Gandinus's work referred expressly to an earlier version that Gandinus had composed at Perugia in 1286–87, and that this earlier recension must have been the very short text that Kantorowicz identified as the first recension of Gandinus's work, which survives in Leipzig Univ. Bib. MS 992, fols. 127–130 and in Oxford, Bodleian Can. Misc. 468, fol. 127–132. There is, however, a tractatus de maleficiis surviving in Tarazona MS 18, fol. 71–82, replete with references to thirteenthcentury masters including Guido de Suzaria, Ubertino de Bobbio, Thomas de Piperata, Odofredus, and Albertus Papiensis. The Tarazona text, should it turn out to be the ancestor of Gandinus's “second recension,” explains Gandinus's statement that he had revised an earlier version of his tractatus de maleficiis. One need not, therefore, challenge the scribes who copied the short tractatus de maleficiis preserved in Munich Clm. 12233, fol. 263–66, and in the Oxford MS, which attribute the authorship of the treatise to Guido de Suzaria.

26. For example, in the prologue to the Tractatus de maleficiis, Gandinus expressly conceded that his work was based on Odofredus's lectures and Guido de Suzaria's writings. But in his discussion of judicial arbitrium, under the rubric De questionibus et tormentis § 38, Gandinus failed to cite his source, Thomas de Piperata's Tractatus de fama.

27. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 6.

28. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 5–8, suggests that the abolition of ordeals led to the creation of the ius commune's law of proof. It is certainly more accurate to trace the emergence of a strict law of proof back to the second half of the eleventh century, when a revival of legal learning coincided with the Gregorian Reformer's campaign to re-impose clerical discipline. For the transmission into medieval jurisprudence of the Roman law requiring two witnesses or confession, see Fraher, “Preventing Crime in the High Middle Ages,” n.17.

29. Early canonical efforts in this area consisted of arguments that “notorious” and “manifest” crimes could be punished without observing due process. See X.2.1 cc.15, 17, 21.

30. Dig. 48.19.5.

31. X.3.2.7 and X.3.2.8.

32. See, for example, Jacobus de Bellovisu, Practica iudiciaria, 4 Tractatus universi iuris (1584), rubric De questionibus et qualitate tormentorum § 42. The author argued that even if a judge had arbitrium, he could not torture a suspect without any circumstantial evidence against the defendant because it was a solemnity of the law that one had to produce legitimate indicia before one could proceed with torture.

33. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric Qualiter advocati circa accusationem se debeant habere. Quod debeat esse iudex medius inter utramque partem et personam, non declinando a dextris, neque a sinistris, ut C. de fal. i. Ubi. Jacobus de Bellovisu, Practica iudiciaria, rubric De questionibus et qualitate tormentorum §§ 168–70, juxtaposed the legal principle that criminal proofs must be “clearer than the light at midday” with the prudent observation that a good judge was like a strong tree that would not bow to a strong wind coming from any direction, or like a balance scale that declines neither to the left not to the right.

34. See especially Joannes Andreae, Additiones in Speculum iudiciale (1520–21) and idem, Novella commentaria in V. lib. decretalium (repr. Turin, 1963), preface, drawing upon the recollections of his master, Guido de Baysio.

35. Bartolus, , In ius universum civile commentaria (Basel, 1562)Google Scholar, Dig. 48.18.10 § Plurimum: De hoc etiam fecit unum tractatum in quo dixit modicum et bonum quidam qui est vocatus dominus Thomas de Piperata de Bononia.

36. Diplovatatius, T., Liber de claris iuris consultis, pars posterior, ed. Forchielli, I. et Stickler, A., Studia Gratiana 10 (1968): 172Google Scholar: Thomas de Piperata floruit tempore dicti Rolandini, doctor Bononiensis illustris. Diplovatatius filled out his brief paragraph on Thomas by reciting the names of other authors who cited Thomas's Tractatus de fama: William Durantis, Joannes Andreae, Albertus Gandinus, Bartolus, and Albericus de Rosate.

37. Dolezalek, G., 4 Verzeichnis der Handschriften zum römischen Recht bis 1600 (1972)Google Scholar listed sixteen extant manuscripts of the Tractatus de fama. By way of comparison, Dolezalek's work lists twelve manuscripts of Angelus Aretinus's Tractatus de maleficiis and eighteen manuscripts that contain copies of Gandinus's Tractatus de maleficiis. In contrast, Dolezalek listed only a single manuscript of Bonifatius de Antellinis's Tractatus de maleficiis.

38. For “secessions” from Bologna to Vicenza in 1204, to Arezzo in 1215, and to Padua in 1222, see Rashdall, H., The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, 2d ed. (1936), 2:10Google Scholar. During the Bolognese civil war that began in 1274, the Church officially dispatched the canons of the Council of Vienne to the law faculty at Padua, instead of communicating them to the faculty at Bologna, as had been the custom since the first official decretal collections were transmitted to Bologna by the papacy at the beginning of the thirteenth century.

39. Sarti, M. and Fattorini, M., De Claris archigymnasii Bononiensis professoribus a saeculo xi usque ad saeculum xiv, 2d. ed. (Bologna, 1888–1896), 1:189n.2Google Scholar indicates that the division in Bologna dated back at least as far as 1218. On Guelphs and Ghibellines in thirteenth-century Italy, see B. Pullan, A History of Early Renaissance Italy from the Mid-Thirteenth to the Mid-Fifteenth Century (1973), 26–48; D. Waley, The Italian City Republics (1969), 200–218.

40. Sarti, and Fattorini, , De Claris … professoribus 2:53–55Google Scholar present the entire text of the Bolognese archival record of this contract, dated 9 and 10 February, 1269.

41. Ibid.: Item quod si civitas Bononie esset in aliquo rumore, quod Deus avertat, et tunc ipsi domino Bitto Bulgano vel suis sociis vel nunciis per forciam esset aliquid acceptum, quod Commune Bononie debeat ei vel eis satisfacere de omni eo, quod probaverit, vel probatum fuerit per vim sibi acceptum fore, ipsum vel ipsos conservare indempnem vel indempnes.

42. Ibid. 1:225n.3.

43. Ibid. 1:224.

44. Ibid. 1:189n.1, citing Ghirardacci's tale about the two lovers. Cf. Ghirardacci, Cherubino, Della historia di Bologna (Bologna, 1596), Bk.7Google Scholar.

45. Waley, Italian City Republics, 218.

46. Sarti, and Fattorini, , De Claris … professoribus 1:225Google Scholar.

47. Ibid. 1:189, citing the commune's Liber reformationum in the Bolognese public archives.

48. Waley, Italian City Republics, 211.

49. Sarti, and Fattorini, , De claris … professoribus 1:189Google Scholar: Cum autem Forolivienses fortiter resistissent et Bononienses bellum in eos majori studio instaurarent, ea re magis exasperati in Jeremienses Lambertaccii (Ghibellini scilicet in Guelphos) bellum civile excitarunt tam cruentem et atrox ut fere civitas eversa sit.

50. Ibid. 1:225: Thomas enim ejusque frater Castellanus perduellionis nomine patria pulsi et fortunis fere omnibus spoliati [sunt].

51. Ibid.: Sed in medio rerum discrimine, cum extremum diem ageret senex Piperata inpendentes suae calamitates animo prospiciens, non filios suos Thomam, Castellanum, ac Bartholomaeum … sed nepotes inpuberes, eorum filios, haeredes instituit … Non tamen innoxios liberos eadem secum involverunt. Thomas had speculated about the relationship between testamentary devices and the criminal sanction of expropriation in a quaestio disputata, preserved in a Vatican MS, Arch. S. Pietro A.29, fol. 135v–136r. The text is partially edited in G. D'Amelio et al. Studi sulle “Quaestiones” civilistiche disputate nelle universita medievali (1980), 286.

52. He would have produced a consilium concerning the legality of the commune's contract for coinage, text found in Sarti, and Fattorini, , De claris … professoribus 2:53–5Google Scholar, and another concerning the legality of the magistrates' actions in trying to coerce Forli to remain subject to Bologna, ibid. 1:189n.1.

53. M. Bellomo, Due “libri magni quaestionum disputatarum” e le “quaestiones” di Riccardo da Saliceto, in Studi Senesi, 3d ser., 18, fasc. 2; for a partial edition of Thomas's quaestiones, see F. Martino, Quaestiones civilistiche disputate a Bologna negli ultimi decenni del secolo XIII, in Studi sulle “Quaestiones,” ed. G. D'Amelio et al. 225–96. Martino's partial transcription of the texts from Leipzig Univ. Bib. MS 992 needs to be compared with the texts preserved in another manuscript, Vat. Arch. S. Pietro A. 29, which includes seventeen quaestiones attributed to Thomas de Piperata, eight of which do not appear in the Leipzig manuscript that Martino used.

54. MS Arch. S. Pietro A.29 contains five of Thomas's quaestiones that discuss criminal cases (fols. 98v, lOOr, 120v, 128v, and 140v) and five that discuss testamentary succession or legacies (fols. 118v, 121r, 127r, 132r, and 135v).

55. See G. Callon's description of Tours MS 653 in Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France, 37:522–3 (8th ser., 1886–1965)Google Scholar. This manuscript, destroyed in 1940, contained a tractatus de maleficiis (fols. 1–6); a tractatus de questionibus (fols. 6–8), a tractatus de exceptionibus (fol. 8), and the tractatus de fama, all attributed to Thomas de Piperata. One would be tempted to dismiss these attributions, but for a mysterious catalogue entry concerning yet another lost manuscript, this one from Seo de Urgel. R. Beer, Handschriftschatze Spaniens, in Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Classe, 129:59 (1893) mentioned a manuscript volume including two treatises, one being the Libellus fugitivus of Nepos de Montealbano, and the second described as follows: Secundus vero tractatus est maleficiorum puniendorum et questionum et maleficiorum faciendorum, compositus a Domino Thomato. This faintly echoes the explicit of the Tours manuscript described above: Explicit tractatus de fama et de maleficiis, compositus a domino Thomasio de Piperatis, legum doctore. Since both manuscripts have been lost to scholarly use, there remains only a tantalizing hint that Thomas de Piperata might have written more than we know about.

56. Kuttner, S., “Bernardus Compostellanus Antiquus: A Study in the Glossators of the Canon Law” Traditio 1 (1943):308–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The glossa ordinaria to Gratian's Decretum suppressed the memory of Bernardus and of Alanus Anglicus. Similarly, the decretalist Tancred acknowledged his dependence upon some of his predecessors while declining to mention others, such as Johannes Galensis. Among the civilians, the nostri doctores, including Bulgarus, Johannes Bassianus, Azo, Accursius, and their followers, suppressed the opinions of the Gosiani: Martinus Gosia, Placentinus, Pillius, and their followers. See H. Kantorowicz and W. Buckland, Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law (1938), 87.

57. Augustinus Giganticus, Commentaria, in Aretinus, Angelus, Tractatus de maleficiis (Venice, 1578)Google Scholar, rubric Comparuerunt dicti inquisiti, no. 5; Jacobus de Bellovisu, Practica iudiciaria, rubric De questionibus et qualitate tormentorum, nos. 78–81.

58. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric De presumptionibus et indiciis indubitatus, § 12, text at n.163.

59. Andreae, Additio ad Speculum iudiciale, rubric Quid sit fama, vv. reprobatus, coarctemus, veniens, text at nn.225–27.

60. Bartolus, In ius universum civile commentaria, Dig. 48.18.10 § Plurimum, text at n.233.

61. Aretinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric Quod fama publica procedente, no. 18, text at n.264.

62. Ziletti, G., ed. Tractatus criminates (Venice, 1563) fol. 1–14Google Scholar; idem ed. Tractatus universi iuris (Venice, 1584) tom. 11, fol. 8–10; Freher, M., ed. Tractatus de fama publica (Frankfurt, 1598)Google Scholar.

63. See Kuttner, S., “Analecta Iuridica Vaticana (Vat. lat. 2343),” in Collectanea Vaticana in honorem Anselmi M. Cardinale Albareda a Bibliotheca Apostolica edita (Vatican City, 1962), 4 n.3Google Scholar.

64. Piperata, Thomas de, Tractatus de fama, in Tractatus universi iuris (Venice, 1584)Google Scholar tom. 11: Quoniam circa famam, indicium, argumentum, et presumptionem multas dubitationes oriri contingit in iudiciis … infrascripta super predictis redigere curavi.

65. For a discussion of the medieval jurists' treatment of fama as both a question of status and a quantum of proof, see Migliorino, F., Fama e infamia: Problemi della società medievale net pensiero giuridico nei secoli XII e XIII (Catania, 1985)Google Scholar, especially the introduction. For Migliorino's opinion of Thomas de Piperata's contribution, see pp. 65–70.

66. Canon eight of the Fourth Lateran Council appears in the decretals as X.5.1.24: … verum etiam cum prelatus excedit, si per clamorem et famam ad aures superioris pervenerit … debet coram ecclesie senioribus veritatem diligentius perscrutari … non tanquam idem sit accusator et iudex, sed quasi denunciante fama vel deferente clamore officii sui debitum exsequatur.

67. See especially the glossa ordinaria at X.2.1.7 and X.2.1.8 concerning the relationship of fama, manifestum, and notorium; also the gloss at X.5.1.24.

68. Migliorino, Fama e infamia, 65: ‘La prima e più celebrata opera dedicata quasi interamente alla fama ….’

69. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Dicitur fama quod homines alicuius civitatis, villae, vel castri, vel vici, vel contratae alicuius communiter opinantur et existimant sive sentiunt, illud verbis sive loquella asserendo, non tamen habent pro certo et vero vel manifesto.

70. Ibid.: Quod autem dixi, homines alicuius civitatis, etc., non sic debet intelligi ut in omnibus partibus civitatis … oporteat esse opinionem sive existimationem predictam. Immo sufficit quod sit in maiori parte, quia refertur ad universos quod fit per maiorem partem.

71. Ibid.: Considerandum est quod sit factum de quo dicitur esse fama. Nam si tale sit sive ita magnum, quod per famam ab omnibus de civitate … scilicet a maiori parte ipsorum sciri debuerit vel sciri soleat, tunc non sufficit esse famam de facto predicto in aliqua contrata civitatis … Puta D. Brancallo et D. Castellanus de Andalotis olim fuerint senatores urbis Romane. Nunc est questio in civitate Bononie si fuerint senatores vel non. Ad probationem fame sufficit probare famam esse, de hoc quod fuerunt senatores urbis Romane, in quarterio Porte S. Proculi vel in contrata ipsorum? Certe non. The example is historically accurate. The degli Andalo were a Bolognese family of professional podestà. Brancaleone degli Andalo, Count of Casalecchio, was senator of the Romans from 1252 to 1254 and from 1254 to 1258. Pullan, History of Early Renaissance Italy, 123–24.

72. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Si vero duo populares fuerunt potestates aliquarum villarum civitatis Bononie, tunc sit questio super hoc. Nonne sufficeret ad famam probandam probare de hoc esse famam in contrata ipsorum? Certe sic.

73. Ibid.: Si questio sit de offensione facta alicui de maioribus civitatis, propter quam offensionem fuit magnus rumor in civitate Bononie, partes forte fecerunt tumultum et ad bellum se preparaverunt, si probatur famam esse de aliquo quod dictam offensionem fecerit, certe non sufficit probare famam esse de hoc in aliqua contrata. Immo probari oportet famam esse per civitates et loca similia. Si de offensione facta alicui parvo populari agitur, et fama sit probanda, sufficit probare famam contrate, et sic de similibus. Thomas's examples illustrate once more the ubiquitous theme of factional strife leading to violence.

74. Cf. X.5.1.24, in which Innocent III asserted that fama had to arise from providis et honestis, and not from malevolis et maledicis; X.3.2.8, in which Innocent taught that a cleric's cohabitation with a woman could be brought before the cleric's superiors on the basis of informal complaints of “good men” among whom the cleric had his abode.

75. Thomas followed a fashion dating back at least as far as Isidore of Seville's Etymologies. Like many of the scholastics' linguistic ventures, Thomas's etymological speculations were ludicrous. He claimed that the word fama was derived from the phrase fides mentis (with fa- standing for fides and -ma standing for mentis), meaning “mental belief.”

76. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Et quidem probatur [fama] per duos testes … nisi iudici constet de dicta fama, quia sit nota sibi ut notoria.

77. The canonistic definition of notorium was expressed in X.3.2.7 and X.3.2.8, under the title “On the cohabitation of clerics with women.” The canonists' glosses to these decretals provided the basis for scholastic discussions of notorium, manifestum, fama, occultum, and related concepts. Cf. Bartolus, In ius universum civile commentaria, Dig. 48.16.6.3: Tractatum de notoriis criminibus non habemus in iure nostro, sed canonistes habent tractatum longum.

78. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Si dicat “nescio,” vel si dicat quod hoc audivit a tali et a tali, vel a x vel xx hominibus, non valet dictum ipsius aliquid.

79. Ibid.: Unde sapientes tabelliones querunt a teste deponente super fama, quid est fama; item quod homines faciunt famam; item unde habuit originem fama de quo deponit … Sed quid si respondeat testis interrogatus de origine fame, “nescio unde habuit originem?” Puto quod bene respondeat.

Si queratur a teste, “quomodo scis?”, debet respondere quia ita sentit maior pars populi civitatis….

80. Ibid.: Si vero respondeat testis “originem habuit fama ab ipso facto de quo agitur vel de quo est fama,” puto responsionem optimam. Nam factum potest hominibus esse certum….

81. Mansfield, J., “Jury Notice,” Georgetown Law Journal 74 (1985): 395Google Scholar; Fraher, R., “Adjudicative Facts, Non-Evidence Facts, and Permissible Jury Background Information,” Indiana Law Journal 62 (1986): 333Google Scholar.

82. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Sed quid operabitur fama probata, cum agitur ex contractu et petitur aliquid ex promissione, et probatur famam esse quod ille a quo petitur illud promisit? Vel quid si agatur rei vendicatione vel simili actione, et probatur famam esse quod res petita sit petentis? Vel agitur civiliter ex quacunque causa et actoris intentio approbatur per famam, nec probatur aliquid aliud?… fama sola non probat in casibus supradictis.

83. Ibid.: Et quidem fama probata aliquando operatur et habet effectum ut valet contractus celebratus cum aliquo, ut sic condemnari possit exceptione cessante, que alias si non probaretur.

84. Ibid.: Illa fama locum habet si mutuo filiofamilias de quo fama sit quod sit paterfamilias. Nam si pecuniam receptam ab ipso repetam et ipse nunc exceptionem opponat, et ego probavero famam fuisse tempore dati mutui quod est paterfamilias, cessabit exceptio supradicta et condemnabitur cum effectu.

85. Ibid.: Nam si fuero in iudicio cum filiofamilias sine consensu patris, cum esset fama quod dictus filiusfamilias esset paterfamilias, tenebit iudicium, quia in iudiciis quasi contrahitur… sed si non fuisset dicta fama nec probaretur, nec instantia iudicii nec sententia valeret regulariter.

86. Ibid.: Sic operatur circa iudicium, quod valeat iudicium et sententia et arbitrium, instantia et acta omnibus alicuius, ut si de iudice vel arbitro vel tabellione erat fama quod esset liber, et erat servus.

87. Ibid.: Sed in dictis casibus fama probata reddit id de quo agitur validum.

88. Ibid.: Sed quid operabitur fama probata, cum agitur ex contractu et petitur aliquid ex promissione, et probatur famam esse quod ille a quo petitur illud promisit?

89. Ibid.: Illud enim quod petitur ex contractu probari debet per testes qui de veritate et sua scientia testimonium perhibeant.

90. Ibid.: Fama sola non probat in casibus supradictis.

91. Ibid.:… verum est quod consentiens fama confirmat fidem rei de qua queritur quando preter famam sunt alie probationes. Que si quidem sint plene et sufficientes probant per se sine fama, nihilominus confirmat fama ibidem si non erant omni exceptione maiores, quod esse debent.

92. See C. Donahue, “Proof by Witnesses in the Church Courts of Medieval England: An Imperfect Reception of the Learned Law” in On the Laws and Customs of England, ed. Arnold et al., 143–55.

93. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Multitudo testium facit additamentum quoddam ad probationem faciendam per eos, que non fieret si non esset multitudo ipsorum, quia non erant omni exceptione maiores, et sic confirmat probationem faciendam per eos.

94. Ibid.: In secundo casu dignitas testium operatur, quod plenam faciant probationem quam non fecerent alias, cum forte non essent omni exceptione maiores vel quia erant amici producentis vel simili ratione, et sic dignitas testium supplet quod alios deficeret et confirmat probationem faciendam per eos.

95. Ibid.: Nam presumptione iuris non vivit homo ultra centum annos, cui statur nisi contrarium doceat.

96. Accursius, glossa ordinaria to Dig. 22.5.3 v. Confirmat: Dicitur fama confirmare, idest cum alio firmare: non quod per se fama non sufficiat; sed respectu assertionis partis, quam assertionem fama confirmat. Sufficit ergo per se.

97. Ibid.: Sufficit ergo per se … secundum Ioan.

98. Ibid.: Alii dicunt, quando consonant naturae, ut B. mortuum, et propter hoc dicit hic “alias consentiens,” idest quandoque; sed alias non sufficit famam probare.

99. Ibid.: Alii dicunt quod [fama] cum alio firmat … Facit ergo secundum hos probationem semiplenam.

100. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Respondetur et inducetur in argumentum quod fama dicitur confirmare, non quod per se non sufficiat absque alia probatione, sed respectu assertionis partis, quam assertionem fama confirmat, et ita sufficit pro se absque alia probatione, allegauit dominus Accursius … et scriptum est in apparatu Accursii, posito in dicto paragrapho “Alias numerus” preter predicta “secundum Io.” quasi Io. predicta dixerit et conscripserit. Sed loan, excludo, quod predicta non scripsit, non dixit. Immo dixit totum contrarium, quod fama sola non probat in casibus supradictis, et hoc puto ipsam veritatem, quod fama probata in casibus supradictis non probat.

101. Ibid.: Non tamen per hoc sentio quod fama obtineat medietatem plene probationis.

102. Ibid.: Item quid operatur fama in maleficiis, ut puta accusatur quis de homicidio vel alio crimine, accusator non probat aliud nisi famam et vocem publicam esse quod accusatus aliquod maleficium commiserit de quo accusatus est, numquid ex tali probatione erit condemnandus?

103. Ibid.: In criminali enim debent esse probationes luce clariores.

104. The Fourth Lateran Council's decree Qualiter et quando had authorized prosecution by ex officio inquisition whenever “a clamor arose that could not be ignored without scandal or tolerated without danger” to law and order. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric Quomodo de maleficiis cognoscatur per inquisitionem, explained that Qualiter et quando had established six prerequisites to inquisitio: public outcry and fama that the suspect had committed the crime; personal jurisdiction over the suspect; a judge's awareness of the infamia; that the outcry not be a single instance, but a constant or repeated phenomenon; that the fama have arisen among honest and discreet persons; and that the fama not have arisen from malice, but out of a zeal for justice. If an inquisitio were undertaken against a particular individual, Gandinus believed that the procedural rules of Qualiter et quando should be followed, although a generalis inquisitio, or an investigation of a crime without a particular suspect, could be undertaken without any fama.

105. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Queritur quid operabitur fama in maleficiis? Respondeo quod confirmabit alias probationes aliorum testium qui non sunt omni exceptione maiores, ut supra dixi in causis civilibus.

106. Ibid.: Sed numquid operabitur [fama], ut torqueri possit accusatus secundum iura communia?

107. Ibid.: Nam ad veritatem maleficii inveniendi torqueri potest accusatus… precedentibus tamen indiciis. A questionibus enim inchoandum non est, nisi precedant indicia sive argumenta.

108. Ibid.: Ex indicio vero non proceditur secundum iura communia ad questiones, sed ex indiciis.

109. Ibid.: ut puta dictum unius testis … vel si constaret accusatum esse inimicum accusatoris … Idem si se iactasset accusatus de maleficio committendo … Idem si visus fuisset accusatus fugere de loco maleficii tempore maleficii commissi … Idem si alias maleficium perpetrasset in personam illius qui nunc dicitur offensus vel etiam alterius, quia qui semel fuit malus et nunc presumitur malus.

110. G. Fasoli and P. Sella, eds., Statuti di Bologna dell' Anno 1288, Bk. 4, rubric 17: De tondolo et tormento: Ordinamus quod nullus possit vel debeat modo aliquo vel ingenio tormentari … nisi in casibus infrascriptis …

111. Ibid.: Et in quolibet predictorum casuum cum violente presumptiones invente fuerint.

112. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Scio tamen quod Italici utuntur hoc vocabulo, quia dicunt quod est presumptio violenta, unde dicit lex municipalis Bononie quod nullus ponatur ad torculum sive tormentum nisi in certis casibus in quibus potest quis poni, videlicet si sint contra eum presumptiones violente. Que ergo dicantur violente presumptiones? Respondeo magna indicia, que sunt minus indiciis indubitatis et plus indiciis simplicibus. For a more refined discussion of violent presumptions, see Innocent III, In V. Lib. Decretalium Commentaria (Venice, 1610) at X.2.23.10 v. verosimile. Innocent claimed that violentae presumptiones constituted a sufficient basis for a condemnation, but cautioned that a judge should only rarely use such presumptions as proof and should mollify the penalty in such a case.

113. In the inaugural oath of the Bolognese podestà, Statuti di Bologna, Bk. 1, rubric 5, the magistrate laid claim to unfettered discretion except as regards torture:… et in his inquirendis habeam purum, merum, et liberum arbitrium, salvo semper … statuto quod loquitur de tondolo et tormento. In contrast, the Florentine statutes of the early fourteenth century gave the podestà and the capitano del popolo broad discretion to torture suspects who fled:… habeant arbitrium et liberam potestatem et teneatur cogere et ad tormenta ponere et omni alia via qui eis vel alteri eorum videbitur investigare quoscunque … qui pro eorum ministeriis publicis consueverunt recipere pecuniam … aufugientes et se absentes … Sed quando et quantum ponantur ad tormenta vel alia via tormentorum procedatur sit in arbitrio Potestatis et Capitanei qui tunc fuerint. Statuto del Capitano del Popolo, 1322–1325 (Florence, 1910), Bk. 2, rubric 25Google Scholar. For plenum et liberum arbitrium involving fraudulent behavior in litigation concerning debt, see ibid., Bk. 2, rubric 28. Bk. 3, rubric 2 authorized the capitano to prosecute and convict anyone who attempted to corrupt a public official, and specifically established a lesser standard of proof: et sufficiat probatio per publica fama. In other criminal matters involving values of less than ten Florentine pounds, the statutes permitted the Capitano to proceed summarily, relying on proof by a single witness: et sufficiat probatio per unum testem. Bk. 2, rubric 1.

114. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Et ideo dixi “secundum iura communia” sive Romana, quod quando lex municipalis determinat quando sit ad tormenta procedendum, per potestatem vel iudicem secundum illam legem municipalem est procedendum et non aliter.

115. Ibid.: Et ideo dixi “secundum iura communia sive Romana” quia quando potestas habet arbitrium, etiam si non essent indicia plura sed unum tantum, posset ad tormenta procedere.

116. Ibid.:… quia dare arbitrium potestati nihil aliud est quam dicere quod bona fide procedat, ut sibi placuerit et ut sua conscientia sibi dictaverit.

117. Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters.

118. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Nam arbitrium supradictum potestati vel iudici dat largas habenas, et hoc vult arbitrii interpretatio.

119. Ibid.: Unde cum datur arbitrium potestati, non dicat quis ad boni viri arbitrium reducendum arbitrium potestatis vel condemnatio ab eo factum. Aliud enim est privatos compromittere in arbitratores, quo casu arbitrium reduci debet ad arbitrium boni viri … Aliud est per legem municipalem vel reformationem populi sive decurionum dari arbitrium potestati, quo casu per arbitrium habet potestas quod dixi.

120. Ibid.: Item quid possit facere potestas sive iudex ex tale arbitrio sibi dato, potius capitur ex consuetudine terrarum quam ex iure.

121. Ibid.:… quia quando potestas habet arbitrium, etiam si non essent indicia plura sed unum tantum, posset ad tormenta procedere.

122. Ibid.: Item licet in procedendo et in maleficium cognoscendo possint omittere ordinem et solemnitatem iuris ex consuetudinaria et communi interpretatione arbitrii, non tamen prorsus non possunt vel debent omittere.

123. Ibid.: Item et cum ad sententiam pervenerint, caveant ne ratione arbitrii condemnent ex sola conscientia, vel ex sola fama, vel ex dicto unius testis, sed si inveniant probatum maleficium tunc condemnent.

124. Ibid.: Idem si non sit omnino plene probatum, sed si ad probationem plenam ad modicum deficiat, forte ratione testium qui non sint omni exceptione maiores, nam tunc condemnent secure per arbitrium quod habent, si tamen conscientia et animus cum probatione concurrit.

125. Ibid.: Tenetur enim potestas qui habet arbitrium de dolo et lata culpa, iudicio meo, ut depositarius.

126. Ibid.: Sed quid si maleficium est probatum per unum testem omni exceptione maiorem, item per famam et vocem publicam, numquid poterit condemnare potestas? Respondeo quod non, secundum iura Romana et communia … Ex arbitrio tamen quod habet potestas bene poterit condemnare, et bona fide videtur procedere si condemnet.

127. Ibid.: Nec propter hoc intelligo plene probatum, quia famam non puto facere dimidium probationis plene.

128. Ibid.: Quis sit effectus indicii? Et certe iosius effectus est, ut moveat animus iudicis ad credendum accusatum de maleficii commississe maleficium.

129. Ibid.: Ista verto indicia aut sunt ad probationem indubitata aut sint dubitata. Primo casu, quando sunt ad probationem indubitata, tunc ex iis proceditur ad sententiam condemnatoriam.

130. They were quoted by Albertus Gandinus, adapted by Bartolus of Saxoferrato, recited by Angelus Aretinus, who attributed them to Bartolus, only to be caught by Girolamo Giganti, who corrected the attribution and rejected the legal doctrine articulated by Thomas de Piperata. Finally, Thomas's three cases were quoted verbatim, without attribution, in Jacobus de Bellovisu's Practica criminalia, rubric De questionibus et qualitate tormentorum nos. 78–81.

131. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Est camera habens unum aditum et exitum, et non plures. De dicta camera exiit sive egreditur aliquis pallidus, cum gladio sanguinolento in manibus. Statim post eius exitum invenitur in dicta camera homo occisus cum gladio. Ista certa sunt indicia ad probationem maleficii indubitati.

It seems that Thomas de Piperata had never seen a thirteenth-century predecessor of Perry Mason establish a client's innocence, despite the client's having been caught with a “smoking revolver” in his hand, while kneeling over the body of his slain enemy.

132. Ibid.: Raro tamen inveniuntur talia indicia, unde subiciamus aliud exemplum de indiciis ad probationem indubitatis que de facto possent venire.

133. Ibid.: Ecce, occiditur Titius in aliqua vinea vel fundo. Accusatus est Seius, quod dictum Titium interfecerit. Nulli testes deponunt quod Seius occiderit eum, sed probatur hoc, videlicet quod Seius erat inimicus Titii. Item dicunt testes quod viderunt Seium admenantem cum gladio contra Titium. Item probatur per testes quod Seius fugit tempore dicti maleficii de loco in quo fuit commissum dictum malencium. Item probatur vox et fama quod dictus Seius occiderit istum Titium.

134. Ibid.: Certe omnia ista iuncta simul, etsi singula per se non sufficiant, vel duo ex eis, que tamen sunt quattuor, quorum quilibet indicat dictum Seium predictum maleficium commississe, bene probant Seium occidisse dictum Titium.

135. Ibid.: Ecce aliud exemplum: Accusatur aliquis, puta Seius, quod Titium fecit occi. Non sunt testes qui hoc dicent, sed probatur hoc contra Seium, videlicet quod erat inimicus Titii. Item quod dictus Seius tempore maleficii perpetrati erat prope locum maleficii. Item quod dictus Seius perpetrato homicidio receptavit homicidam. Item quod homicida erat domesticus et familiaris Seii. Item quod Seius iactabat se, quod faceret dictum Titium occi, et est homo de quo verosimilie sit quod hoc faceret, et hoc facere possit. Item quod olim alique offensiones facte fuerunt inter predictos Titium et Seium.

136. Ibid.: Ista certe satis videntur facere indicia indubitata quod ille Seius fecerit occidi predictum Titium.

137. Cf. Sarti, and Fattorini, , De claris … professoribus 2:53, no. 32Google Scholar, in which “Thomaxium domini Peverarii” appears as a jurisconsult and “domino Gandino judice” appears as a witness.

138. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, preface: Circa cuius libelli correctionem et continentiam talem intendo ordinem observare: ante omnia premittendo, quod de maleficiis cognoscitur quinque modis, videlicet per accusationem, per denuntiationem, per inquisitionem et exceptionem, et quando crimen est notorium.

139. Ibid., rubric Quomodo de maleficio cognoscitur, quando crimen est notorium § 4: Notorium vero facti habetur id crimen, in quo fama suum prebet adminiculum et ipsa evidentia rei protestatur, quod se prebet et se exhibet conspectui hominum omnium vel maioris partius alicuius loci, ut nulla possit tergiversatione celatur, ut extra de cohabitatione clericorum et mulierum c. Tua et c. Vestra et c. fin. Gandinus quoted verbatim from the decretals that he cited.

140. Ibid., rubric Quid sit fama: Restat nunc videre, quo modo cognoscitur, quando crimen est notorium. Sed quoniam fama, infamia, presumptiones et indicia sunt precedentia cognitionem dicti notorii criminis, et etiam quoniam pro investigatione et cognitione criminum plurimum operantur, ideo de eis omnibus videamus.

141. Ibid., rubrics Quid sit fama; Unde aut a quo loco possit fama procedere; A quo vel a quibus personis possit fama incipere et ex quo tempore; Qualis et quantus sit fame effectus; De presumptionibus et indiciis dubitatis, quibus proceditur ad tormenta; De presumptionibus et indiciis indubitatis, ex quibus condemnatio possit sequi; De rumore, de occulto, et de manifesto.

142. Ibid., rubric Quid sit fama § 1: Equidem fama est inlese dignitatis status, moribus et legibus comprobatus, et in nullo diminutus.

143. Ibid., rubric De presumptionibus et indiciis indubitatis, ex quibus condemnatio possit sequi.

144. Ibid., § 1: Sed licet ex ea sola probatione, que iuris est tantum, aliquis non possit vel debeat corporaliter diffinitive damnare, tamen ex ea sola presumptione, que iuris est et de iure, et ex quolibet alio indicio indubitato poterit contra aliquem diffinitiva formari sententia, quia talis presumptio, qui iuris est et de iure, probationem aliquam in contrarium non admittit … Item ex quolibet indicio indubitato poterit diffinitiva formari sententia … et merito, quia Illa lege ultima (scil. Cod. 4.19.25) cavetur, quod accusatores eam rem, hoc est illud crimen, habent et debent in publicam notionem deferre, ut possit diffinitiva proferri sententia, quod crimen idoneis testibus sit munitum, saltim duobus … vel quod sit apertissimis documentis instructum … vel quod sit instructum indiciis ad probationem indubitatis, clarioribus luce expedita.

145. Ibid.: Et circa presentem materiam primo intendo formare quandam dubitabilem questionem, que tota die de facto potest subsistere.

146. Ibid.: Questio talis est. Quidam nomine Titius in domo vel agro reperitur occisus vel vulneratus, de malefactore autem aliter non constat, nisi quia quidam nomine Seius de dicto maleficio inculpatur; contra hunc Seium ista probantur per testes idoneos omni exceptione maiores: primo, quod publica vox et fama est ab idoneis orta personis, quod dictus Seius dictum malencium commisit; secundo, quod ipse erat illius Titii capitalis inimicus; tertio, quod ille Seius visus fuit solus exire domum vel agrum Titii, cum gladio evaginato in manu fugere, in qua domo vel agro ille Titius repertus est occisus incontinenti vel vulneratus. Modo queritur, numquid ista omnia indicia simul iuncta et commixta sint et dici possint indicia indubitata, ex quibus possit ad condemnationem procedi?

147. Ibid.: Et primo videtur posse dici, quod sic, triplici ratione: prima quia sicut sufficit, quod quis sit testibus superatus vel propria voce confessus, ad hoc, ut possit capitalis sententia contra eum proferri … ita eodem modo debebit ex dictis contra eum repertis sententia proferri, cum talia indicia non respuantur a iure … et cum talia indicia non videantur continere minorem auctoritatem et fidem probationis, quam testes vel instrumenta (citing Cod. 4.19.21 and Cod. 3.32.19) … Item tarn testes quam aperta indicia et manifesta equiparantur, ut possit sequi diffinitiva sententia (citing Cod. 4.19.25).

148. Ibid.: Secunda ratione: quia quotiens circa idem pluria auxilia eiusdem generis ex eodem factor descendentia simul commixta et iuncta concurrunt, dicuntur rem perficere et plenam probationem adducere … sic et a simili supradicta indicia simul coniuncta plenam probationem inducunt, ideo quod singula, que non prosunt, tamen simul iuncta coadiuvunt …

149. Ibid.: Tertia ratione, quia in qualibet civili causa regulariter due semiplene probationes faciant unam plenam et possit causa civilis per indicia et presumptiones probari … Plus tamen valere debent et operari tria vel pluria auxilia quam duo. Nam ratio consistit, ut plus tribus quam duobus credatur. Pluralitati enim standum est … Ergo per locum a proportione maiori tria indicia seu tres semiplene probationes unam plenam probationem poterunt operari. Alioquin facile et frequenter remanerent maleficia impunita, quod in contrarium magna ratio suadet.

For the force of this argument, see Fraher, “Theoretical Justification for the New Criminal Law of the High Middle Ages,” 577–95.

150. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric De presumptionibus et indiciis indubitatus: Quarta ratione … Reperitur in iure, quod ipsa principalis causa criminalis per argumenta et per presumptiones dignoscitur et terminatur, quamquam liquido delictum probari non possit, ut ff. de re militari 1. Non omnes § A barbaris, (Dig. 49.16.5.6) ibi: “et si hoc liquido probari non possit, argumentis tamen cognoscendum est,” et tamen ibi capitalis causa agebatur.

151. Ibid.: E contra, videtur dicendum quod non possit ex dictis indiciis et presumptionibus diffinitive damnari, tribus rationibus. Prima, quia in civilibus questionibus maioribus una libra auri non minor quam trium testium exigatur probatio.

152. Ibid.: Multo fortius in qualibet criminali causa due vel tres presumptiones aut indicia probationem non poterunt operari … maxime cum quelibet causa criminalis sit maior qualibet pecuniaria … tamen in criminali causa ex dictis semiplenis probationibus non erit quis diffinitive damnandus, quia in causa criminali probationes debent esse apertissime … Strictius enim in eis proceditur, cum circa hominis salutem agatur.

153. Ibid.: Secunda ratione, quia, licet evidentia rei habeatur pro quadam specie probationis … et etiam cum manifestum et apertum indicium habeatur aliquem inveniri in crimine et fore detentum et captum … et manifesta non indigeant probatione … tamen propterea non debet quis ex talibus indiciis diffinitive damnari, nisi aliter de maleficio convincatur, ut arg. ff. di ritu nuptiarum 1. Palam § Que in adulterio (Dig. 43.2.23.12) et C. de defensoribus civitatum 1. Defensores (Cod. 1.55.8).

154. Ibid.: Potest tertia etiam ratio assignari, quoniam ex testibus, ex instrumentis, ex indiciis indubitatis, non autem ex presumptione est diffinitiva sententia proferenda … In civili autem secus, ideo, quia in criminalibus causis maius periculum vertitur, ideo quia imminet periculum anime … Et in talibus dubiis et incertis probationibus melius est facinus inpunitum relinqui nocentis, quam innocentem damnare, ut ff. de penis 1. Absentem (Dig. 48.19.5).

155. Ibid.: Solutio. Videtur, quod ex predictis indiciis possit colligi tantum iuris presumptio contra predictum Seium … Et quamvis in causa civili ex iuris tantum presumptione possit diffinitiva sequi sententia … tamen in criminali causa vel in causa questionis predicte ex tali presumptione iuris tantum non debebit vel poterit quis damnari.

156. Ibid.: … quia in criminalibus causis intervenire debent et requiruntur probationes clariores luce … Quod videtur ea ratione procedere, quia in causis criminalibus perspicacius est consilium adhibendum, quia ibi maius periculum et detrimentum contingit.

157. Ibid.: Sed licet ex ea sola probatione, que iuris est tantum, aliquis non possit vel debeat corporaliter diffinitive damnari, tamen ex ea sola presumptione, que iuris est et de iure, et ex quolibet alio indicio indubitato poterit contra aliquem diffinitiva formari sententia … Item ex quolibet indicio indubitato poterit diffinitiva formari sententia, ut C. de probationibus 1. ult (Cod. 4.19.25), et merito, quia Illa lege ultima cavetur quod accusatores eam rem, hoc est illud crimen, habent et debent in publicam notionem deferre, ut possit diffinitiva proferri sententia, quod crimen idoneis testibus sit munitum, saltim duobus, … vel sit apertissimis documentis instructum … vel quod sit instructum indiciis ad probationem indubitatis, clarioribus luce expedita.

158. Ibid., § 6: Quartum habetur indicium indubitatum, quotiens constat, quod crimen, quod adversus aliquem oritur, ita est publicum et manifestum, ut merito possit et debeat notorium appellari, quo casu nec testes requiruntur nec etiam accusator.

159. Ibid., § 4: Secundum est indicium indubitatum, quando constat, quod aliquis in iudicio de crimine sponte sit confessus vel in tormentis et perseveraverit.

160. Ibid., § 3: Primum est indubitatum, quotiens contra aliquem est iuris et de iure presumptio.

For example, suppose that a man and woman have successfully defended their marriage against a challenge that the union was invalid on the ground of the couple's alleged consanguinity. Subsequently, the wife is charged with adultery. Her husband now claims to be her blood-relative because husbands are legally liable for failure to accuse an unfaithful wife, while a woman's kin have no responsibility to accuse her. The husband's claim to be the woman's blood relation is precluded by the legal presumption arising from the prior legal determination that they were man and wife.

161. Ibid., § 7: Est etiam et quintum indubitatum indicium propter evidentiam et qualitatem facti.

For example, if the physical evidence established that the victim of an assault had lost an eye in the attack, the injury was “atrocious,” and the assault became what we would call aggravated assault. Or again, according to Gandinus, if someone drew a sword against someone, or wounded someone, or killed someone, the very evidence of the fact established mens rea (quod hoc dolo fecerit et ex sua animi pravitate et ideo puniendus).

162. Ibid., §§ 9, 10, and 11.

163. Ibid., § 12: Ex predictis vero tribus indiciis … scripsit dominus Thomas de Piperata posse ad condemnatione procedi … Sed omnes sapientes, quos Bononie vidi et alibi, dicunt, et etiam vidi de consuetudine observari, quod propter talia vel similia non possit quis diffinitive in persona damnari.

164. Ibid.: At si ex maleficio, ex quo essent talia indicia, deberet sequi pecuniaria pena, habeat potestas arbitrium vel non, posset locum habere quod scripsit dictus dominus Thomas … et ita vidi sepius observari.

165. Ibid.: Illud tamen in summa notandum est, quod omnia predicta indicia, de quibus habetur mentio … non adeo indubitata dicuntur, quin adversus ea non possit probari contrarium, preter quam in casu ubi est iuris et de iure presumptio contra aliquem de delicto … quoniam nihil est adeo indubitatum, quin quandam solitam dubitationem recipiat.

166. Pazzaglini, P., The Criminal Ban of the Sienese Commune, Studi Sienesi vol. 45 (1979), 6.Google Scholar suggests that Gandinus's generation advocated “stiffer fines for the rich and harsher corporal punishments for the poor.” Pazzaglini's book includes a transcription of a Sienese criminal condemnation, dated December 16, 1225, in which a defendant named Giordanellus was fined 200 lire for homicide and was placed under a ban that was redeemable upon payment of 1000 lire. Pazzaglini also points out that Siena resorted to discounting such large fines, and permitting convicted malefactors to pay off their penalties at greatly reduced rates, when the commune desperately needed funds for its defense. Ibid., 87.

167. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric Quomodo de maleficio cognoscitur, quando crimen est notorium § 4: … quod notorium facti est, quod commissum vel factum non dubitatur a populo vel a maiore parte populi, ut dicit Ubertus de Bobbio.

168. Ibid.: Notorium vero facti habetur id crimen, in quo fama suum prebet adminiculum et ipsa evidentia rei ita protestatur, quod se prebet et se exhibet conspectui hominum omnium vel maioris partis alicuius loci, ut nulla possit tergiversatione celari, ut extra, de cohabitatione clericorum et mulierum c. Tua et c. Vestra et c. fin. (X.3.2.8, 7, and 10).

169. See the casus, laying out the facts of the case in the gloss to X.3.2.8.

170. See Gratian's Decretum, Causa 2 quaestio 1, for an example of where the problem stood in 1140. I have treated this subject at greater length in “Preventing Crime in the High Middle Ages.”

171. Gloss at X.3.2.8: Nota quod in notoriis facti non est necessaria probatio.

172. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric Quomodo de maleficio cognoscitur, quando crimen est notorium § 9: In iis que sunt notoria iudici et aliis … nec requiritur actor vel denuntiatior, nec datur libellus, nec lis contestatur, nec iuratur de calumnia vel de veritate dicenda, nec requiruntur testes nec aliqua probatio: immo tunc ordinem iudiciorum non servare est secundum ordinem iuris procedere; citabitur tamen criminosus ad sententiam audiendam.

173. Ibid., § 4: Unde dixit dominus Ubertus quod si quis aliquem in platea coram omnibus interfecit, quod illud crimen non erit notorium, dicens quod potest esse quod hoc crimen non constat iudici, quis accusatus coram eo infitiatur, et sic sit res dubia.

174. Ibid., § 9: … iis que sunt notoria iudici et aliis, ut quia factum sunt presente iudice et tot aliis qui sufficiant ad notorium facti …

175. Ibid., § 10: Si vero sit notorium aliis tantum et non iudici, tunc officialis seu denuntians auditur sine inscriptione … et in hoc notorio requiritur probatio …

176. Ibid.: … quod sit factum in loco publico de die et tot presentibus, qui faciant crimen esse notorium.

177. Ibid., § 11: Alii vero dicunt sufficere, si testes probant alterum de duobus: vel crimen fore notorium vel se vidisse illud committi.

178. Pazzaglini, Criminal Ban of the Sienese Commune, 6, 87.

179. Gandinus, Tractatus de maieficiis, rubric De questionibus et tormentis § 37: Sed pone quod homicidium vel aliud maleficium fore commissum tam occulte quod de malefactore non constat; verum post aliquod tempus capitur quidam, contra quem insurgit publica vox et fama de maleficio predicto et qui alias sit homo male conditionis et fame.

180. Ibid. § 38: Postremo quero: ecce datum est potestati vel iudici liberum et generate arbitrium inquirendi et puniendi maleficia et excessus; numquid potestas sine aliquibus indiciis potest contra delatum de crimine procedere ad tormenta?

181. Ibid.: Videtur quod sic, quia dare arbitrium potestati nihil aliud est dicere, nisi ut cum bona conscientia procedat, secundum quod eius conscientia dictaverit. Nam arbitrium dat potestatibus largas habenas, et hec est huius arbitrii interpretatio.

182. Cf. K. Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, passim.

183. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric De questionibus et tormentis: Potest itaque potestas et debet ex arbitrio ad tormenta procedere si aliquod aliud habeat indicium, per quod animus eius moveatur quod inculpatus de crimine sit torquendus, et non alias.

184. Ibid.: Nam licet in processu potestas possit ex suo arbitrio multa de iuris solemnitate omittere, non tamen potest prorsus omittere.

185. Ibid.: Nam facti questio in arbitrio est iudicantis, non autem iuris auctoritas, ut ff. ad municipalem 1. Ordine § i. (Dig. 50.1.15.pr.).

186 Ibid.: Verum in ferenda sententia caveant potestates, ne condemnent ex solo arbitrio, conscientia, vel ex dicto unius testis vel ex sola fama, cum in ferenda sententia debeant iura servare.

187. Ibid.: Verum etiam, si maleficium non esset plene probatum, sed ad plenam probationem modicum deficeret—forte ratione testium qui non essent omni exceptione maiores—tunc potest potestas ex tali arbitrio condemnare secure, si eius conscientia et animus cum probatione concordet.

188. Ibid.: Tenetur enim potestas, qui habet arbitrium, solum de dolo et lata culpa ut depositarius.

189. Ibid., rubric De presumptionibus et indiciis indubitatis, § 12, text at n. 163.

190. Ibid., rubric De penis reorum § 8: Circa impositionem penarum diligenter attende et nota, quod iudex non debet subito et inconsulto calore delatum punire.

191. Arbitrium was the product of a legislative act, either in the form of a statute or in the form of a reformatio.

192. Cf. Gandinus's scrupulous parsing of the relevant passages of the Digest and the Code. Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric De presumptionibus et indiciis indubitatis.

193. The notion that torture was a res fragilis became a juristic commonplace that was transmitted into early modern literature on criminal procedure, such as Sebastian Guazzini, Tractatus ad defensam inquisitorum, carceratorum, reorum, et condemnatorum (Geneva, 1664). “But let judges be on their guard against resorting to torture with facility, as it is an expedient which may prove fragile or perilous, and may play false to truth, because some persons have such an incapacity for the endurance of pain that they are more willing to lie than to suffer torments.” translated in H. C. Lea, Torture (1973), 190.

194. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric De questionibus et tormentis, proem.: Et ut iudicibus immodice sevientibus freni quedam temperies adhibita videatur, primo notanda sunt V. magistralia.

195. Ibid., rubric A quo vel a quibus possit fama incipere et ex quo tempore § 5: Sed pone questionem, que sepe occurrit de facto. Aliquod delictum publicum vel privatum commissum est in civitate … in personam alicuius; tempore vero illius delicti de malefactore aliquo non patebat; post aliquot tamen dies criminis quidam ob causam dicti criminis captus fuit et ductus ante tribunal iudicis de ipso maleficio cognoscentis, qui captus et representatus erat alias homo male condicionis et fama; post hec sic acta clamor insonuit, quod iste erat conscius et culpabilis de maleficio antedicto, de quo crimine et maleficio nullus ante dictam captionem erat aliquatenus inculpatus; nunc vero adversarii huius duo nituntur probare, unum quod iste alias homo male condicionis est habitus et fame, aliud quod nunc per civitatem est clamor et fama publica contra eum; que per duos idoneos testes probantur; est tamen incertum a quo auctore super crimine contra eum processerit ilia fama publica aut clamor. Queritur, numquid ex talibus presumptionibus et indiciis possit iudex questionibus inquirere contra eum?

196. Ibid.: Ergo ut denotatus et male meritus hic, de quo queritur, non poterit ipsius civitatis … contra cuius mores commisit, pro se aliquod auxilium invocare, quia frustra iuris civitatis implorat auxilium, qui contra illud commisit.

197. Ibid.: Sed licet incertum sit, quis illud maleficium commiserit, tamen, cum de ipso detento et capto malum exemplum habeatur, dum se sua sponte constituit et se fecit hominem male fame, videtur quod iudex ex officio suo et de bono regimine possit de crimine occulto ad questiones procedere contra ilium.

198. Ibid.: Et ideo videtur quod iudex animadvertendo in eundem ut iniuriosum et male meritum possit, ut terribilem se ostendens, de dicto crimine inquirere per tormenta et maxime, ut publice aliis ad terrenda maleficia sit exemplum.

199. Statuti di Bologna dell' Anno 1288, ed. Fasoli and Sella, Bk. 4, rubric 17: De tondolo et tormento.

200. Pazzaglini, Criminal Ban of the Sienese Commune, 27, points out that the procedure for summoning a criminal defendant varied according to his residence, his civil status, and the severity of the crime. Similarly, the increasing use of severe corporal sanctions and the escalation of monetary sanctions had more severe implications for the impecunious defendant than for the wealthy or aristocratic suspect, who could afford to wait in exile until the commune needed money badly enough to be willing to commute the criminal ban in return for a modest payment. Ibid., 106. For the fourteenth century, see G. Ruggiero, Violence in Early Renaissance Venice (1980), 95ff., suggesting that the working class tended to be law-abiding, while socially marginal individuals, such as foreigners, were likely to be the victims of crime or of criminal justice.

201. This is contrary to the arguments of Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, Levy, J. P., La hierarchie des preuves dans le droit savant du moyen age (Paris, 1939)Google Scholar; idem, “Le problème de la preuve dans les droits savants du moyen age” in La Preuve: 17 Recueuils de la Société Jean Bodin 137–67; and most recently Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water, 141, who repeats the contention that the ius commune forced the jurists to devise a system of judicial torture as a means of securing convictions and thus escaping the two-witness rule.

202. Classical Roman law had wrestled with the same problem. See Hadrian's rescript to Valerius Verus, preserved at Dig. 22.5.3.2: “In short, all I can reply to you is that a cognitio should not be tied at once to a single mode of proof. You must judge from your own conviction what you believe and what you find not proved.”

203. Traditionally, priests exercised complete discretion with regard to penances imposed in the internal forum. Similarly, any ecclesiastical superior possessed the discretionary authority to impose a purgatory oath on any of his subject clerics who was suspected of wrongdoing. Although the ecclesiastical judge faced constraints about imposing certain kinds of “ordinary” penalties upon convicted miscreants, “extraordinary” penalties were discretionary. Finally, some canonists left it to the judge to determine how many witnesses were required to make a crime notorious.

204. Fraher, “The Theoretical Justification for the New Criminal Law of the High Middles Ages,” 578.

205. Maisonneuve, H., Etudes sur les origines de l'Inquisition 2d ed. (Paris, 1960)Google Scholar; Esmein, History of Continental Criminal Procedure, 80–81.

206. X.3.2.8.

207. Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, pars iii, rubric Quid sit occultum?

208. Kuttner, S., “Ecclesia de occultis non iudicat: Problemata ex doctrina poenali decretistarum et decretalistarum a Gratiano usque ad Gregorium Papam IX,” Actus Congressus Iuridici Internationalis Romae, 12–17 Novembris 1934 3: (1936) 225–46Google Scholar. Cf. Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, pars iii, rubric Quid sit occultum? Occulta enim soli Deo reservantur.

209 Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, pars iii, rubric Quid sit occultum? Dicitur pene, idest quasi, occultum quia id pauci sciunt, puto duo vel tres–ita tamen quod probari possit–vel etiam quinque.

210. See Hostiensis, Summa aurea (Venice, 1605) rubric De accusationibus, denunciationibus, et inquisitionibus: Gratia exempli dico tibi quod hec sunt capitalia crimina que depositionem inducunt: sacrilegium, homicidium, adulterium, fornicatio, falsum testimonium, rapina, sub qua continetur usura, furtum, superbia, invidia, avaritia, et si longo tempore teneatur iracundia, ebrietas si assidua sit … item dilapidatio … duplex contumacia … simonia … et demum publica crimina.

211. Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, pars iii., rubric Quid sit manifestum: Est autem manifestum publica seu famosa proclamatio ex certa scientia et a certis autoribus proveniens.

212. Decretum 2.1.15, 17, and 21 preserved texts from Pope Nicholas I, Pope Stephan V, and St. Ambrose that supported this proposition.

213. Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, pars iii, rubric Quid sit manifestum: Licet aperta, idest manifesta, sit adversariorum reprehensio, iudex tamen debet ordinem iuris servare. Ex hoc probatur quod manifestum probari debet.

214. Ibid., rubric Quid sit notorium: Porro notorium facti est illud crimen in quo fama publica suum prebet adminiculum et ipsa rei evidentia protestatur, ita se exhibens omnium hominum vel maioris partis alicuius loci conspectui, ut nulla possit tergiversatione celari.

215. Ibid., rubric De notoriis … criminibus: Sed qualiter sciet iudex crimen alicuius notorium fore si id negatur? Responsum, secundum Tancredum et Vincentium: Per facti evidentiam si est illius loci habitator, quod verum est si fiat in conspectu eius pro tribunali sedentis, et non alias.

216. Ibid., rubric Quid sit notorium: Tot enim debent adesse quod eorum presentia faciat crimen notorium. Nec paucorum presentia, puta duorum vel trium vel v., sufficit ad aliquid notorium faciendum … Immo requiritur totius vicinie noticia, et quod omnes communiter crimen commissum fore acclament, secundum quosdam … Alii, ut Vincentius, dicunt quod sufficit scientia maioris partis eius … Quidam tamen, ut Ioannes, dixerunt x. hominum scientia sufficere … Quidam etiam dixerunt, et forte non male, quod arbitrio iudicis relinquitur quot homines faciant notorium, cum non sit in iure expressum.

217. Ibid., rubric De notoriis … criminibus: Hodie autem valde officium iudicum in hac inquisitione exuberat. Ipsi namque defensiones arctant, ut vere dici possit quod eorum officium latissime patet … Nonnunquam enim hominem inauditum et indefensum statim suspendunt. Sed certe quicquid fiat nulli est de iure legitima defensio deneganda.

Joannes Andreae noted, in a marginal addition to this passage, that Durantis had borrowed the text from Hostiensis.

218. Hostiensis, Summa aurea, rubric De exceptionibus: Quia cuilibet heretico et cuilibet excommunicato reservatur legitima defensio, ergo quantumcumque criminosus sit, potest defendere se.

219. Fraher, “Preventing Crime in the High Middle Ages.”

220. Hostiensis, Summa aurea, rubric De criminibus sine ordine puniendis: Secundum leges et canones ad quemlibet iudicem pertinet excessus subditorum … etiam sine aliqua fama inquirere et punire. Hoc enim publice interest … Et proceditur in his de piano, sine aliqua solemnitate, ita quod iudex malos expellat et bonos admittat, alias in pecunia puniendo, aliquando corpus torquendo, vel excommunicando vel suspendendo, prout viderit expedire, quia hec omnia arbitrio suo committo … et sicut de facto servant iudices maxime seculares. Quicquid tamen facient in occultis, non puto de rigore iuris, quod sit legitima defensio deneganda. Sed in notoriis, cum nec possit haberi, legitima denegatur … Unde quantumcumque sit aliquis infamatus, semper ei legitima defensio reservatur.

221. Hostiensis, Lectura in quinque Gregorii decretalium libros (Paris, 1512), commenting on X.3.2.8: vel dicas quod generaliter in quolibet notorio potest procedi sine citatione et probationibus … sed melius est et tutius ut citatio fiat antequam proceditur, nisi forte scandalum vel magnum periculum reipublice sit in mora.

222. Ibid.: Et secundum illos qui hoc asserunt, quandocumque aliquid negatur notorium [esse], semper probandum est … et ubi tale notorium proponitur tanquam accessorium, non proceditur super principali quousque sit probatum. Sed hoc nihil aliud est quam prolongare lites et circuitus inducere, unde dicendum est quod ubi non est locus inficiationi, potest iudex procedere et delinquentem punire quantumcumque inficietur. Et hoc est speciale in maleficiis, ne remaneant impunita.

223. Ibid.: Bonus enim iudex nihil arbitrio suo facit, sed vidit leges et iura, et sicut audit et se habet veritas iudicat et discernit. In iudicando tamen magis debet esse cordi custodia veritatis quam obedientia voluntatis.

224. T. Diplovatatius, De Claris iuris consultis, 172, asserted that Durantis quoted from Thomas's Tractatus de fama in Durantis's Speculum iudiciale, rubric De notorio crimine. Sarti, and Fattorini, , De claris … professoribus 2:224Google Scholar, expanded the image to one of great reliance by Durantis upon Thomas. But a careful reading of the Speculum iudiciale produces no indentifiable borrowing from Thomas's work.

225. Joannes Andreae, Additio ad Speculum iudiciale, rubric Quid sit fama v. reprobatus: … et adverte mihi placet descriptio [scilicet fame] Iacobi quia brevis. Thomas enim dixit, etc.

226. Ibid., v. coarctemus: … est sciendum quod in tractatu de fama multa scripserit Thomas de Piperata legum doctor, satis miscendo de indicio, argumento, et presumptione.

227. Andreae's summary of Thomas's tractatus appeared in Ibid., v. veniens.

228. Pazzaglini, The Criminal Ban of the Sienese Commune, 12.

229. Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, rubric De contumacia accusati: Sed pone, A. fiat accusatus de morte T., citatus non venit se defendere, propter quod bannitus est et demum propter contumaciam condemnatus. Nunc captus est per curiam. Queritur an debet mori, et videtur quod sic. Nam videtur esse condemnatus … Debet enim propter contumaciam haberi pro confesso … Et hoc verum est. Debet ergo index facere quod de crimine constet.

230. Joannes Andreae, Additio ad Speculum iudiciale, rubric De contumacia accusati v. cognitas: Potestas contra ilium contumacem tulit sententiam ad capitis truncationem, vel ut deberet furcis suspendi ita quod moreretur, habendo et condemnando ipsum pro confesso de illo crimine. Ille postea capitur. Adversarius petit executionem sententie … Captus allegans quod ultra relegationem non debuit puniri propter contumaciam dicit quod suam innocentiam vult probare … Item licet cause prosecutio vel facti questio in potestate sit iudicantis, pene tamen impositio reservatur auctoritate legis … Solvit, ut supra dixi eum de iure audiendum [esse] per leges hic allegatas, licet italica consuetudo servet contrarium.

231. Bonifacius de Vitalinis de Mantua, Tractatus de maleficiis (Lugduni, 1555), proemium: nee presumant iudicare secundum eorum conscientias, ut faciunt multi iuris et iustitie ignari, sed solum secundum leges et iura, et probationes sibi factas. For the correct authorship and date of this tractatus, see D. Maffei, “Intorno a Bonifacio Ammanati giurista e cardinale” 586 C.N.R.S. Colloques internationaux (Paris, 1980), 241Google Scholar.

232. Bartolus, In ius universum civile commentaria, Dig. 48.5.2.5.: … et sic iudex inquirendo habet magis largas habenas quam credatis.

233. Ibid., Dig. 48.18.10 § Plurimum: De hoc [scilicet fama] fecit unum tractatum in quo dixit modicum et bonum quidam qui est vocatus dominus Thomas de Piperata de Bononia, et ubicumque ipse aliquid dicit, ego dicam vobis. Speculator etiam in titulo de notoriis criminibus etiam ponit de fama et modicum et non clare.

234. Ibid., Dig. 12.3.31: Pro cuius declaratione primo oportet me dicere quando dicatur plene probatum. Respondendum breviter quando est facta iudici plena fides, hoc est quando iudex per ea que sunt sibi ostensa est adductus ad fidem et credulitatem eius quod intenditur.

235. Ibid.: … ista scientia habetur duobus modis, uno modo, in rebus que sunt artis seu scientie alicuius, per rationes et demonstrationes … Secundo modo ista scientia habetur, in his que sunt facti, et tunc illud scire dicimur ad quod movetur per sensum, hoc est scientia, qua requiritur in teste.

236. Ibid.: Ad hanc autem scientiam iudex non posset perduci in his que habent actum transeuntem, sed bene posset perduci in his que sunt actus permanentis. Et inter ista duo extrema, scilicet nescientiam et scientiam, est quoddam medium, videlicet credulitas sive fides.

237. Ibid.: Ad istam autem credulitatem sive fidem pervenitur per quattuor gradus. Primo cum iudici res proponitur per actorem et per reum negatur, tunc iudex adducitur in dubitationem. Est enim dubitare quando quis non applicat magis animum suum ad unam partem quam ad aliam … Ista dubitatio non est gradus probationis … Post dubitationem autem potest iudex inclinare animum suum ad aliquam partium, et tunc si hoc facit ex aliquo levi indicio vel ex aliquo levi argumento, ista appellatur suspicio, que aliqualiter movet animum iudicis, non tamen in totum removet dubitationem … Sed nec debet de suspicionibus aliquem damnari, et hic est primus gradus probationis seu credulitatis … Post istam autem suspicionem si iudici apparent argumenta fortiora, tunc iudex incipit opinari … Et hic est secundus gradus probationis … Post istam opinionem, si iudici appareat tantum quod firmiter adhereat uni parti absque aliquo dubio alicuius contrarii, tunc dicitur perfecta credulitas seu perfecta probatio.

238. Ibid., Dig. 22.5.3 v. Testibus: Nota quod potestati iudicis conceditur utrum debeat adhiberi fidis testi vel non. Tamen quia acta quandoque sunt examinanda in causa appellationis, tutius est quod causa suspicionis propter quam fides testi minuitur iudex faciat apparere in actis.

239. Ibid., Dig. 48.18.20: Ideo dico hic, quod sunt quidam iudices stulti qui statim cum habent indicia contra reum, cogunt istum ad confitendum … Certe hoc non debet fieri, quia condemnarent eum ex indiciis et suspicionibus, sed debent adhibere tormenta cum moderamine et ex istis veritatem investigare. Et ita iam feci pluries, sed si habita tortura non inveniebatur verum, absolvebam eum, et hoc faciebam scribi in actis, “Habita tortura cum moderamine non reperi eum culpabilem.” Et hoc ne tempore syndicatus possit dici, “Tu debuisti eum torquere.”

240. Ibid., Dig. 12.2.31 no. 48: Istis premissis quero utrum due semiplene probationes faciant unam plenam probationem? Et siquidem sunt due semiplene eiusdem generis, ut duo testes, non est dubium quod faciant plenam, sed si sunt due semiplene diversi generis, tunc videtur quod non faciant plenam.

241. Ibid., Dig. 47.2.3: Idem dico, si aliquis deprehenditur in domo alicuius, ubi pulchra mulier est, certe facit hunc adulterum manifestum; Ibid., Dig. 48.5.2 v. Si simul: Quero qualiter probabitur adulterium? Responsum non potest probari directo aliqua ratione, quia si videres in camera duos vel in lecto, nescires tamen quid facerent. Sed dico quod probatur ex presumptione.

242. Ibid., Cod. 4.19.25: In criminalibus exiguntur probationes luce clariores. Facit iste textus … quod maleficia possunt probari per instrumenta … Et videtur quod quis condemnetur ex presumptionibus, ut 1. Si quis adulterii, de adulterio. Dicit glossa quod hic fallit. Tu dic quod indicium facit probationem luce clariorem, quia iudicem reddit certum de adulterio.

243. Ibid., Dig. 1.18.6.1: Allegatur quod iudex debet iudicare secundum allegata et probata, non autem secundum conscientiam … Solutio: Aut id quod iudex habet in conscientia est notum sibi ut iudici aut tanquam private persone. Primo casu conscientia sua iudicat informatus ex actis coram eo, et ita potest intelligi hic. Alias, si ut private persone est sibi notum, tunc non potest iudicare secundum conscientiam suam, sed secundum probationes sibi factas.

Bartolus interpreted this famous maxim as an exclusionary principle concerning evidence, rather than as a constraint upon the judge's exercise of discretionary power to determine guilt or innocence according to a standard of subjective certainty.

244. Ibid., Dig. 48.18.20 no. 6: Non insisto sed quero utrum requirantur plura indicia an sufficiat unum indicium ad torturam? Leges omnes videntur loqui in plurale … Glossa videtur loqui in singulari … Hoc stat in arbitrio iudicis.

245. Ibid., no. 5: De hoc non potest dari certa doctrina, sed relinquitur arbitrio iudicis … Sed ego dabo doctrinam quam potero, et pone in terminis, aliquis accusatur de furto; contra eum possunt esse indicia, quod est homo male conditionis et fame, et consuetus facere similia … quod ipse erat vicinus, habebat notam domum. Nam quia conversabatur ibi … et quod ipse post furtum factum aufugit et se abscondit … et post furtum repertus est expendere pecuniam cum ante esset pauper homo, et nec reperitur unde habeat … Item quod res furtiva est reperta penes cum …

246. Ibid., Dig. 48.18.20: Iste tamen presumptiones … possunt elidi, verbi gratia, si res furtiva reperiatur penes me, ostendo eum a quo habui.

247. Ibid., Dig. 48.19.5: Hic habetis quod nemo debet damnari ex suspitionibus et presumptionibus.

248. Ibid., no. 1: Dicitur hic quod in criminibus non potest damnari absens. Quero utrum hoc verum sit, sive sit absens post litem contestatam, sive ante? Quidam dicunt post litis contestationem posset damnari quis … Azo et Hug. dicunt indistincte absentem non damnandum.

249. Bartolus was aware that Cod. 9.47.21 was an ancient Roman law exception to the general rule of Dig. 48.19.5. See Ibid., Cod. 9.47.21 v. Ne diu: Hec lex ponit unum casum in quo contra absentes pervenitur ad condemnationem in crimine capitali. But the quasi-capital sentence of the criminal ban was interpreted as a less-than-capital punishment, equivalent to the Roman relegatio. Even under the rule of Dig. 48.19.5, an absent party could be sentenced to exile. Cf. Bartolus's comments at Dig. 48.1.10.

250. Ibid., Dig. 48.8.1.1: Domini quicquid ipsi dicant, veritas est ista: per italiam maleficia puniuntur secundum statuta, non secundum leges.

251. Ibid., Dig. 48.16.6 no. 3: Quero que dicantur crimina notoria? Tractatum de notoriis criminibus non habemus in iure nostro, sed canonistes habent tractatum longum.

252. Ibid.: Tamen quantum ad propositum nostrum … notorium dicitur proprie illud quod habet causam permanentem. Illud vero quod habet causam momentaneam dicitur magis manifestum quam notorium.

253. Ibid., Dig. 11.7.4 no. 2: Sed quid arbitrabitur iudex? Dicas quod verum notorium est quando factum est tale de sua natura quod omnes sciunt vel scire eos verisimile sit, sic quod non possit allegare ignorantiam, quin sit supina, sicut si quis gerat se pro episcopo in aliqua civitate, vel si quis in veritate toto populo aspiciente occidit hominem.

254. Notorium, properly understood, meant a crime that was so well established that no formal trial was required. The summary procedure for crimen notorium was a product of canon law; cf. X.3.2.8. Manifestum was easily confused with notorium. Cf. Bartolus at Dig. 11.7.4: Quandoque tamen manifestum ponitur pro notorio … Unde ubi manifestum scribitur in aliqua materia que non requirat iudicialem indaginem nec probationem, propter quod exponitur manifestum, id est notorium, alioquin impropria significatione reiecta, verba secundum subiectam materiam intelliguntur …. Manifestum was as old as the Twelve Tables, the earliest redaction of republican Roman law, and served to increase the sentence for theft four-fold. Cf. A. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (1953) s.v. “furtum manifestum.”

255. Bartolus, In ius universum civile commentaria, Dig. 47.2.3: Ita vides hic si deprehenditur quis cum re furtiva, licet non fuerit visus furari, est manifestus fur. But he could still disprove his guilt, ibid., Dig. 48.18.20.

256. Ibid., Dig. 12.2.31.

257. Ibid., Dig. 47.2.3 no. 48: Item si aliquis fuerit visus effugere cum gladio evaginato et reperitur aliquis mortuus, certe ex hoc est homicidium manifestum, quod talis fecit.

258. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama, text at n.132.

259. This reading of the procedure in a case of “manifest homicide” would be consistent with Bartolus's discussion of presumptive proof based upon “special indicia,” In ius universum civile commentaria, Dig. 48.18.20, where Bartolus seems to suggest that even evidence that would constitute a manifest theft retains the limited character of a rebuttable presumption: Ista tamen presumptiones … possunt elidi.

260. Ibid., Dig. 48.5.25 suggests that the inquisitorial judge received his power from the ius commune and from statutory law: Et sic iudex inquirendo habet magis largas habenas quam credatis; et hoc de iure commune, sed de iure municipali in quibusdam terris sunt statuta quod indistincte iudex posset inquirere.

261. On Angelus, see T. Diplovatatius, De Claris iuris consultis, 374, and Clarence-Smith, Medieval Law Teachers § 132.

Angelus Aretinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric Comparuerunt dicit inquisiti, no. 5: Et quod dixi, quod ex indiciis nemo potest damnari, verum est nisi indicia sunt indubitata.

262. Ibid., rubric Quod fama publica procedente, no. 8: Indicium vero plenum est dinumeratio rei per signa sufficientia, per que animus in aliquo tamquam existente quiescit et plus investigare non curat.

263. Ibid., no. 18. Angelus quoted Thomas's case verbatim, but with attribution. For the text, see n. 132.

264. Ibid., rubric Comparuerunt dicti inquisiti, no. 5: Et dicuntur indicia indubitata secundum Ni. de Ma., Bal., et Sal.… quando a lege sunt approbata adeo quod lex vult super ilia indicia fieri condemnationem … quia cum ista sint legi indubitata, debent etiam esse iudici indubitata.

265. Ibid.: Secus si a lege non sunt approbata, sed iudicis religioni commissa sunt, quia ix illis solis non potest damnari, ut dicta lege Absentem (Dig. 48.19.5).

266. Ibid.: Et ponunt exemplum in indiciis indubitatis ubicumque ex qualitate et indiciorum multitudine indicatur veritas oculis mentis iudicis, sicut clara lux veritatem ostendit oculis corporis.

267. Cod. 4.19.25. It may be worth noting that this snippet of Roman law, which was probably the most frequently cited authority for the proposition that criminal proofs must be “clearer than light,” in fact laid out three alternative forms of proof in criminal cases: reputable witnesses, irrefutable documents, or indicia “clearer than light” that are “undoubted as to proof.” Hence the original formulation of the standard of proof “clearer than the light of day” was specifically tied to circumstantial evidence, and not to witness proof.

268. Angelus Aretinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric Comparuerunt dicti inquisiti, no. 5: Quidam visus est intrare domum Titii cum gladio; postea auditus est Titius acclamasse; postea ille cum gladio sanguinolento visus est exire domum, et Titius reperitur in facie vulneratus.

269. Ibid.: Tune ista sunt signa et indicia indubitata simul collecta, et ex his potest ille condemnari de vulnere.

270. Ibid.: Et hoc videtur determinasse Bartolus in similibus exemplis in lege secunda, ff. de furtis. (Dig. 47.2.2).

271. What Angelus seems to have had in mind was Bartolus's commentary at Dig. 47.2.3, text at nn. 241, 255. But elsewhere, at Dig. 11.7.4, Bartolus had been very careful to distinguish between the “manifest” cases illustrated by his examples in the commentary to Dig. 47.2.3, and other cases that were either “notorious” (Dig. 11.4.7) or “fully proved” by establishing undoubted belief in the mind of the judge (Dig. 12.2.31).

272. Augustinus Giganticus, Commentaria, rubric Comparuerunt dicti inquisiti, no. 5.

273. In contrast to Girolamo Giganti's impatient slap at Angelus Aretinus for having quoted Thomas's opinion about proof by undoubted indicia, see Jacobus de Bellovisu, Practica iudiciaria, rubric De questionibus et qualitate tormentorum, nos. 78–81, arguing that in many cases the law permits criminal cases to be determined by arguments and presumptions. This point was illustrated by three cases—the room with one exit, the body in the vineyard, and the assassination of Titius. Each of the hypotheticals is phrased in terms quoted from Thomas de Piperata's Tractatus de fama. The Practica iudiciaria, or Practica criminalia, universally attributed to Jacobus de Bellovisu, was actually an early sixteenth-century work whose publisher attributed it to a famous fourteenth-century jurist in order to enhance the work's credibility and circulation. See Maffei, D., “Giuristi medievali e falsificazione editoriale …,” Ius commune, Sonderheft 10 (1979)Google Scholar.

274. This is not to suggest that Thomas made a brilliant conceptual leap. He articulated expressly a theme that was implied in Roman law texts such as Cod. 4.19.25 and Dig. 22.5.3.

275. Langein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 3–8; Fiorelli, La tortura giudiziaria.

276. Ibid.

277. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 5–8.

278. Ibid., 6.

279. B. Shapiro, “To a Moral Certainty: Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600–1850,” Hastings Law Journal 38:155.

280. Donahue, “Proof by Witnesses in the Church Courts of Medieval England,” 133.

281. Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters.

282. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama.

283. X.2.1.2.

284. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 5–8; Fraher, “Preventing Crime in the High Middle Ages,” n.17.

285. Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water, 70–83 gives a good, short account of the evidence suggesting that people suspected that ordeals could be brought to a crooked result. Bartlett himself thinks that theological and legal considerations were more important than social, practical concerns.

286. For the Aristotelian impact on doctrinal and intellectual developments in the university curriculum during the 1200s, see G. Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History (1975) 185–238; for the Aristotelian impact on political thought, a useful introduction is W. Ullmann, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages (1975) Ch. 8, “The New Science of Politics.”

287. See especially Aquinas's Summa theologica, the first part of the second part, questions 90 to 97, on the nature and effects of law. Available in an English translation in D. Bigongiari, ed. The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas (1953) 3–85.

288. For Bernard's world, the best introduction is J. Leclerq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture (1961).

289. Statuti di Bologna, Bk. 1, rubric 5; Statuti del Capitano del Popolo, Bk. 2, rubrics 1, 2, and 28. Texts at n.113.

290. Thomas de Piperata, Quaestio disputata. Incipit: Cavetur in statute civitatis Bononie quod potestas habeat arbitrium in homicidiis suo tempore perpetratis. Text preserved in Arch. S. Pietro, MS A.29 fol. 99v. Publica utilitas est quod presens potestas habeat arbitrium in dicto maleficio, ut sic puniatur. Nam rei publice interest mala puniri.

291. For a general discussion, see G. D'Amelio et al., Studi sulle “Quaestiones” 222–96. The two quaestiones at issue are the one mentioned supra in n.290, which is preserved only in manuscript form, and another, partially printed in Ibid., 248, incipit: Statutum est in civitate Bononie si quis fuerit accusatus …

292. Ibid., 248–50.

293. MS Arch. S. Pietro A.29 fol. 99r: Solutio: Dico dictos fideiussores non teneri ad dictam condemnationem solvendam … quia omnino separata sunt et diversa maleficium vel malefactor et fideiussor vel contractus, unde obligatio fideiussoris non est pars cause maleficii.

294. Ibid.: Tertium [argumentum] est arbitrii supradicti iniquitas. Nam talia arbitria conceduntur potestatibus contra ius commune, et ideo extendi non debent.

295. Ibid.: Item [arbitria] sunt odiosa. Nam plerumque potestas ex arbitrio condemnat absolvendum et absolvit condemnandum, et ideo debent restringi.

296. Thomas de Piperata, Quaestio disputata, text at n.290.

297. MS Arch S. Pietro A.29 fol. 99v: Contingit quod tempore preterite potestatis fuit quidam vulneratus. Moritur ex illo vulnere tempore presentis. Queritur numquid presens potestas habeat arbitrium in hoc homicidio, an non?

298. Ibid., Solutio: Dico preteritam potestatem non habuisse arbitrium nec presentem habere in dicto maleficio sive homicidio.

299. Ibid.: Preteritam potestatem dico non habuisse arbitrium in dicto malo sive homicidio, quia dictum malum fuit suo tempore inchoatum, set non fuit suo tempore consummatum, et dicto “perpetratis” requirit veram consummationem homicidii factam in suo tempore.

300. Ibid.: Set inchoatum alteris tempore fuit suo tempore consummatum. Ubi enim potestas habeat arbitrium in homicidiis, obtinet quod certo tempore, scilicet tempore sue regiminis sint totali perpetrata inchoando et consummendo. Verbum enim “perpetratis” designat rem perfectam.

301. Ibid.: Sexta quia publica utilitas est quod presens potestas habeat arbitrium in dicto maleficio, ut sic puniatur. Nam rei publice interest mala punire.

Cf. Fraher, “The Theoretical Justification for the New Criminal Law of the High Middle Ages.”

302. Dig. 9.2.51. I suggest that Thomas must have known the text because it was a stock authority for one of his favorite themes, the public interest in criminal prosecutions.

303. Ibid.: “A slave who had been wounded so gravely that he was certain to die of the injury was appointed someone's heir and subsequently killed by a further blow from another assailant.”

304. Ibid.: “But if anyone should think that we have reached an absurd conclusion, let him ponder carefully how much more absurd it would be to conclude that neither should be liable under the lex Aquilia or that one should be blamed rather than the other.”

305. On “free rein,” see Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama, text at n.118; Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, text at n.181; Bartolus, In ius universum civile commentaria, text at n.232.

306. MS Arch. S. Pietro A. 29 fol. 99r., text at n.295.

307. Blanshei, “Criminal Law and Politics of Medieval Bologna.”

308. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama, text at n.124.

309. Ibid., text at n.122.

310. This is true if fama, the procedural prerequisite to an inquisitio, played a role analogous to that of probable cause.

311. This was the rule of Dig. 48.19.5, at least in capital cases.

312. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama, text at n.124.

313. The most recent expression of the same conflict in our own criminal process is McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (1987).

314. Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water, 70.

315. Hyams, “Trial by Ordeal,” 125.

316. Watson, A., The Evolution of Law (1985).Google Scholar Watson believes that where a professional class of lawyers emerges in a society, the lawyers' traditions and professional concerns dominate other factors in the development of the law, particularly in private law. Social needs and functions then affect the evolution of the legal system less directly than in the earliest stages of legal development, before the emergence of a professional class of jurists.