1. Frederick, David C., “John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance of the Right of Petition,” Law and History Review 9 (1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Frederick's discussion focuses on the political and constitutional aspects of petitioning, and it is unclear whether the disappearance also refers to other forms of petitioning.

2. Leys, Colin, “Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” Political Studies 3 (1955).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. Greg Marquis points out the potential of petitions as a source for legal history in an article published after this paper was first written, “Doing Justice to ‘British Justice’: Law, Ideology and Canadian Historiography” in Canadian Perspectives on Law and Society: Issues in Legal History, ed. Pue, W. Wesley and Wright, Barry (Ottawa, 1988), 53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. Legal positivism, advanced first by John Austin, defines law as the command of the sovereign: The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London, 1861–63). Parliament is thus one voice, though this voice can be manipulated, as if by a ventriloquist, by public opinion. The latter tends also to be given monolithic form, most notably by Dicey, A. V., Lectures on the Relation Between Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century, 2d ed. (London, 1930).Google Scholar The historiography of legal positivism is particularly entrenched in Canada, where central control and executive power is held to be especially marked. See, for example, Stewart, Gordon T., The Origins of Canadian Politics (Vancouver, 1986).Google Scholar

5. Some work has been done on the configuration of legislatures. See Johnson, J. K., Becoming Prominent: Regional Leadership in Upper Canada, 1791–1841 (Kingston, Ont. and Montreal, 1989)Google Scholar; and Swainson, Donald, “The Personnel of Politics: A Study of the Ontario Members of the Second Federal Parliament” (Ph.D. diss., Toronto, 1968).Google Scholar

6. Hurst, James Willard, The Growth of American Law: The Law-Makers (Boston, 1950)Google Scholar; SirHoldsworth, William, The History of English Law 5th ed. (London, 1931).Google Scholar

7. The term “booster” is ubiquitous, that of “cutter” is peculiar to Warren Magnusson, who sees a more or less constant tension between the two mentalities: “Introduction: The Development of Canadian Urban Government,” in City Politics in Canada, ed. Magnusson, Warren and Sancton, Andrew (Toronto, 1983).Google Scholar See also, inter alia, G. P. de T. Glazebrook, “The Origins of Local Government,” and Whebell, C. E. J., “Robert Baldwin and Decentralization, 1841–49” in Aspects of Nineteenth-Century Ontario: Essays Presented to James J. Taiman, ed. Armstrong, F. H. et al. (Toronto 1974)Google Scholar; Aitchison, J. H., “The Municipal Corporations Act of 1849,” Canadian Historical Review 30 (1949): 107–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Adam Shorn, “Municipal History 1791–1867,” and McKay, K. W. “Municipal History 1867–1913” in vol. 18 of Canada and Its Provinces, ed. Shortt, A. and Doughty, A. G. (Toronto, 1914).Google Scholar For a discussion of urban and local historiography in general, see Artibise, Alan F. J. and Linteau, Paul Andre, The Evolution of Urban Canada: An Analysis of Approaches and Interpretation (Winnipeg, 1984).Google Scholar Municipal politicians were required to meet a property qualification, suffer than that set for their constituents. To take one example, in 1873 The Municipal Institutions Act (36 Vic. c.48) provided a graduated scale for councillors, from four hundred dollars freehold or eight hundred dollars leasehold in townships, up to fifteen hundred dollars freehold or three thousand dollars leasehold in cities (s.71). For voters, the range was one hundred dollars freehold or leasehold in townships up to four hundred dollars freehold or leasehold in cities (s.78). A number of social and urban historians have concluded that at this period municipal politicians were members of the political, business, and social elites of their respective municipalities: Gagan, David, Hopeful Travellers: Families, Land and Social Change in Mid-Victorian Peel County, Ontario (Toronto, 1981)Google Scholar; Katz, Michael, The People of Hamilton, Canada West: Family and Class in a Mid-Nineteenth Century Canadian City (Cambridge, Mass., 1979)Google Scholar; Akenson, Donald H., The Irish in Ontario: A Study in Rural History (Kingston, Ont., 1984)Google Scholar; Bloomfield, Elizabeth, “Community Leadership and Decision Making: Entrepreneurial Edicts in Two Ontario Towns 1870–1930,” in Power and Place: Canadian Urban Development in the North American Context, ed. Stelter, Gilbert A. and Artibise, A. E. J. (Vancouver, 1986)Google Scholar; Matthews, W. Thomas, “Local Government and the Regulation of the Public Market in Upper Canada, 1800–1860: The Moral Economy of the Poor?” Ontario History 79 (1987).Google Scholar For a discussion of the mid-Victorian Ontario business corporation, see Risk, R. C. B., “The Nineteenth-Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in Ontario,” University of Toronto Law Journal 23 (1973).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8. Most studies focus on the minority group, rather than on rural municipalities. At confederation, the ratio between rural municipal corporations (townships) and urban municipal corporations (cities, towns, and villages) was decidedly unbalanced, at 399 to 104. County councils were made up of representatives from each incorporated village, township, and town (unless the town had formally separated); they were therefore predominantly rural in composition, and presumably rural in interest. Consequently, when thirty-six counties are added to the equation, the ratio is greater than four to one in favor of the rural element; McKay, “Municipal History,” 455. See also White, Randall, Ontario 1610–1985: A Political and Economic History (Toronto, 1985), 340.Google Scholar White calculates that Ontario was seventy-eight percent rural in 1871. Voters and municipal politicians in townships were subject to a lower property qualification than were those from cities, towns, and villages. But see the discussion of excemptions from the Assessment Act on which the property qualification was based discussed below. It may have been possible to be a municipal politician in a rural area with assessable property worth four hundred dollars without being part of the “large propertied interests” of whom W. Thomas Matthews has written: McKay, “Municipal History,” 464; Matthews, W. Thomas, “By and For the Large Propertied Interests: The Dynamics of Local Government in Six Upper Canadian Towns During the Era of Commercial Capitalism, 1820–1860” (Ph.D. diss., McMaster, 1985).Google Scholar Perhaps the lower amount was inserted as a set-oiFto the farming exemption in the Assessment Act, which would exclude income and produce from and personal property used in farming from the calculation. Russell, Peter A., “Emily Township: Pioneer Persistence to Equality,” Histoire Sociale/Social History 22 (1989)Google Scholar contends that capital or perseverance led to success in one rural area during an earlier period. When one considers as well the varying levels of development throughout the province, the presumption of social-economic class homogeneity and hegemony may be misleading. Furthermore, as one study has contended, one can look at Ontario during these years as crudely stratified into two broadly based classes, thereby depriving the term elite of much of its usefulness. By definition, ratepayers would not be members of the transient under-class: Katz, Michael B., Doucet, Michael J., and Stern, Mark J., The Social Organization of Early Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also Katz, The People of Hamilton. As well, since membership on council is a commonly used criterion for elite membership, the definition becomes tautological. Some petitions evince an overlap in membership with the legislative assembly in rural as well as urban local governments. I have not done a systematic study of this point, but many of the names of Wardens/Reeves/Mayors are similar to those of provincial members. In addition, a petition by Kingston refers to the Warden of Frontenac as a provincial member, 1868 (893); and a petition by Frontenac County 1870–71 (249) refers to a councillors absence from a resolution by reason of his attendance at the legislature.

9. For example, Handley, Robin, “Public Order, Petitioning and Freedom of Assembly,” Journal of Legal History 7 (1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Frederick, “John Quincy Adams.” See also Morgan, Kenneth, “Petitions against Convict Transportation, 1725–1735” English His torical Review 104 (1989).Google Scholar

10. Leys, “Petitioning.”

11. Ibid., 58.

12. Handley, “Public Order,” 140.

13. Sidney, and Webb, Beatrice, History of English Local Government (London, 1906) vol. 5Google Scholar, Statutory Authorities for Public Purposes.

14. Thompson, Margaret Susan and Sibley, Joel H., “Historical Research on Nineteenth-Century Legislatures,” in Handbook of Legislative Research, ed. Lowenburg, Gerhard et al. (Cambridge, Mass, and London, England, 1985), 710.Google Scholar

15. My primary source for this paper is Record Group 49 of the Ontario Archives, the records of the clerk of the Legislative Assembly from 1867. This record group includes petitions to the Legislative Assembly numbered in order of date of filing, for each sessional year. The petitions are folded in thirds so that information could be inscribed on the backs. Each petition was given a number, under which it was filed and also registered in the petition register and distribution books. The number was inscribed at the bottom by the clerk (an archivist has repeated this number at the top, to increase ease of access) together with the date of filing and the name of the member who filed it. At the top the clerk inscribed the petitioner's name(s) or description (i.e. “certain inhabitants of the township of York”) and the relief sought (not always reliable). In some cases the member or the petitioners have attempted to provide this information; often the clerk made amendments to suit his indexing preferences. Printed blank-form petitions from the end of the period studied also had a printed back for greater clerical convenience. A few petitions in every year are missing: They can be identified by subject and petitioner or record in the petition registers. Petition “wrappers,” envelopes that seem to have been provided by the legislature, are filed in a separate series. In some cases they can be matched against the corresponding petition by means of the number, but many more of the wrappers are missing. The wrappers are also less uniform in the information they present. While spaces were provided to note various matters about the petition and resulting bill, if any, on most some or all of these are left blank. Some wrappers contain affidavits swearing to the conditions precedent, with some press clippings of notices (occasionally these find their way into petitions as well). Unfortunately, the records of the Private Bills Committee are almost nonexistent, and references to petitions and their outcome although plentiful are inadequate and inconsistent. Of the 6927 petitions 1536, or 22 percent, were from municipal corporations. Of these, I have classified 576 as private and 960 as public. Because some petitions are ambiguous and others combine requests on several issues occasionally mixing public with private, this breakdown is not precise.

16. Some of these were concerned with monetary relief or aid-in-kind, and are marked (presumably by the clerk) “not read” or “praying for aid,” as any petition requiring the outlay of public money required prior approval of cabinet, with a duplicate petition sent to the Lieutenant Governor. Because these petitions for aid cannot be classified as attempts at legislative change, they therefore will be considered only incidentally, to illustrate various attitudes of municipal politicians: Ontario Legislative Assembly, Rules, Orders and Forms of Proceeding of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, adopted by the House in the First Session of the First Parliament (Toronto, 1868), 23Google Scholar (2nd edition, 1876), 26, hereafter cited as Rules. In the first edition, the rule only required that a petition for public aid be adjourned to a later day. An archivist's or clerk's note in the Archives of Ontario Record Group 49 Series I-7-F-2 Box 12 (1871–72) on the back of a printed notice to provincial members states that such petitions required a duplicate to the Lieutenant Governor; this was confirmed by the second edition. Petitions from this series are cited by the sessional year and the number in parentheses.

17. 12 Vic. C.8. The following is an approximate breakdown of public petitions from local governments by general subject, from the most to least numerous: ophthalmic hospital (228), assessment act (189), municipal institutions and municipal drainage acts (155), liquor licensing/prohibition (115), education (48), registry act (30), local improvement fund (29), distribution of supplies (17), distribution of statutes (13), conservation/timber policy (11), elections/franchise/voters list act (10), medical act (9), railway act (6), agriculture and arts act (6), anti-sectarian grants/disendow Upper Canada College (5), indigent sick/hospitals/inebriate asylum (4), joint stocks companies act (4), Canada thistle act (4), vagrancy act (2), miscellaneous (10).

18. For example, Willard Hurst holds that private acts were a distraction, nuisance and embarrassment to congress and state legislatures, Growth of American Law, passim.

19. The following is an approximate breakdown of private petitions from local governments by general subject, from the most to the least numerous: railways (134), restructuring of jurisdictions (118), aid for civic projects or general purposes (44), “legalize” bylaw or agreement (28), confirm or deny, survey etc. roads (24), authorize extra powers (21), power to deal with municipally owned property (20), authorize/ amend water or gas works (18), location of registry office (14), charitable institutions/ aid to fire victims (12), bonus to manufacturers (12), change of classification (10), Huron and Ontario canal (9), open/close/widen/change name of streets (9), companies other than railways (9), limit or extend limits of municipality (9), extra provincial member for Essex (8), normal schools (8), authorize extra debt (8), amend debt acts (8), distribution of Middlesex debt (7), investigation of various matters (5), crown lands in municipality (6), accounting between municipalities (4), legalize past mistakes (3), miscellaneous (19). Some of these would not have been meant to result in private acts, but in changes in schedules to public acts, but are included here because they would have gone through the private bills committee.

20. John H. Taylor, “Urban Autonomy in Canada: Its Evolution and Decline,” in Stelter and Artibise, Power and Place. For his discussion of nineteenth-century Ontario, Taylor relies heavily on an article by Crawford, K. G., “The Independence of Municipal Councils in Ontario,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 6 (1940)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which first advanced the thesis. See also Bothwell, Robert, A Short History of Ontario (Edmonton, 1986), 56Google Scholar; Teaford, Jon G., “Special Legislation and the Cities, 1865–1990,” American Journal of Ilegal History 23 (1979).Google Scholar Hendrik Hartog makes a similar observation regarding New York City in Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the City of New York in American Law 1730–1870 (Chapel Hill, 1983). I use the terms municipal government/council/corporation and local government interchangeably. By municipal law they were one and the same. Except where the text makes clear, I do not distinguish between urban and rural governments. As far as I can tell they were not treated differently within the petitioning process. Taylor and Crawford are interested in cities only, but cities differed only in degree from other municipal corporations, not in kind.

21. Stokes, Mary, “Power and Responsibility in Local Government in Canada-West/ Ontario, 1850–1880” (unpublished paper, University of Western Ontario, 1981)Google Scholar; idem., “Judicial Attitudes to Municipal ‘Unreasonableness’: A Case Study in Ontario Legal History, 1835–1979” (unpublished paper, University of Western Ontario, 1980); idem., “Local Governments in the Shadow of the Law: The Municipal Corporation as Legal Actor in Canada West/Ontario 1850–1870” (unpublished paper, University of Western Ontario, 1987).

22. The British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vic. c.3 s.92(8) gave the province exclusive jurisdiction over “municipal institutions.”

23. Frederick, “John Quincy Adams,” 114–16, Handley, “Public Order,” 138; the archives of Ontario has petitions dating back to the eighteenth century. For petitions and the legislative process at the federal level, see Bourinot, John George, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, with an Introductory Account of the Origin and Growth of Parliamentary Institutions in the Dominion of Canada (Montreal, 1884).Google ScholarLambert, Sheila in Bills and Acts: Legislative Procedure in Eighteenth-Century England (London, 1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar examines the private bill procedure in England in some depth, though for a slightly earlier period. (I am indebted to Doug Hay for this last reference.)

24. Leys, “Petitioning,” 48–52.

25. Lambert, Bills and Acts, 53, 85. Private legislation remains part of the legislative process today, but is used less, due to general enabling provisions and the use of alternative forms of legitimation.

26. Ibid. See also SirClifford, Frederick, A History offrivate Bill Legislation, 2 vols. (London, 1885).Google Scholar

27. Rules (1868), (1876).

28. See Sydere, Arthur, General Index to the Journals and Sessional Papers of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Ontario, 1867–1882 (Toronto, 1883).Google Scholar Occasionally other requirements, such as time for filing, were waived by the committee.

29. Unfortunately, the Journals are less than uniform in their reporting regarding petitions.

30. Rules (1868), 15, and Rules (1876), 17.30.

31. That the petitioning municipality would bear these costs was sets out in the statute itself. See, for example, 39 Vic. cc.39, 40, 41, 42.

32. For the origins of “lobbying,” see Hurst, Growth of American Law, 62. Elwood Jones and Douglas McCalla mention the advantage of physical proximity to the private bills committee: “Toronto Waterworks 1840–77: Continuity and Change in Nineteenth Century Toronto Politics,” Canadian Historical Review 60 (1979), 309.

33. This was the practice in Leeds and Grenville counties, and an examination of the handwriting against the signature of the clerk (who was a signing officer of the municipal corporation, and that of the Warden/Mayor/Reeve indicates that this was also the case in other municipalities. Clerks were generally salaried employees, and this was part of the performance of their job, so any cost would be indirect and negligible. A few (non-municipal) petitions include the name of the lawyer or law firm on the back. Some that don't can still be recognized as “professional” by the quality of the paper, calligraphy, and language. Elizabeth Bloomfield finds that some at least of the clerks were lawyers, “Lawyers as Members of Urban Business Elites in Southern Ontario,” in Beyond the Law: Lawyers and Business in Canada, 1830 to 1930, ed. Wilton, Carol (Toronto, 1990).Google Scholar The rules provided for parliamentary agents; there was a professional “parliamentary bar” in England and apparently also in Ontario: Stokes, “Local Government”; Clifford, Private Bill Legislation 2:267–70; Lambert, Bills and Acts; Rules (1868), 19.

34. Leys, “Petitioning,” 58.

35. Archives of Ontario, Record Group 21, Essex County Council Papers, Leeds and Grenville County Council Papers. Documents from this series will be cited by council name, year, and folder number.

36. Essex County Council Papers, 1869 (3). It should be noted that though this subject is a provincial “elephant” the council uses preconfederation nomenclature.

37. This phenomenon was especially prevalent in the petitions on the issue of “equalization.” See, for example, Archives of Ontario Record Group 49, 1–7–F–2, Box 12, 1869 (78) and 1870–71 (27).

38. Ibid., 1869 (755).

39. See, for example, ibid., 1871–72 (388), 1876–77 (1367), 1871–72 (102). To give the benefit of the doubt, confederation was still a recent event and it might well be that the new division of powers was apt to slip the mind.

40. Ibid., 1871–72 (105).

41. Ibid., 1876–77 (1029), 40 Vic. c.17 s.40.

42. Thompson and Silbey, “Historical Research,” 713.

43. See, for example, 1868–69 (785).

44. For example, 1869 (883), 1868–69 (783, 797), 1868–69 (896), 1874–75 (59).

45. 1869 (724).

46. For example, 1876–77 (89). The Ontario Medical Act petitions, though hand written, all use the same or similar wording. Cf. Naylor, C. David, “Rural Protest and Medical Professionalism in Turn of the Century Ontario,” Journal of Canadian Studies 21 (1986).CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

47. Gates, Lillian F., After the Rebellion: The Later Years of William Lyon Mackenzie (Toronto, 1988), 180 ff.Google Scholar, demonstrates that Mackenzie, while provincial member of Haldimand, worked in conjunction with the county council; this is only one instance and for a slightly earlier period. It seems likely that tandem efforts would depend on considerations of party or other power relationships. See also Noel, S. J. R., Patrons, Clients, Brokers: Ontario Society and Politics, 1791–1896 (Toronto, 1990)Google Scholar, especially chaps. 12 and 13. Noel contends that party structure was still essentially a coalition of factions and interests. (I thank Peter Oliver for directing my attention to this most illuminating work.)

48. Most recently in Cruikshank, Ken, Close Ties: Railways, Government and the Board of Railway Commissioners, 1851–1933 (Montreal and Kingston, 1991).Google Scholar

49. Jones, Elwood and McCalla, Douglas, “Toronto Waterworks 1840–77: Continuity and Change in Nineteenth–Century Toronto Politics,” Canadian Historical Review 60 (1979): 323.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

50. Hurst, , The Growth of American Law, 229, 242.Google Scholar

51. The bankruptcies of numerous communities, and the legislative responsibility therefore, have been chronicled by several historians. For a detailed account see Shortt, “Municipal History,” 442–52. It was perhaps due to former laxity in matters of municipal indebtedness that the legislature was careful in the amendment of these acts.

52. The council of the city of Kingston accuse the provincial member, warden of Frontenac, of introducing a colorable, retroactive bill to prejudice the rights of the city in pending litigation in the court of Common Pleas: 1867–68 (893). Cruikshank, Kenneth, in his study Close Ties: Railways, Government and the Board of Railway Commissioners, 1851–1933 (Kingston, 1991)Google Scholar notes that the County of Simcoe, though armed with favorable legal opinions, preferred to lobby the federal government (ultimately fruitlessly) rather than proceed to the Court of Appeal.

53. 1870–71 (290, 294).

54. This is not always recognized by legal historians. See Freyer, Tony A., “Law and the Antebellum Southern Economy: An Interpretation,” in Ambivalent Legacy: A Legal History of the South, ed. Bodenhamer, David K. and Ely, James W. (Jackson, Miss., 1984).Google Scholar Aside from the petitions requesting aid, which I have not investigated, about seven out of ten private petitions seem to have been successful.

55. See 1871 (82), 1875–76 (194). “Jones and McCalla state that Toronto council sought “expert legal advice at every stage” of a private petition, “Toronto Waterworks,” 304. There is also the indirect evidence of legal paper, legal wording, and elegant calligraphy not found in the public petitions.

56. Such as to license hack cabs, etc. 1873 (441), against suspension bridge 1867–68 (464), against tollgate 1869 (385).

57. 1867 (385).

58. Dean, D. M., “Public or Private? London Leather and Legislation in Elizabethan England,” Historical Journal 31 (1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

59. 1867–68 (83), 1868–69 (68), 1969 (3, 19, 58), 1871–72 (8), 1974 (35, 91).

60. 1873 (144), 1874 (6), petition of Canada Central Reailway, 1874 (93), 1876–77 (166). It would appear that the Ottawa council had run counter to a Railway Company with more clout.

61. 1874 (244).

62. 1871–72 (189), 1875–76 (163), 39 Vic. c.62, Sydere, General Index to the Journals, 173, 149; 1867–68 (443).

63. 1873 (494); Kingston's first attempt to be allowed to mortgage its market property was “reported adversely” by the private bills committee, though the next year saw the act pass; 1867–68 (397), 1867–68 (42), 32 Vic. c 15.

64. 1867–68(443).

65. 1868–69(8).

66. Exceeded only by railways. See above, note 19.

67. For example 1874 (265), 38 Vic. c.26.

68. Artibise and Linteau's The Evolution of Urban Canada offers a useful compilation and critique of these works.

69. 1874 (213).

70. Hodgins, Bruce W., John Sandfield MacDonald (Toronto, 1975), chap. 6.Google Scholar

71. Teaford, “Special Legislation,” 193. Franks, C. E. S., The Parliament of Canada (Toronto, 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, contends that the executive has always been dominant in Canada. For a discussion of how the British parliamentary and American congressional systems differ, see Atiyah, P. S. and Summers, Robert S., Form and Substance in Anglo–American Law: A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal Institutions (Oxford, 1987).Google Scholar Unfortunately, the authors omit the Canadian variant, but one can assume much of their discussion of the British structure would apply to Ontario.

72. Horwitz, Morton, “The History of the Public/Private Distinction,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 130 (1982): 1424.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

73. 1871–72(24).

74. 1868–69(653).

75. I have classified these mixed petitions as private.

76. Hurst, Growth of American Law, 232.

77. Weaver, John C. and Lottinville, Peter de, “The Conflagration and the City: Disaster and Progress in British North America during the Nineteenth Century” Histoire Sociale/Social History 13 (1980): 417.Google Scholar

78. Eventually the province agreed to pay twenty-five hundred dollars. Whether or not municipal councils considered philanthropy to be one of their functions is not settled. See Stokes, “Local Government in the Shadow of the Law”; Splane, R., Social Welfare in Ontario, 1791–1893 (Toronto, 1965)Google Scholar; Speisman, Stephen, “Munificent Parsons and Municipal Parsimony: Voluntary vs. Public Poor Relief in Nineteenth–Century Toronto,” Ontario History 65 (1973)Google Scholar; Jarvis, Eric, “Municipal Compensation Cases: Toronto in the 1860's,” Urban History Review 3 (1973)Google Scholar; and David Murray, “The Cold Hand of Charity: The Court of Quarter Sessions and Poor Relief in the Niagara District, 1828–1841,” in Pue and Wright eds., Canadian Perspectives; 1871 (78).

79. Most of the earlier exemption petitions are handwritten; the later ones are printed specifically for use by municipalities. The earlier form petitions were designed for individuals and had to be adapted for completion by a corporation.

80. Barnes, Eleanor and Jaczapavicius, Danguole, Select Committees of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario: A Checklist of Reports (Toronto, 1983), 13–14.Google Scholar The authors report that Oliver Mowat, then premier and attorney general, suggested that his petitions did not accurately reflect public opinion. A select committee was set up in 1878. The next year, a second select committee analyzed the answer to a questionnaire sent by the first committee. This process the authors claim created a “climate for reform.”

81. 32 Vic. C.27 S.9.

82. 1875–76(8); 1876–77(1069); 1867–68(425), 1868–69(200), 1870–71 (50), 1871–72 (26, 28). Frontenac county included in one petition an address by the county judge on the issue. Said Judge Gwynn, in part, “of all the loves for the ancients, which to my mind passes human understanding, is that which seems to pervade the public mind at large for the ancient laws and legal customs”: 1873 (707).

83. 1869 (843); 1871–72 (303); 1868–69 (798); 1871–72 (107).

84. 1875–76 (171); 1876–77 (1105); 1873 (691).

85. 1870–71 (24, 32, 42, 144, 260, 315); 1871–72 (39); 1876–77 (1085, 1086). A provincial clerk seems to have felt these petitions were for aid rather than to change policy; the two latter petitions are marked to this effect.

86. 1873(691).

87. 1871–72 (79); 1873 (691).

88. 1875–76 (124); 1876–77 (421, 679, 1108).

89. 1874–75 (108); 1875–76 (72).

90. Akenson, The Irish in Ontario, 210.

91. For example, 1868–69 (36); 1870–71 (25); 1874 (291, 427). The act was amended in 1875–76 (39 Vic. c.4) to allow investment in education, sectional bonuses or fire engines.

92. For example, 1874 (33); 32 Vic. c.42.

93. 1871 (12), 1873 (2); 1867–68 (569); 35 Vic. ?.??; 36 Vic. c.41.

94. McKay, “Municipal History,” 457–61, also 1867–68 (415) and 1868–69 (456), but 1873 (81) and 1874–75 (96) inter alia, contra. For a discussion of the “regress” and progress of municipal democracy, see Jarvis, Eric James, “Mid-Victorian Toronto: Panic, Policy and Public Response, 1857–1873” (Ph.D. diss., Western Ontario, 1979).Google Scholar

95. 29 and 30 Vic. c.55; inter alia, 1867–68 (5) but (162) contra.

96. Vic. C.31, 39 Vic. c.30.

97. 1870–71 (92).

98. 33 Vic. C.27. The subject of nineteenth-century municipal taxation is a fascinating one that I hope to address at a later date.

99. 37 Vic. c.36.

100. 1875–76(10, 11, 170).

101. 34 and 35 Vic. c.30, 30 Vic. c.48, 37 Vic. c.16.

102. See Marquis, “Doing Justice to ‘British Justice,’” 51–53.

103. 32 Vic. C.36. For a discussion of wider consequences of Ontario's concept of justice at a slightly later date, see Silver, A. I., “Ontario's Alleged Fanaticism in the Riel Affair,” Canadian Historical Review 69 (1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

104. 1869 (367); 1876–77 (12).

105. 32 Vic. c.36 S.9.

106. For example, 1875–76 (45).

107. 1867–68(528); 1871–72(310); 1868–69 (826, 827); 1867–68(504); 1875–76(170).

108. 29 Vic. c. 12 s.413.

109. 31 Vic. c.30 S.42.

110. 1870–71 (276); 1873(77).

111. 31 Vic. C.7, 37 Vic. C.31.

112. The hospital for the blind (ophthalmic hospital), located in Brantford, was given a measure of provincial support, to be in the discretion of the inspector, in 1873: 36 Vic. C.32 S.3.

113. 35 Vic. C.28.

114. 36 Vic. C.48 s. 58. It is to be noted that although the counties had to foot the bill, the amount fixed was subject to revision by the provincial prison inspectors.

115. See Gagan, Hopeful Travellers, and more particularly “The Security of Land: Mortgaging in Toronto Gore Township, 1835–95,” in Armstrong, Aspects of Nineteenth-Century Ontario. Gagan argues that mortgaging was common as between father and son where no money changed hands, to ensure security for the parents and other children. In such a case registration fees would be particularly burdensome as there would be no proceeds out of which disbursements could be made.

116. The term is from Matthews, “By and for the Large Propertied Interests,” but the conclusion is a general one.

117. 32 Vic. c.6. For a more lofty view of jury reform, see Romney, Paul, “From Constitutionalism to Legalism: Trial by Jury, Responsible Government and the Rule of Law in the Canadian Political Culture,” Law and Society Review 7 (1989).Google Scholar

118. 32 Vic. c.13, 38 Vic. c.14.

119. Stokes, “Local Government in the Shadow of the Law,” 18, Parker, Graham, “Trial by Jury in Canada,” Journal of Legal History 8 (1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar An example of intraelite conflict: Parker points out that the jury property qualifications were very high, ibid., 181; Romney maintains the jury was further ratified by the selection process: “From Constitutionalism to Legalism,” 138–40. In “The Cold Hand of Charity,” David Murray ignores the question of jury composition, which undermines his conclusions regarding class bias.

120. 36 Vic. c.13. The county was reimbursed for a third of the extra expense.

121. 36 Vic. C.48, 37 Vic. c.16.

122. 39 Vic. C.26. The “grouping” clause originated in a private act inspecting the Fenelon Falls Railway Company (34 Vic. c.43); it entered the Municipal Act in 1873 (36 Vic. c.48) and was repealed the next year (37 Vic. c.16).

123. 1874 (154). The council claimed that the city had granted seven hundred dollars in bonuses, complaining that on the petition of a few ratepayers they were required to hold a minor election costing sixteen hundred dollars. They also wished to require that the bylaw not pass by a majority of votes cast but by a majority of all entitled to vote and that promoters defray the expenses of the vote.

124. Noel, Patron, Clients, Brokers, 243–46. Noel is unusual in his recognition of the importance of municipalities at this stage.

125. 36 Vic. C.47; Noel, Patrons, Clients, Brokers, 246.

126. 1874 (212, 221, 291, 302, 314, 315, 348, 360, 391, 429, 430).

127. 39 Vic. C.4.

128. See Gidney, R. D. and Lawr, D. A., “Bureaucracy and Community: the Origins of Bureaucratic Procedure in the Upper Canadian School System,” Journal of Social History 13 (1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lawr, D. A. and Gidney, R. D., “Who Ran the Schools? Local Influence on Education Policy in Nineteenth Century Ontario,” Ontario History (1980): 72Google Scholar; Gidney, R. D., “Centralization and Education: The Origins of an Ontario Tradition,” Journal of Canadian Studies 7 (1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Gidney, R. D. and Millar, W. P. J., Inventing Secondary Education: The Rise of the High School in Nineteenth–Century Ontario (Montreal and Kingston, Ont. 1990).Google Scholar Gidney and his colleagues ultimately conclude that local school trustees had considerable influence in policy and practice, successfully stonewalling Egerton Ryerson and his centralizing bureaucracy on a number of issues. While their argument is persuasive, this does not mean that the trustees can be described as autonomous; they are looking at the situation from Ryerson's point of view. The implication is strong, however, that the trustees were beleaguered by oppressive rules and regulations. They were fighting a losing rearguard action, winning a few skirmishes, but achieving little more than a stalemate overall.

129. Leeds and Grenville County Council Papers, 1879, folder d. Conspicuous by their exclusion from this plan are the cities.

130. Ibid.

131. Aydelotte, William O., “Constituency Influence on the British House of Commons, 1841–47,” in The History of Parliamentary Behaviour, ed. Aydelotte, W. O. (Princeton, 1978), 245.Google Scholar

132. Mandeler, Peter, “Debate: The Making of the Poor Law Redivus: Reply,” Past and Present 127 (1990).Google Scholar I am endebted to David Phillips for this reference.

133. Greer, Allan and Radforth, Ian, eds., Colonial Leviathan: State Formation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Canada (Toroto, 1992), 8.Google Scholar

134. Careless, J. M. S., “Robert Baldwin,” in The Pre–Confederation Premiers, ed. Careless, J. M. S. (Toronto, 1980).Google Scholar