1. See Ginzburg, Carlo, The Judge and the Historian: Marginal Notes on a Late-Twentieth-Century Miscarriage of Justice (London: Verso, 2002), 12–18Google Scholar; Maoz, Asher, “Historical Adjudication: Courts of Law, Commissions of Inquiry and “Historical Truth,” Law and History Review 18 (2000): 559–606, especially 568–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. Among the first and best analyses of the similarities and differences between the judge and the historian are the writings by Calogero, Guido, La logica del giudice e il suo controllo in Cassazione (Padua: Cedam, 1964, originally published in 1937), 128Google Scholar; and Calamandrei, Piero, “Il giudice e lo storico,” Rivista di diritto processuale civile 16 (1939): 105–28Google Scholar. More recently, see Pavone, Claudio, “Note sulla Resistenza Armata, le rappresaglie naziste ed alcune attuali confusioni,” in Priebke e il massacre delle Fosse Ardeatine (Rome: L'Unità, 1996), 39–49Google Scholar; Thomas, Yan, “La vérité, le temps, le juge et l'historien,” Le Débat 102 (1998): 17–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stolleis, Michael, “Der Historiker als Richter – der Richter als Historiker,” in Geschichte vor Gericht. Historiker, Richter und die Suche nach Gerechtigkeit, ed. Frei, Norbert, Van Laak, Dirk, and Stolleis, Michael (München: Beck, 2000), 173, 177–179Google Scholar; Costa, Pietro, “In Search of Legal Texts: Which Texts for Which Historian?” in Reading Past Legal Texts, ed. Michalsen, Dag (Oslo: Unipax, 2006), 158–81Google Scholar; and Borrello, Maria, Sul giudizio. Verità storica e verità giudiziaria (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2011).Google Scholar

3. Donini, Massimo, “La gestione penale del passaggio dal fascismo alla democrazia in Italia. Appunti sulla memoria storica e l'elaborazione del passato ‘mediante il diritto penale’,” Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica 39 (2009): 183Google Scholar; see also Bobbio, Norberto, “A quando, la libertà dagli ‘spietati doveri’?” in Una “inutile strage”? Da via Rasella alle Fosse Ardeatine, ed. Bandinelli, Angiolo and Vecellio, Valter (Naples: Pironti, 1982), 68–69Google Scholar (noting that “in the court of history, there are no final judgments”).

4. Thomas, “La vérité, le temps, le juge et l'historien,” 21 (“historiens et juristes ne s'appuient pas sur une même idée de la vérité […] On dit communément que la vérité en histoire est affaire d'adéquation du jugement aux faits alors que, en droit, le jugement ne constate pas, mais déclare la vérité”).

5. Stolleis, “Der Historiker als Richter – der Richter als Historiker,” 180.

6. See Wieviorka, Annette, “Justice, Histoire et Mémoire. De Nuremberg à Jérusalem,” Droit et société 38 (1998): 59–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7. This is clearly shown by the impressive list of worldwide “history-related legal cases,” provided by the Network of Concerned Historians, http://www.concernedhistorians.org/content/le.html (September 8, 2012).

8. Particularly relevant, from this point of view, is the example of the so-called truth-finding trials in Argentina: see Maculan, Elena, “Prosecuting International Crimes at National Level, Lessons from the Argentine ‘Truth-Finding Trials’,” Utrecht Law Review 8 (2012): 106–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Abregú, Martín, “La tutela judicial del derecho a la verdad en la Argentina,” Revista IIDH Instituto Interamericano de derechos humanos 24 (1996): 11–41.Google Scholar

9. Garapon, Antoine, Peut-on réparer l'histoire? Colonisation, esclavage, Shoah (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2008)Google Scholar; and Levmore, Saul, “Privatizing Reparations,” Boston University Law Review 84 (2004): 1291–318.Google Scholar

10. Orland, Leonard, A Final Accounting. Holocaust Survivors and Swiss Banks (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2010)Google Scholar; Ludi, Regula, “Historical Reflections on Holocaust Reparations: Unfinished Business or an Example for Other Reparations Campaigns?” in Repairing the Past? International Perspectives on Reparations for Gross Human Rights Abuses, ed. Plessis, Max du and Peté, Stephen, (Antwerpen-Oxford: Intersentia, 2007), 119–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bazyler, Michael J., “The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 20 (2002): 11–44Google Scholar; and Baumgartner, Samuel P. “Human Rights and Civil Litigation in United States Courts: The Holocaust-Era Cases,” Washington University Law Journal 80 (2002): 835–54.Google Scholar

11. Sammons, Diane E., “Corporate Reparations for Descendants of Enslaved African-Americans – Practical Obstacles,” in Repairing the Past? (Antwerpen-Oxford: Intersentia, 2007), 315–58Google Scholar; Hylton, Keith N., “Slavery and Tort Law,” Boston University Law Review 84 (2004): 1209–55Google Scholar; Ogletree, Charles J., “Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in North America,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 38 (2003): 279–320Google Scholar; and Posner, Eric A. and Vermeule, Adrian, “Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices,” Columbia Law Review 103 (2003): 689–747.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12. Festa, Matthew J., “Applying a Usable Past: The Use of History in Law,” Seton Hall Law Review 38 (2008): 479, 488–98Google Scholar (discussing the phenomenon of “law office history,” as it was first defined by Alfred Kelly).

13. As regards the role of historians within so-called truth committees, see Stabili, Maria Rosaria, “Gli storici e le Comisiones de la verdad latinoamericane,” Contemporanea 12 (2009): 137–42Google Scholar; for an interesting account of the experience of the Swiss Bergier-Commission, an independent body created to investigate the issue of restitution of property unlawfully seized by National Socialists, see Spuhler, Gregor, “Die Bergier-Kommission als «Geschichtsbarkeit»? Zum Verhältnis von Geschichte, Recht und Politik,” Traverse: Zeitschrift für Geschichte 11 (2004): 100–114.Google Scholar

14. See Pezzino, Paolo, “‘Experts in truth?’: The Politics of Retribution in Italy and the Role of Historians,” Modern Italy 15 (2010): 349–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vladimir Petrović, Historians as Expert Witnesses in the Age of Extremes (PhD diss. Budapest: Central European University, 2009); Rosner, David, “Trials and Tribulations: What Happens When Historians Enter the Courtroom,” Law and Contemporary Problems 72 (2009): 137–158Google Scholar; Festa, “Applying a Usable Past: The Use of History in Law,” 540; Evans, Richard J., “History, Memory and the Law: The Historian as Expert Witness,” History and Theory 41 (2002): 326–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Damamme, Dominique and Lavabre, Marie-Claire, “Les historiens dans l'espace public,” Sociétés Contemporaines 39 (2000): 5, 10–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15. Irmtrud Wojak, “Die Verschmelzung von Geschichte und Kriminologie. Historische Gutachten im ersten Frankfurter Auschwitz-Prozeß,” in Geschichte vor Gericht, 29–42.

16. See Henri Rousso, “Justiz, Geschichte und Erinnerung in Frankreich. Überlegungen zum Papon–Prozeß,” in Geschichte vor Gericht, 141, 155.

17. Dumoulin, Olivier, Le rôle social de l'historien. De la chaire au prétoire (Paris: Albin Michel, 2003): 11, 63–106Google Scholar; Lévy-Dumoulin, Olivier, “Des faits à l'intérpretation: l'histoire au prétoire. Un exemple canadien,” La revue pour l' Histoire du CNRS [en ligne] 16 (2007): 1–7Google Scholar; Petrović, Historians as Expert Witnesses in the Age of Extremes, 142, 176; and Reiter, Eric H., “Fact, Narrative, and the Judicial Uses of History: Delgamuukw and Beyond,” Indigenous Law Journal 8 (2010): 55–79.Google Scholar

18. For an early critique of the tendency toward a kind of “forensic historicism” see Forsthoff, Ernst, “Der Zeithistoriker als gerichtlicher Sachverständiger,” Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 18 (1965): 574–75Google Scholar (discussing the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial).

19. Vivant, Carole, L'historien saisi par le droit. Contribution à l'étude des droits de l'histoire (Paris: Dalloz, 2007).Google Scholar

20. Cartier, Emmanuel, “Histoire et droit: rivalité ou complementarité?,” Revue française de Droit constitutionnel 67 (2006): 509, 516.Google Scholar

21. Particularly relevant is the Italian experience: see legislative decree 30–7–1999, no. 281 (introducing a particular regime for the processing of personal data for purposes of historical research) and the decision of the Italian Data Protection Authority, 14–3–2001, http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/doc.jsp?ID=1556419 (September 8, 2012) (sanctioning the adoption of a code of self-regulation concerning the processing of personal data for purposes of historical research). See Carucci, Paola, “La salvaguardia delle fonti e il diritto di accesso,” in Segreti personali e segreti di stato. Privacy, archivi e ricerca storica, ed. Spagnolo, Carlo (Fucecchio: European Press Academic Publishing, 2001), 47–54.Google Scholar

22. See, generally, Bellescize, Diane de, “L'autorité du droit sur l'histoire,” in L'autorité, ed. Foyer, Jean, Lebreton, Gilles and Puigelier, Catherine (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008), 51–84.Google Scholar

23. For a comparative overview, see Hennebel, Ludovic and Hochmann, Thomas, ed., Genocide Denial and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; as regards the French experience, see Cartier, “Histoire et droit: rivalité ou complementarité?” 527–33 (discussing “la derive historicide du droit”).

24. Kahn, Robert, Holocaust Denial and the Law. A Comparative Study (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25. Cons. Const., 28–2–2012, no. 2012–647 DC, Les petites affiches 70 (2012)Google Scholar: 11, with a comment by Jean-Pierre Camby, “La loi et le négationnisme: de l'exploitation de l'histoire au droit au débat sur l'histoire”; see also Salomon, Tim René, “Meinungsfreiheit und die Strafbarkeit des Negationismus,” Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 45 (2012)Google Scholar: 48.

26. Cajani, Luigi, “Criminal Laws on History: The Case of the European Union,” Historein 11 (2011): 19–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Laurent Pech, “The Law of Holocaust Denial in Europe: Toward a (qualified) EU-wide Criminal Prohibition,” in Genocide Denial and the Law, 185–234.

27. The sentence quoted is taken from the “Blois Appeal” promoted by the Association “Liberté pour l'histoire,” http://www.lph-asso.fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=14&lang=en (September 8, 2012); on this see Nora, Pierre, “History, Memory and the Law in France, 1990–2010,” Historein 11 (2011): 10–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cajani, Luigi, “Historians between Memory Wars and Criminal Laws: The Case of the European Union,” in Jahrbuch der Internationalen Gesellschaft für Geschichtsdidaktik (Schwalbach/Ts: Wochenschau, 2008), 27.Google Scholar

28. This is the category adopted by the European Court of Human Rights to affirm the compatibility of genocide denial legislation with Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. See Pech, “The Law of Holocaust Denial in Europe,” 213.

29. On this, see the remarks by Martin, Jean-Clément, “La démarche historique face à la vérité judiciaire. Juges et historiens,” Droit et société 38 (1998): 13, 16–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Benz, Wolfgang, “Holocaust Denial: Anti-Semitism as a Refusal to Accept Reality,” Historein 11 (2011): 69–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30. On the notion of “public use of history” see Gallerano, Nicola, “Storia e uso pubblico della storia,” in L'uso pubblico della storia, ed. Gallerano, Nicola (Milan: F. Angeli, 1995)Google Scholar, 17; Damamme and Lavabre, “Les historiens dans l'espace public” ; and Dumoulin, Le rôle social de l'historien, 91.

31. See, generally, Teubner, Gunther, ed., Juridification of Social Spheres. A Comparative Analysis in the Areas of Labor, Corporate, Antitrust and Social Welfare Law (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1987)Google Scholar; Rodotà, Stefano, La vita e le regole. Tra diritto e non diritto (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2006), 9–72Google Scholar; Lars Chr. Blichner and Anders Molander, “What is Juridification?,” Working Paper University of Oslo, 14 (2005): 2–41, https://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2005/wp05_14.pdf (September 8, 2012); and Levi-Faur, David, “The Political Economy of Legal Globalization: Juridification, Adversarial Legalism, and Responsive Regulation. A Comment,” International Organization 59 (2005): 451–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

32. Melloni, Alberto, “Per una storia della tribunalizzazione della storia,” in La storia che giudica, la storia che assolve, ed. Marquard, Odo and Melloni, Alberto (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2008)Google Scholar, 30; see also Jean, Jean-Paul, “Le procès et l'écriture de l'histoire,” Tracès. Revue de science humaines [en ligne] 9 (2009): 61–74Google Scholar, http://traces.revues.org/4344 (September 8, 2012).

33. It is a matter of debate whether the best translation of the Italian “Fosse Ardeatine” is “Ardeatine Quarries” or “Ardeatine Caves.” We opted for the latter, as “[t]he ‘Fosse’ were originally quarries, and the Italian for ‘quarries’ is cave, which is why they are known as ‘caves’ in English (as well as because they were underground). Soon after the war the name was changed to ‘Fosse’ which means ‘graves’, but also ‘ditches’.” (Alessandro Portelli, “The Massacre at the Fosse Ardeatine. History, Myth, Ritual and Symbol,” in Memory, History, Nation. Contested Pasts, ed. Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone [Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 2005], 40). See also the entry “Ardeatine Caves,” in The Oxford Companion to World War II, ed. Dear, Ian C.B. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34. On this issue, see De Baets, Antoon, Responsible History (New York–Oxford: Berghahn, 2010), especially 72–90Google Scholar; and Nathalie Mallet-Poujol, “Diffamation et ‘vérité historique’” Recueil Dalloz (2000): jur., 226–31.

35. This fact would hypothetically have fallen under Article 25 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention. “The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.” For a historical overview see Silveri, Umberto Gentiloni and Carli, Maddalena, Bombardare Roma. Gli Alleati e la “città aperta” (1940–1944) (Bologna: il Mulino, 2007), 187–202.Google Scholar

36. Rochat, Giorgio, “L'armistizio dell'8 settembre 1943,” in Dizionario della resistenza, vol. I, Storia e geografia della liberazione, ed. Collotti, Enzo, Sandri, Renato and Sessi, Frediano (Turin: Einaudi, 2000), 32–40.Google Scholar

37. See Gabriele Ranzato, “Roma,” in Dizionario della resistenza, 412–23.

38. For a detailed account of the partisan attack on via Rasella, see Staron, Joachim, Fosse Ardeatine und Marzabotto: Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen und Resistenza (Paderborn, München, Wien, and Zürich: Schöningh, 2002), 35–77Google Scholar; Prauser, Steffen, “Mord in Rom? Der Anschlag in der Via Rasella und die deutsche Vergeltung in den Fosse Ardeatine im März 1944,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 50 (2002): 269, 279–86Google Scholar; Ranzato, “Roma,” 420; and Roberto Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza Italiana (Turin: Einaudi, 1964), 224.

39. See below, note 90.

40. For the details see Katz, Robert, Roma città aperta. Settembre 1943 – Giugno 1944, (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 2009), 282.Google Scholar

41. The Sant'Anna massacre is in the background of Spike Lee's Miracle at Sant'Anna (2008). There were also other terrible mass executions, such as Civitella Valdichiana (115 victims), but these were not of the same scale as Marzabotto and Sant'Anna di Stazzema. See, generally, Baldissara, Luca and Pezzino, Paolo, Il massacro. Guerra ai civili a Monte Sole (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009)Google Scholar; Klinkhammer, Lutz, Stragi naziste in Italia. La guerra contro i civili 1943–1944 (Rome: Donzelli, 1997)Google Scholar; and Staron, Fosse Ardeatine und Marzabotto, 12–13.

42. See, generally, Ettore Gallo, “Diritto e legislazione di guerra,” in Dizionario della resistenza, 338.

43. Military Trib. Rome, 20–7–1948, Rassegna di diritto pubblico 4 (1949): II, 170, with a comment by Francesco Capotorti, “Qualificazione giuridica dell'eccidio delle Fosse Ardeatine.”

44. See Sutter, Philip, “The Continuing Role for Belligerent Reprisals,” Journal of Conflict & Security Law 13 (2008): 93–122CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially 99.

45. “No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible.”

46. Generals Kesselring, von Mackensen, and Mälzer were all sentenced to death by Allied war crimes tribunals, the last two specifically for having ordered the Ardeatine Caves massacre (see Staron, Fosse Ardeatine und Marzabotto, 132, 148). The verdict was commuted to life imprisonment. Gen. Mälzer died of natural causes in 1952 while serving the sentence. The other two generals were released that same year (see Rivello, Pier Paolo, “Lacune e incertezze negli orientamenti processuali sui crimini nazifascisti,” in Giudicare e punire. I processi per crimini di guerra tra diritto e politica, ed. Baldissara, Luca and Pezzino, Paolo [Naples: L'Ancora del Mediterraneo, 2005], 259Google Scholar) and died in their own beds, without ever disavowing their full adherence to Nazism and its abject and destructive policies.

47. One can observe a clear inconsistency on this point. The decision notes that the designation of Col. Kappler as executor of the reprisal order came after the head of the battalion, Maj. Dobbrick, whose battalion the attacked German patrol was part of, excused himself from the task, arguing that his men were not trained to conduct this kind of operation. Also, when Corp. Amonn, one of the soldiers entrusted with the execution, entered the Caves and saw the corpses lying on the ground, he was so horrified that he fainted (see Katz, Roma città aperta, 290). There were, therefore, ways to not obey the order.

48. Kappler could not be sentenced to death because the Italian Military Penal Code of 1941 (article 185) punished acts of violence against civilians committed by a military force as a “common” murder and therefore with the sanctions contained in the Penal Code. The head of the Fascist police in Rome, Pietro Caruso, who, under Kappler's orders, had drafted a list of fifty prisoners who were eventually executed at the Ardeatine Caves was, instead, sentenced to death in 1944 by a special tribunal (see below, note 84).

49. Sup. Mil. Trib., 25–10–1952, Kappler, Rivista di diritto internazionale 36 (1953): 193Google Scholar, with a comment by Roberto Ago; Court of Cassation, S.U., 19–12–1953, no. 26, Kappler, http://www.difesa.it/GiustiziaMilitare/RassegnaGM/Processi/Kappler_Herbert/Pagine/08sentenza26.aspx (September 8, 2012). It is worth remembering that in 1976, after considerable pressure from the German government, Col. Kappler was released for medical reasons (cancer) but confined in a military hospital in Rome. On the night between August 14 and August 15, 1977, his wife smuggled him out of the hospital in a large suitcase and drove him to Germany, were he was publicly acclaimed by former Nazi supporters. The German authorities refused to extradite him, arguing that as a “prisoner of war” (not a war criminal) Kappler had exercised his right to escape. He eventually died in 1978 as a result of his cancer. For a detailed account of Kappler's escape, see Bohr, Felix Nikolaus, “Flucht aus Rom. Das spektakuläre Ende des ‘Falles Kappler’ im August 1977,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 60 (2012): 111–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

50. Behind the weak prosecution of Nazi crimes in postwar Italy also lay political reasons. These were related, on the one hand, to the need to preserve good relationships with the new German state, and, on the other hand, to fear of a massive prosecution of Italian war criminals abroad. On this, see Focardi, Filippo, Criminali di Guerra in libertà. Un accordo segreto tra Italia e Germania federale, 1949–1955, (Rome: Carocci, 2008), 35–40Google Scholar; Steinacher, Gerald, “Das Massaker der Fosse Ardeatine und die Täterverfolgung. Deutsch-italienische Störfälle von Kappler bis Priebke,” in Italien, Österreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Europa. Ein Dreiecksverhältnis in seinen wechselseitigen Beziehungen und Wahrnehmungen von 1945/49 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Gehler, Michael and Guiotto, Maddalena (Wien, Cologne and Weimar: Böhlau, 2012), 296–301.Google Scholar

51. See above, Section 4, discussing the decisions of Military Trib. Rome, 20-7-1968, and Sup. Mil. Trib., 25-10-1952.

52. Military Trib. Rome, 1–8–1996, Priebke, Cassazione penale 37 (1997): 251.

53. See, on this issue, Sacerdoti, Giorgio, “A proposito del caso Priebke : la responsabilità per l'esecuzione di ordini illegittimi costituenti crimini di guerra,” Rivista di diritto internazionale 80 (1997): 130.Google Scholar

54. See Steinacher, “Das Massaker der Fosse Ardeatine und die Täterverfolgung,” 308–9.

55. Court of Cassation, 15–10–1996, Priebke, Foro italiano 120 (1997): II, 5.

56. What is astonishing, and revealing in terms of the lack of any real search for those involved in the Ardeatine Caves massacre, is that Maj. Hass, after the war, was recruited by United States intelligence agencies and operated in Italy under a false name. Subsequently, he returned using his real name. In 1969 he even played the role of a Nazi officer in the movie “La caduta degli dei” (“The Damned”) by Luchino Visconti (see Steinacher, “Das Massaker der Fosse Ardeatine und die Täterverfolgung,” 311). When he was arrested in 1996 he had been living near Milan for at least 20 years and his name was in the telephone directory.

57. Military Trib. Rome, 22–7–1997, Hass, Priebke, Diritto penale e processo 3 (1997): 1510.Google Scholar

58. One of Hass' defense witnesses was the eminent professor of criminal law and Minister of Justice Giuliano Vassalli, at that time a young member of the Resistance held by the Gestapo. Hass managed to postpone Vassalli's execution, which had been ordered by Col. Kappler; eventually Vassalli, through the intercession of Pope Pius XII, was set free on June 2, 1944 (see Katz, Roma città aperta, 352).

59. Military Court App. 7–3–1998, Hass, Priebke, Diritto penale e processo 4 (1998): 1122.Google Scholar

60. Court of Cassation, 16–11–1998, Hass, Priebke, Foro italiano 122 (1999): II, 273.Google Scholar

61. See, generally, Focardi, Filippo, La guerra della memoria: la Resistenza nel dibattito politico italiano dal 1945 ad oggi (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2005), 19–32.Google Scholar

62. Also among the defendants in this case was Franco Calamandrei, member of the partisan commando unit and son of the distinguished jurist Piero Calamandrei. On the emotional atmosphere surrounding this trial, see Cipriani, Franco, “Piero e Franco Calamandrei tra via Rasella e le Fosse Ardeatine,” Clio 45 (2009): 65Google Scholar; Carlo Galante Garrone, “Via Rasella davanti ai giudici,” in Priebke e il massacre delle Fosse Ardeatine, 51–56; and Focardi, La guerra della memoria, 28.

63. Court of Rome, 9–6–1950, Giurisprudenza italiana 102 (1950): I, 2, 577, with a comment by Domenico Riccardo Peretti Griva, “L'attentato di via Rasella e le responsabilità per l'eccidio delle Fosse Ardeatine.”

64. Court of Cassation, S.U., 19–7–1957, n. 3053, Foro italiano 80 (1957): I, 1398.Google Scholar

65. Decision by the Rome judge for the preliminary hearing, 16–4–1998.

66. Court of Cassation, 23–2–1999, no. 1560, Foro italiano 122 (1999): II, 273.Google Scholar

67. One should note here the caution that is required in using judicial materials as sources of historical fact finding. The decision just cited states, at para. 6, as an argument to quash the decision of the judge of the preliminary hearing, that the 1952 final decision in the Kappler case (see above, note 49) had reversed the prior decisions as regards the legitimacy, from a ius in bello perspective, of the via Rasella attack. The 1999 decision states, literally: “The Supreme Military Court, with its decision 25–10–1952, n.1711 (Rassegna della Giustizia Militare, 83) has overturned this thesis, declaring the reprisal unlawful in relation to the lawfulness of the Italian action: ‘Via Rasella, in light of the norms of international law, must be evaluated with rigorous coherence. It cannot be characterized otherwise than an act of hostility against the occupation armed forces, committed by persons who possessed the status of legitimate belligerents.’” If one consults the 1952 decision as printed in the law review (published by the Italian Ministry of Defense in a special issue in 1996 devoted entirely to war crimes trials) one finds the phrase as transcribed. But when one goes to verify the text of the decision by examining it as published in many law reviews in the year 1953, one realizes that its sense is opposite, because the 1996 reprint omitted a “not.” The correct phrase—completely consistent with the context of the decision—is, therefore: “committed by persons who did not possess the status of legitimate belligerents” [emphasis supplied]. To make things even more complicated, for unknown reasons the whole phrase was omitted in the on line text of the 1999 decision published on the Italian Ministry of Defense web site, http://www.difesa.it/GiustiziaMilitare/RassegnaGM/Processi/Priebke_Erich/Pagine/17_23-02-99.aspx (September 8, 2012). After notification by the authors of this article, it was eventually corrected in January 2012. The mistaken quote in the 1996 decision has been repeatedly used in many writings and public debates as the judicial seal on the historical truth of the via Rasella attack: see ex multis Luigi Miragliuolo, “I fascisti fornirono perfino scorte armate ai treni per Auschwitz,” http://www.storiaxxisecolo.it/deportazione/deportazionefascismo1l.htm (September 8, 2012); Raimondo Ricci, “Processo alle stragi naziste? Il caso ligure. I fascicoli occultati e le illegittime archiviazioni,” http://www.istitutoresistenza-ge.it/Pubblicazioni/ricci.html (September 8, 2012); http://www.finanzaonline.com/forum/arena-politica/1231494-priebke-bisogna-avere-pieta-per-chi-non-e-ha-mai-avuta-8.html (September 8, 2012); and http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=143733 (September 8, 2012). All of this helps us to understand how much the historical debate regarding Via Rasella remains a heated topic in Italy, more than 65 years after the fact. For an interesting insight into how the extremely detailed entry on via Rasella in Wikipedia (http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatti_di_via_Rasella [September 8, 2012]) was debated, see http://www.territorioscuola.com/wikipedia/?title=Discussione:Attentato_di_via_Rasella (September 8, 2012). For a literary account of how history can be changed by the insertion or the omission of a “not” see novel, José Saramago's, The History of the Siege of Lisbon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1996).Google Scholar

68. See, for example, Staron, Fosse Ardeatine und Marzabotto, 22–27, 37; Prauser, “Mord in Rom?,” 269–301; and Klinkhammer, Stragi naziste in Italia, 4–5.

69. What is still an object of debate is the role that the Catholic Church, and Pope Pius XII, played in the case. Robert Katz's book Death in Rome (New York: Macmillan, 1967) describes an attitude of inertia on the part of the Pope, whose intervention might have saved the victims. This reconstruction of events (entirely apart from its judicial scrutiny) has, however, been challenged (see below, note 117, sect. 11).

70. See Giorgio Resta, Talking about History: A Comparative Analysis of Post-War Personality Rights Litigation in Europe, on file with the author.

71. See Clifford, Rebecca, “The Limits of National Memory: Anti-Fascism, The Holocaust and the Fosse Ardeatine Memorial in 1990s Italy,” Forum for Modern Language Studies 44 (2008): 128–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ponzani, Michela, “La memoria divisa intorno alla strage delle Fosse Ardeatine (parte prima),” Il secondo Risorgimento d'Italia 18 (2008): 27, 37.Google Scholar

72. See Portelli, “The Massacre at the Fosse Ardeatine,” 31.

73. Ibid.

74. See Ponzani, “La memoria divisa intorno alla strage delle Fosse Ardeatine,” 34.

75. See Ranzato, Gabriele, Il linciaggio di Carretta – Roma 1944. Violenza politica e ordinaria violenza (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1997)Google Scholar, 35; and Katz, Roma città aperta, 371.

76. Later it was found out that Carretta secretly helped the anti-Fascist activists detained in Regina Coeli and resisted the removal of the men on Caruso's list from the prison (Katz, Roma città aperta, 371).

77. This impressive documentary is freely accessible at: http://www.mediatecaroma.it/mediatecaRoma/permalinkView/1/IL3000088764/Giorni_di_gloria.html (September 8, 2012).

78. See Taviani, Ermanno, “L'immagine della nazione nella cinematografia tra fascismo e repubblica,” in 1945–1946. Le origini della Repubblica, ed. Monina, Giancarlo (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2007), 239–76Google Scholar; and Vercelli, Claudio, “Cinema resistente: uno sguardo d'insieme sulla raffigurazione della Resistenza dal dopoguerra ad oggi,” Asti contemporanea 11 (2005): 303–88Google Scholar. As regards the importance of film and other media in understanding the climate surrounding the postwar trials, see Staron, Fosse Ardeatine und Marzabotto, 24, 115.

79. Throughout the twentieth century, European law developed a far-reaching system of post mortem protection of privacy and personality interests, which is generally alien to common law jurisdictions, and particularly United States law: see Rösler, Hannes, “Dignitarian Posthumous Personality Rights – An Analysis of U.S. and German Constitutional and Tort Law,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 26 (2008): 153–205.Google Scholar

80. The decisions published in the law reports are Cass, 13–5–1958, no. 1563, Foro italiano 81 (1958): I, 1117Google Scholar; Court of App. Florence, 11–3–1960, Foro padano 15 (1960): I, 96Google Scholar, with a comment by Fabiani, Mario, Diffamazione e prova della verità del fatto narrato; Foro italiano 83 (1960): I, 1028Google Scholar; and Cass., 24–4–1962, no. 816, Foro italiano 85 (1962): I, 1722.Google Scholar

81. Cass, 24–4–1962, no. 816, 1724–25.

82. Cass, 13–5–1958, no. 1563, 1120.

83. See Court of App. Rome, 14–2–2005, Diritto dell'informazione e dell'informatica 21 (2005): 256Google Scholar, denying that Capt. Priebke's reputation is capable of being further injured by the attribution of untrue facts (namely, alleged execution of the trade unionist Bruno Buozzi and thirteen other anti-Fascists in La Storta, Rome).

84. See High Court of Justice, 21–9–1944, Giustizia Penale 50–51 (1945–1946): II, 42; on this trial see Staron, Fosse Ardeatine und Marzabotto, 103.

85. Cass, 24–4–1962, no. 816, 1724–25.

86. See generally Focardi, Filippo, “La questione dei processi ai criminali di guerra tedeschi in Italia: fra punizione frenata, insabbiamento di Stato, giustizia tardiva (1943–2005),” Annali della Fondazione Ugo La Malfa 20 (2005): 179–212.Google Scholar

87. See Katz, Roma città aperta, 384–85.

88. See Ponzani, Michela, “La memoria divisa intorno alla strage delle Fosse Ardeatine (parte finale),” Il Secondo Risorgimento d'Italia 19 (2009): 11, 35–38Google Scholar; the climate created by the revisionist press is described in detail in the autobiography of the partisan Rosario Bentivegna, written in collaboration with the historian Michela Ponzani; see Bentivegna, Rosario, Senza fare di necessità virtù. Memorie di un antifascista, (Turin: Einaudi, 2011).Google Scholar

89. On this myth, see Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza italiana, 227; and Steinacher, “Das Massaker der Fosse Ardeatine und die Täterverfolgung,” 294–95.

90. See Portelli, Alessandro, L'ordine è già stato eseguito: Roma, le Fosse Ardeatine, la memoria (Rome: Donzelli, 1999), 317–34Google Scholar; Alessandro Portelli, “The Massacre at the Fosse Ardeatine,” 29, 33; Pavone, “Note sulla Resistenza Armata, le rappresaglie naziste ed alcune attuali confusioni,” 46; Staron, Fosse Ardeatine und Marzabotto,46; Ferretti, Maria, “Mémoires divisées, Résistance et guerre aux civils en Italie,” Annales 60 (2005): 627, 630CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ponzani, Michela, “Trials of Partisans in the Italian Republic: The Consequences of the Elections of 18 April 1948,” Modern Italy 16 (2011): 121, 133CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ponzani, “La memoria divisa intorno alla strage delle Fosse Ardeatine (parte finale),” 36.

91. For further details in Katz, Roma città aperta, 385.

92. See above, note 65 and corresponding text.

93. Court of Cassation, 23-2-1999 (quoted above, note 66).

94. Cass. civ., 21–7–2009, no. 16916, Foro italiano 132 (2009): I, 2974, with a comment by Domenico Maltese, “La stampa sulla vicenda di via Rasella,” and by Mirella Chiarolla, “Il peso delle parole.”

95. Cass. civ., 6–8–2007, no. 17172, Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata 24 (2008): I, 241Google Scholar; on this decision, see Vincenzo Zeno–Zencovich, “Il giudizio della storia e la storia attraverso il giudizio,” Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata 24 (2008): II, 34–40.Google Scholar

96. See Gian Paolo Pelizzaro, “… E Pietro, 12 anni, saltò. In aria…,” Storia in rete (2009): 42, http://www.storiainrete.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/05-via-rasella-pdf.pdf (September 8, 2012) (arguing that historical expertise did not consider relevant details of the places, and concluding that the photograph is not a fake).

97. As regards the history of the Regiment “Bozen” see Prauser, “Mord in Rom?” 279–82; and Lorenzo Baratter, Dall'Alpenvorland a via Rasella. Storia dei reggimenti di polizia sudtirolesi (1943–1945) (Trento: Publilux, 2003), 51–77, 79–96.

98. Cass. civ., 6–8–2007, no. 17172.

99. Katz, Robert, Morte a Roma. Il massacro delle Fosse Ardeatine (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1996), 224–31.Google Scholar

100. Ibid., 231.

101. On the various types of criticism of the role played by Pius XII during the totalitarian era see, ex multis, Malgeri, Francesco, “La chiesa di Pio XII tra guerra e dopoguerra,” in Pio XII, ed. Riccardi, Andrea (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1984), 95Google Scholar; and Melloni, “Per una storia della tribunalizzazione della storia,” 20–23. See also the studies quoted below, note 114.

102. Court of Rome, 27–11–1975, Temi romana 25 (1976): 636, with a comment by Fernando Della Rocca, “Un processo storico.”

103. In the 1980s the courts started to allow the defendant merely to prove that the facts reasonably appeared to be truthful on the basis of the available sources of information. See Zeno-Zencovich, Vincenzo, “Damage Awards in Defamation Cases: An Italian View,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 40 (1991): 692.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

104. Court of Rome, 27–11–1975, 648.

105. Katz, Morte a Roma, 224–25.

106. Ibid., 226.

107. Court of Rome, 27–11–1975, 648.

108. Court of App. Rome, 1–7–1978, Temi Romana 27 (1978): 313Google Scholar, with a comment by Fernando Della Rocca, “Ancora del processo su Pio XII e le fosse Ardeatine.”

109. Ibid, 317.

110. Ibid., 320–23.

111. Cass. pen., 19–10–1979, Foro italiano 104 (1981): II, 243.Google Scholar

112. Court of App. Rome, 2–7–1981, Temi Romana (1981): 715, with a comment by Fernando Della Rocca, “Brevi considerazioni conclusive sul processo contro l'accusatore di Pio XII (a proposito dell'eccidio delle fosse Ardeatine).”

113. Cass., 29–9–1983, Giustizia Penale (1984): II, 325.

114. See ex plurimis the important studies by Miccoli, Giovanni, I dilemmi e i silenzi di Pio XII. Vaticano, Seconda guerra mondiale e Shoah (Milan: Rizzoli, 2007)Google Scholar; and Riccardi, Andrea, L'inverno più lungo. 1943–1944: Pio XII, gli ebrei e i nazisti a Roma (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2008).Google Scholar

115. Katz, Roma città aperta, 278.

116. English translation by Robert Katz, http://www.theboot.it/mar_intros.html#anc6 (September 8, 2012). The document was originally published in Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la seconde guerre mondiale, vol. 10, Le Saint Siège et les victimes de la guerre, Janvier 1944 – Juillet 1945, ed. Pierre Blet, Robert A. Graham, Angelo Martini and Burkhart Schneider (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980), doc. no. 115, 189–90. In the original version, it reads as follows: “Récit de l'attentat de la Via Rasella. Contremesures encore incertaines. L'Ing. Ferrero, del Governatorato di Roma, dà i seguenti particolari circa l'incidente di ieri: il numero delle vittime tedesche è di 26 militari; tra i civili italiani si lamentano tre o quattro morti; non è facile ricostruire la scena dato che tutti si sono dati alla fuga; alcuni appartamenti sono stati saccheggiati e la polizia tedesca ha preso l'assoluto controllo della zona senza permettere ingerenza di altre autorità; sembra ad ogni modo che una colonna di automezzi tedeschi attraversando via Rasella abbia la responsabilità di aver provocato gli italiani che poi avrebbero lanciato delle bombe dall'edificio di fianco al Palazzo Tittoni; finora sono sconosciute le contromisure: si prevede però che per ogni tedesco ucciso saranno passati per le armi 10 italiani. L'Ing. Ferrero spera di dare più tardi maggiori particolari.”

117. For a critical evaluation of the new evidence provided by Katz, see Gariboldi, Giorgio Angelozzi, “Pio XII e le Fosse Ardeatine,” Nuova storia contemporanea 5 (2001): 135–42Google Scholar, especially 139; and Vedovato, Giuseppe, “Ancora sul “silenzio-non assenso' di Pio XII,” Rivista di studi politici internazionali 72 (2005): 99–111Google Scholar. See also Miccoli, I dilemmi e i silenzi di Pio XII, 270–71; and Riccardi, L'inverno più lungo, 324–28.

118. The expression “judiciarisation du passé” is used by de Bellescize, “L'autorité du droit sur l'histoire,” 52.

119. The presence of an all-lay jury seems to prevent the trial from accomplishing its “epistemic tasks”. See Taruffo, Michele, La semplice verità. Il giudice e la costruzione dei fatti (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2009), 183–91.Google Scholar

120. See above, sect. 9, discussing the Court of Cassation decision of 24-4-1962, and sect. 10, discussing the defamation cases concerning the partisans involved in the via Rasella attack.

121. See above, note 23 and corresponding text.

122. Cass. civ., 6–8–2007, no. 17172.

123. For the selection over time of a specific judicial “truth,” see above, sect. 6 and 10, concerning the legal characterization of the via Rasella attack.

124. See generally Hyland, Richard, Gifts. A Study in Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

125. See above, sect. 4 discussing The Kappler Trial.

126. On this, see the important study by Modona, Guido Neppi, “La magistratura dalla liberazione agli anni cinquanta. Il difficile cammino verso l'indipendenza,” in Storia dell'Italia Repubblicana, vol. III, L'Italia nella crisi mondiale (Turin: Einaudi, 1997), 83–137.Google Scholar

127. Donini, “La gestione penale del passaggio dal fascismo alla democrazia in Italia”; and Lacché, Luigi, “‘Sistemare il terreno e sgombrare le macerie’. Gli anni della Costituzione provvisoria: alle origini del discorso sulla riforma della legislazione e del codice di procedura penale (1943–1947),” in L'inconscio inquisitorio. L'eredità del Codice Rocco nella cultura processualpenalistica italiana, ed. Garlati, Loredana, (Milan: Giuffrè, 2010), 271–304Google Scholar. As regards the double standard and the so-called “judicial offensive against the Resistance,” see Ponzani, Michela, L'offensiva giudiziaria antipartigiana nell'Italia repubblicana (1945–1960), (Rome: Aracne, 2008)Google Scholar; Ponzani, “Trials of partisans in the Italian Republic,” 133; Focardi, La guerra della memoria, 28–30; Franzina, Emilio, “L'azione politica e giudiziaria contro la Resistenza (1945–1950),” in La democrazia cristiana dal Fascismo al 18 Aprile: Movimento cattolico e Democrazia cristiana nel Veneto, ed. Isnenghi, Mario and Lanaro, Silvio, (Venice: Marsilio, 1978), 220Google Scholar; and Battaglia, Achille, I giudici e la politica (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1962), 10.Google Scholar

128. Pezzino, “‘Experts in truth?’” 349.

129. Court of Cassation, 16-11-1998; Military Court of Appeal, 7-3-1998 (discussed above, sect. 5).

130. The Court of Cassation discussions quoted above, note 94 and note 95.

131. See above, sect. 7, discussing the outcomes of the criminal and civil proceedings related to the “facts” of via Rasella and the Ardeatine Caves.

132. The adjudication of cases by courts of law is regarded by Jon Elster as one of the many institutional devices available to achieve the aims of transitional justice: see Elster, Jon, Closing the Books. Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 79–135CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Zolo, Danilo, La giustizia dei vincitori. Da Norimberga a Baghdad (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2006), 140–67.Google Scholar

133. See, generally, Goff, Jacques Le, Histoire et mémoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), 186–93Google Scholar; more specifically, on the influence of the contemporary “moralization of the past” on historiographical practice (and on the very notion of “historical truth”) see Cattaruzza, Marina, “How Much Does Historical Truth Still Matter?,” Historein 11 (2011): 49–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

134. See above, note 2.

135. Calamandrei, “Il giudice e lo storico,” 107; see also Stolleis, “Der Historiker als Richter —der Richter als Historiker,” 177–78.

136. Bloch, Marc, The Historian's Craft (New York: Vintage Books, 1953), 138.Google Scholar

137. See above, note 14.

138. Le Crom, Jean-Pierre, “Juger l'histoire,” Droit et société, 38 (1998): 37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

139. European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 29-9-2004, App. n. 64915/01, Chauvy and others v. France, para. 69: “[t]he Court considers that it is an integral part of freedom of expression to seek historical truth and it is not the Court's role to arbitrate the underlying historical issues, which are part of a continuing debate between historians that shapes opinion as to the events which took place and their interpretation.”

140. Tribunal de Grande Instance (TGI) Paris, 8–7–1981, Recueil Dalloz (1982): jur., 59 ; see also TGI Paris, 14–2–1990, Gazette du Palais (1991): II, 452 ; TGI Paris, 2–4–1998, Les petites affiches 85 (1998): 24Google Scholar. Similar words can be found in Irving v. Penguin Books, Lipstadt (2000) England and Wales High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division 115 (leave to appeal denied in [2001] England and Wales Court of Appeals Civ. 1197): “Needless to say, the context in which these issues fall to be determined is one which arouses the strongest passion. On that account, it is important that I stress at the outset of this judgment that I do not regard it as being any part of my function as the trial judge to make findings of fact as to what did and what did not occur during the Nazi regime in Germany. It will be necessary for me to rehearse, at some length, certain historical data. The need for this arises because I must evaluate the criticisms of or (as Irving would put it) the attack upon his conduct as an historian in the light of the available historical evidence. But it is not for me to form, still less to express, a judgment about what happened. That is a task for historians. It is important that those reading this judgment should bear well in mind the distinction between my judicial role in resolving the issues arising between these parties and the role of the historian seeking to provide an accurate narrative of past events” (Gray J.).

141. Edelman, Bernard, “L'office du juge et l'histoire,” Droit et société 38 (1998), 52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

142. de Bellescize, “L'autorité du droit sur l'histoire,” 66–76; Dumoulin, Le rôle social de l'historien. De la chaire au prétoire, 123–46.

143. de Baets, Responsible History, 16–39.

144. Hochmann, Thomas, “Les limites à la liberté de l''historien' en France et en Allemagne,” Droit et société 69–70 (2008): 537–38.Google Scholar

145. See, in particular, TGI Paris, 21–6–1995, Forum des Association Arméniennes de France c. Lewis, Les petites affiches 117 (1995): 17Google Scholar, holding the prominent Orientalist Bernard Lewis liable under Article 1382 c.civ. for denial of the Armenian genocide. See also the Pétré-Grenouilleau affair, recalled by Nora, “History, Memory and the Law in France, 1990–2010,” 11, and by Melloni, “Per una storia della tribunalizzazione della storia,” 45.

146. See above, sect. 11, discussing the various rulings concerning the defamation of Pope Pius XII.

147. Court of App. Rome, 2–7–1981, 722.

148. Ibid., 726.

149. Whinston, Stephen, “Can Lawyers and Judges Be Good Historians?: A Critical Examination of the Siemens-Slave Labor Cases,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 20 (2002): 160–75.Google Scholar

150. See, for a clear example, the critical analysis of the Priebke trial provided by Battini, Michele and Pezzino, Paolo, Guerra ai civili. Occupazione tedesca e politica del massacro. Toscana 1944 (Venice: Marsilio, 1997), 223–51Google Scholar, 253–58. The two historians argue that the reconstruction of the Ardeatine Caves massacre offered by the court was not entirely convincing, as the judges omitted to hear from Col. Dietrich Beelitz––Field Marshal Kesselring's chief of operations––as a witness. Col. Beelitz, informed by Gen. Mälzer of the attack on via Rasella while the Field Marshal was away from headquarters, telephoned the news to the German Armed Forces Supreme Command and witnessed the discussions that preceded the decision to execute ten Italians for every German killed. The authors conclude that by hearing from Col. Beelitz as a witness––as occurred in other proceedings––the judges could have ascertained the responsibility of the Wehrmacht (and of Field Marshal Kesselring in particular) for the reprisal and the massacre of hundreds of innocent civilians.