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Sectoral Clashes in Cuban Politics and Development

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2022

Jorge I. Domínguez
Jorge I. Domínguez*
Affiliation:
Harvard University
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This essay discusses aspects of contemporary cuban politics and economics, up to but not including the 1969-1970 sugar harvest effort, from the point of view of a theory of sectoral clashes presented by Markos Mamalakis. The essay will focus on those hypotheses, derived from Mamalakis' previous work, which attempt to explain social and political conflict and policy making.

Mamalakis defines a clash or collision of sectors as the aggressive and administered struggle for privileges and advantages among an economy's sectors. The clash is administered or manipulated because the transfer of resources from one sector to another is brought about through governmental economic policy; it is aggressive because the transfer of resources goes beyond voluntary saving or nondiscriminatory fiscal policies to such an extent that the government is willing to risk the decay of one economic sector in order to promote another.

Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Research Review , Volume 6 , Issue 3 , Fall 1971 , pp. 61 - 88
Copyright
Copyright © 1971 by the University of Texas Press

Footnotes

*

I am grateful to John Powell and to Markos Mamalakis for comments on an earlier version of this essay which was presented at the round table on sectoral clashes of the annual conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, held in Boston, December 26-31, 1969. They do not necessarily agree with this version. I am also grateful to the Society of Fellows and to the Center for International Affairs, both at Harvard University, for personal and research support.

References

Notes

1. References are from Markos Mamalakis, “The Theory of Sectoral Clashes,” Latin American Research Review, 4: 3: 10-11, 27-29. See also Markos Mamalakis, “Public Policy and Sectoral Development: A Case Study of Chile, 1940-1958,” in Markos Mamalakis and Clark Reynolds, Essays on the Chilean Economy (Homewood, Ill., 1965), and Markos Mamalakis, “La teoría de los choques entre sectores,” El Trimestre Económico, 33: 2 (1966).

2. An effort is made to use as much reliable, quantitative data as possible. We use the data of the academic or governmental sources most opposed to the conclusions based on those data which are presented here. We seek to reduce the possible biases of some of the sources. For a discussion see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, “Availability and Reliability of Statistics in Socialist Cuba,” Latin American Research Review, 4: 1, 2.

3. A form of H5 is also presented by Andrés Suárez, Cuba; Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966, xiii-xiv (Cambridge, Mass., 1967).

4. Lloyd Free, Attitudes of the Cuban People toward the Castro Regime (Princeton, N. J., 1960); for the Bohemia survey, see Revolución, June 20, 1959, 18.

5. Maurice Zeitlin, Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class, 13-44, 57-58 (Princeton, 1967).

6. Compiled from data in Richard R. Fagen, Richard A. Brody, and Thomas J. O'Leary, Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution, 19, 115 (Stanford, 1968).

7. There is variation in exile views toward the revolution prior to its victory and during the first months of its government. Those with least education were also less initially favorable to the revolution. This is in opposition to Free's survey. There are two probable explanations. (1) Among the least educated exiles one finds military, police, and early displaced farmers whose attitudes are atypical of the Cuban lower class. (2) Among the most educated exiles, over-all the most favorable to the revolution at the outset, there is the sharpest generational cleavage. Young university educated persons were the most favorable, while old university educated persons were the least favorable education-age groups to the revolution. Allowing for this variation, exile attitudes toward the revolution at its outset are consistent with other available data. Ibid., pp. 39-43.

8. Junta Central de Planificación, Compendio estadístico de Cuba, 1966, 20-21 (La Habana, 1967).

9. Cuban Economic Research Project, Labor Conditions in Communist Cuba, 71 (Miami, Fla., 1963).

10. International Labor Office, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1959, 186 (Geneva, 1959).

11. The Cabinet is defined to include the President of the Republic, the President of the National Bank, the chief executive officer of INRA, and all the ministers. Shifts from one post to another are not counted.

12. For discussion, see Richard R. Fagen's work: “The Cuban Revolution: Enemies and Friends,” in David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, Enemies in Politics (Chicago, 1967); “Mass Mobilization in Cuba: The Symbolism of Struggle,” Journal of International Affairs, 20: 2 (1966); and The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba, 1-32 (Stanford, 1969).

13. Lee Lockwood, Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel (New York, 1969), is a sensitive presentation of Fidel Castro's relation to the Cuban people.

14. For comparative theory and data, see Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR, 129-232 (New York, 1967); Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR, 213-257 (Boston, 1966); Merle Fainsod, “Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case,” and Carl Beck, “Bureaucracy and Political Development in Eastern Europe,” in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, 1963); John D. Powell, “Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics,” American Political Science Review, 64: 2 (1970).

15. Ernesto Guevara, Economic Planning in Cuba, 4 (New York, 1961); Revolución, March 3, 1960, 12; for Boti and Fidel Castro, see Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study on Cuba, 766 (Coral Gables, Fla., 1965); Francisco García and Juan Noyola, “Principales objetivos de nuestro plan económico hasta 1965,” Cuba Socialista, 2: 13: 11-16 (1962).

16. On incrementalism and planning, see Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, 82-85 (New York, 1963).

17. Edward Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba, 184-204 (New York, 1968).

18. On politics and communications theory, see Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York, 1967); on the mobilization system, see David Apter, The Politics of Modernization, 359-360 (Chicago, 1965).

19. Obra revolucionaria, 1963, 15: 33-38, 18: 7, 32: 12.

20. Speech of March 1964, in Obra revolucionaria, 1964, 10: 14; and speech of February 1965, in Che Guevara Speaks, 115 (New York, 1967).

21. This discussion parallels others in socialist countries. In Cuba, it is found in the following articles: for budgetary controls, Ernest (Che) Guevara, “Sobre la concepción del valor,” Nuestra Industria: Revista Económica (hereinafter NI:RE), 3 (1963); Luis Alvarez Rom, “Las finanzas como un método de desarrollo político,” NI:RE, 1 (1963); Miguel Cossío, “Contribución al debate sobre la ley del valor,” NI:RE, 4 (1963); Ernesto Guevara, “El socialismo y el hombre,” NI:RE, 14 (1965). For economic autonomy, Alberto Mora, “En torno a la cuestión del funcionamiento de la ley del valor en la economía cubana en los actuales momentos,” Comercio Exterior, 1: 3 (1963); Alberto Mora, “Sobre algunas problemas actuales de la construcción del socialismo,” NI:RE, 14 (1965); see also articles by Marcelo Fernández in Cuba Socialista, February and May issues, 1964. For summaries of the issues, Salvador Vilaseca, “El Banco Nacional de Cuba y los sistemas de Financiamiento,” NI:RE, February, 1 (1965), and Alban Lataste Hoffer, Cuba: Hacia una nueva economía política del socialismo, 33-41 (Santiago, 1968).

22. Evidence of Guevara's strained personal relations with some of his antagonists may be found in his Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, Victoria Ortiz, tr., 271, 280, 282 (New York, 1968).

23. Data from Vilaseca, 8.

24. Compiled by examining every issue of these two journals for this period.

25. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Statistical Bulletin for Latin America (New York), 3: 1: 22-24, 27, 31 (1966); 4: 2: 34, 37, 40, 42, 66 (1967); 6: 1: 36, 39, 42, 44, 68 (1969).

26. Severo Aguirre, “El primer aniversario de las cooperativas cañeras,” Cuba Socialista, 1: 3: 24 (1961).

27. Dudley Seers, ed., Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution, 133 (Durham, N.C., 1964).

28. Ibid., 42.

29. ECLA (1966), 101-109.

30. On land reform, Antonio Núñez Jiménez, “Revolución agraria en Cuba,” INRA, 2: 6: 7 (1961); Blas Roca, “Nueva etapa de la revolución cubana,” Cuba Socialista, 2: 5: 45 (1962); Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, “The Cuban Revolution and the Peasantry,” World Marxist Review, 8: 10: 62-71; and Comisión Económica para América Latina, El dessarrollo industrial de Cuba, ST/ECLA/Conf. 23/L. 63 (1966). For an interpretative essay, see James O'Connor, The Origins of Socialism in Cuba, 90-134, 214-239, 319-327 (Ithaca, 1970).

31. For further discussion of the problems leading to agricultural decay, Seers, ed., 137-140.

32. For Cuban data, Rodríguez, 66-67; Theodore Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice, 135-165 (New York, 1965). For an alternative explanation to sectoral theory, Dahl and Lindblom, 340-341.

33. Seers, ed., 323.

34. Cuban cement statistics in Panorama económico latinoamericano, 5: 283 (1966); Cuban electric power statistics, Granma Weekly Review, January 7, 1968, 2; United Nations statistics, ECLA (1966), 69-83.

35. Carlos Fernández R., “El XI congreso nacional de la CTC-R,” Cuba Socialista, 2: 6 (1962); Revolución, February 2, 1963, 3; and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Labor Sector and Socialist Distribution in Cuba, 40-44, 69-73, 112-115, 145-150, 178-180 (New York, 1968).

36. Junta Central de Planificación, Compendio estadístico de Cuba (La Habana) 1966, 15-17 (1967); 1967, 18, 22-24, (1968); 1968, 12, 16, 18, 19 (1969).

37. Data compiled from Junta Central de Planificación, Boletín estadístico de Cuba, 1964, 25, 46, 47 (La Habana, 1966).

38. Granma Weekly Review, October 8, 1967, 4.

39. Lataste, 36, 49.

40. Granma Weekly Review, July 16, 1967, 3; Miguel Martin, “Informe al congreso,” Cuba Socialista, 62 (1966).

41. Gramma Weekly Review, May 28, 1967, 3, for Fidel Castro's speech of May 18; and June 18, 1967, 4, 12, for data on financial benefits.

42. Ibid., June 18, 1967, 12.

43. For alternative and more subtle explanations of the relation between politics, economics, organizations, interest groups, and changes therein, Dahl and Lindholm; Seymour M. Lipset, The First New Nation, 52-68 (Garden City, N.Y., 1967); and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968). Sectoral theory's prediction that economic growth is unlikely under “extreme sectoral clashes” has been discussed from the perspective of “balanced growth” and the role of agriculture by Ragnar Nurkse, Equilibrium and Growth in the World Economy, Gottfried Haberler and Robert Stern, eds., 241-259 (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); Hla Myint, The Economics of the Developing Countries, 128-146 (New York, 1965); and Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure, 236-256 (New York, 1965). A symposium on these issues is in Gerald Meier, Leading Issues in Development Economics, 229-337 (New York, 1964).

44. The literature on the effects of economic growth on social conflict is vast. Among the studies, Seymour M. Lipset's Political Man, 27-86 (New York, 1963), relates economic growth to democratic stability. Huntington, however, suggests that the stabilizing effect is only likely at fairly high levels of economic prosperity; countries in the midst of the process are likely to face acute social conflict. For a quantitative analysis, Bruce M. Russett et. al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 261-340 (New Haven, 1967).

45. Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, 1-160 (New York, 1966); Kuznets, 1-81 (1965). For a description and critique of existing economic growth theory and further bibliographical references, Charles Kindleberger, Economic Development, 40-60 (New York, 1965).

46. For the role of labor and government in the non-communist industrialized countries, see Kuznets, 168-170, 217-219, 234-243; for an example of the analysis of sectoral shifts and preferences in existing economic growth theory, see 86-159 (1966). For comparative information on China and the Soviet Union, see Alexander Eckstein, Walter Galenson, and Ta-Chung Liu, Economic Trends in Communist China (Chicago, 1968), 19-28, 379-383, 459-460, 503-505, and Abram Bergson, The Real National Income of Soviet Russia since 1928,250-257 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1961).

47. Concepts of center-periphery from S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood-Cliffs, N. J., 1966), and E. Shils, Political Development in the New States (New York, 1964). On communications power holders, Frederick Frey, “Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey,” Communications and Political Development, Lucien Pye, ed. (Princeton, 1963).

48. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, footnote 2.

49. Albert O. Hirschman's The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven, 1958) precedes Mamalakis' work by several years. Hirschman provides an insightful analysis, and suggests a strategy of change, which is highly sensitive to intersectoral relations and their social and political implications. But Hirschman does not fall into two pitfalls of stressing the pre-eminence of economic sectors or economic sectoral determinism of all social and political life. Mamalakis may be pushing himself, regrettably, into these pitfalls in the essay in LARR, which follows.

50. Two comments. First, the United States economic embargo is also part of the explanation for Cuba's slow rate of economic growth. Cuban leaders have also insisted that major explanations for slow growth are government economic policies and the management of the economy. However, this essay is not concerned primarily with national economic growth but with differential sectoral performance. In the early 1960s, the embargo affected industry more than agriculture, because of the former's dependence on foreign repair parts. Therefore, the lower performance of agriculture in the early 1960s cannot be explained by external factors. Likewise, an unaltered embargo could not explain the shifts of the mid-1960s. Second, the early policy of industrialization was an attempt to diversify the Cuban economy. The shift back to sugar was a recognition that sugar production was essential for long-term growth. Both policies could be rationally defended in their contexts. But it was this essay's concern to go beyond such considerations to explore decision making and policy implementation, and their effects on Cuban politics and economics.

51. For a modern perspective on interest group theory, David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York, 1961); for a comparative perspective, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, 1966).