1. A useful review of the diverse approaches to the study of social change can be found in Juan F. Marsal, Cambio social en América Latina (Buenos Aires: Solar Hachette, 1967).

2. A representative example of this current can be found in Howard Wiarda, “Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model,” World Politics 25, no. 2 (January 1973): 206–35; and “Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World: Persistent Strains and New Variations,” The Review of Politics 36, no. 1 (January 1974). My own ideas on the subject of “corporatism” and its connection with the themes discussed in the present work can be found in Guillermo O'Donnell, “Corporatism and the Question of the State,” in James Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Pittsburgh University Press, 1976), pp. 47–89.

3. For a criticism of these and other mistakes in dealing with the problem of dependence, nothing is better than Fernando H. Cardoso, “As novas teses equivocadas,” in Autoritarismo e Democratização (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1975), pp. 25–62; and “The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States,” LARR 12, no. 3 (1977):7–24.

4. This is apparent in two of the most influential recently published books on the subject: Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968); and Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences of Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), especially the chapters written by Joseph LaPalombara and Lucian Pye. On these works, Mark Kesselman's critique is worth reading, “Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology,” World Politics 26, no. 1 (October 1973): 139–54.

5. Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina (México, D.F.: Siglo XXI, 1968); Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1966); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: Academic Press, 1974); and Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: NLB Editions, 1975), respectively.

6. Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1972).

7. Another warning that should be made now is that, having decided to use a high level of generality, I must overlook the analysis of differential aspects “internal” to the subjects dealt with—for example, the state itself. This has the advantage of allowing discussion of general tendencies without entering into distinctions that, although important, seem to be more so for variations around such trends than for their direction. But it has, among others, the disadvantage that the terminology employed herein could be understood in a reifying sense.

8. I understand the state to comprise the set of organizations and relationships that claims the character of the “public,” as opposed to the “private,” on a territorially limited area. This also envisages a generalized conformity of the population concerning provisions of the state and backing it with control of the means of physical coercion. This definition is an analytical minimum sufficient to distinguish the state.

9. Other aspects of the BA state that cannot be dealt with here have been discussed in O'Donnell (“Corporatism,” and Modernization) and in Oscar Ozlak and Guillermo O'Donnell, “Estado y políticas públicas. Algunas sugerencias para su estudio,” paper presented at the Conferencia sobre el Estado y Políticas Públicas, Buenos Aires, August 1974.

10. A good discussion of the different analytical problems implied by one subject and the other can be found in a forthcoming book by Alfred Stepan on corporatism in contemporary Latin America.

11. The principal focus of this work will be the urban popular sector—the set formed by the working class and the unionized layers of the middle sectors. By “political activation” I mean not only a notorious “presence” in the political arena but one which tends to be continually exercised (i.e., not only by discontinuous protest outbursts); this in turn implies that such activation supports itself on an organizational basis not entirely subordinate to the state and the dominant classes.

12. I cannot enter here into the complex problem of the relationship between that perception and the objective risk entailed by each situation. I would suggest, however, that the former acts as a multiplying function of the latter once a critical threshold has been crossed.

13. On these subjects I must refer to O'Donnell, Modernization and “Modernización y golpes militares,” Desarrollo Económico 12, no. 47 (December 1971) and to the bibliographies in those works.

14. For interesting expressions of the threat in Brazil, by observers and actors very close to the state implanted by the 1964 coup, see Luis Vianna Filho, O Governo Castello Branco (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympo Editora, 1975) and Fernando Pedreira, Marco 31 (Rio de Janeiro: José Alvaro Editor, 1964). Also see Helio Silva's documented narrative, 1964 ¿golpe ou contragolpe? (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1975).

15. I omit reference here to the behavior of the landholding-exporting sector, which in any event is generally more reluctant to ally itself with the popular sector.

16. The purpose here is not to make the sad inventory of the repressive measures employed but to exemplify how they tend to vary as a function of the prior threat level.

17. I have just proposed one factor that seems to be very important in explaining the fate of these BAs. This is not necessarily incongruous with what has often been mentioned to explain the observable differences in the stabilization of the BA in Argentina and Brazil: the greater autonomy towards the state and the higher militancy of the Argentine working class as compared with its Brazilian counterpart. However, I suspect that the argument tends, on its own, to exaggerate the differences between these two countries. Furthermore, by itself, this argument hardly fits the continuation of the BA in Chile.

18. O'Donnell, Modernization.

19. On this subject, Cardoso and Faletto's Dependencia is fundamental.

20. Albert Hirschman, “The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America,” in Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 85–123.

21. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962).

22. Above all, see Francisco Weffort, “Classes populares e desenvolvimiento social: contribução ao estudo do ‘populismo,‘” ILPES-CEPAL (Santiago de Chile, 1968), mimeographed; and Cardoso and Faletto, Dependencia.

23. On the rapid worldwide expansion of the United States-based transnational firms during this period, see Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of the Multinational Enterprise : American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974).

24. On this first wave of direct foreign investment in industrial activities, and their relationship with the size of our markets, see O'Donnell, Modernization.

25. Data and bibliography on the Argentine case and quotations of similar available evidence, with respect to other Latin American countries, can be found in Guillermo O'Donnell and Delfina Link, Dependencia y autonomía (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores, 1973).

26. In the Argentine case, a disaggregation of the minimal industrial salaries between branches mainly owned by Argentine capital and those owned mainly by foreign firms shows practically no difference until 1959. From that date, when the “first wave” of foreign investments started, wages quickly drifted apart, and by 1961–1962, those of workers employed in predominantly foreign-owned branches were higher by 25–30 percent. Other characteristics and consequences of this period appear in Pablo Gerchunoff and Juan Llach, “Capitalismo industrial, desarrollo asociado y distribución de ingreso entre los gobiernos peronistas: 1950–1972,” Desarrollo Económico 15, no. 57 (abril-junio 1975).

27. Huntington, Political Order.

28. David Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation: A Developmental Approach (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971).

29. Of course, deepening is closely connected with other aspects of economic policy, which I can only mention briefly here. First, in connection with final supply, it was accompanied by a speedy expansion of consumer goods (basically durables) more varied and complex than those produced internally until then. The trend to channel the enlarged productive capacity toward the terminal supply of this type of goods not only contributed to bias the distribution of income but also made the role of international capital weightier directly, by increasing the possibilities of the TNCs specializing in producing these goods, and indirectly by increasing the need of the national firms (if they were to compete with this expansive high-income market) to resort to technology, trademarks, and advertising licensed by the TNCs. In another sphere, both the financial needs of the deepening as well as the inducement of the new patterns of consumption led to important changes in the financial system, most notably with reference to the development of institutions aimed at financing the purchase of consumer durables. See María de Conceição Tavarea, Da Sustituçáo de Importaçoes ao Capitalismo Financeiro (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1972), pp. 155, 207, 221–63.

30. Mario Brodersohn, “Financiamiento de empresas privadas y mercados de capital,” Programa Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo de Mercados de Capital, Buenos Aires, 1972, mimeographed. See also the sources quoted therein.

31. O'Donnell and Link, Dependencia and the sources quoted therein.

32. Hirschman, in Bias for Hope, makes a persuasive argument about the need of contextual stability so that it is really possible to move forward in the export of industrial goods.

33. Works from viewpoints as dissimilar as those of Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) and Nicos Poulatzas, Purvoir Politique et Classes Sociales (Paris: Maspero, 1968), among many others, coincide on this point.

34. To the repression and direct weakening of the unions, the BAs have added the review of labor legislation, above all laws on strikes and dismissals. For a good analysis of diverse state controls on the working class in Brazil, see Kenneth Mericle, “Control of the Working Class in Brazil,” in Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism, pp. 303–39.

35. The importance of a “social peace” guaranteed by an effective state control of the workers arises, without need to resort to literature suspect of having hostile biases toward the TNCs, among others, in a publication sponsored by the Council of the Americas, Jack H. Behrman, Decision Criteria for Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America (New York: Unipub, Inc.: 1974). The interviews Louis Goodman held with executives of TNCs confirm this argument; see his “The Social Organization of Decision-Making in the Multinational Corporation,” forthcoming. On my side, between 1971 and 1973, I interviewed executives of TNCs in Argentina and obtained information, to be presented and analyzed in future works, which confirms this view.

36. The concern about the uncertainty of the context and the medium-term economic results, together with the obstacle this entailed for investment decisions, appeared in the great majority of the cases as salient factors in the interviews I held in Argentina. An interesting survey of industrial firms in Argentina, carried out by the Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas (“El planeamiento en las empresas,” Buenos Aires, 1973, mimeographed) also shows the much greater objective need of large capital for a stabilization of the social context.

37. Marcelo Diamond, Doctrinas económicas, desarrollo e independencia (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1973), presents a useful discussion of this topic.

38. It is in this context that the question of “corporatism” that is attracting the attention of students of Latin America is to be understood; see Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism, as well as Phillipe Schmitter's more general discussion in “Still the Century of Corporatism?” The Review of Politics 36, no. 1 (January 1974).

39. In this sense an important phenomenon is the emergence of new decision-making agencies and “technocratic” knots endowed with great decision-making power over strategic economic and financial variables. A good study of this can be found in Celso Lafer, “Sistema político brasileiro: algunas características y perspectivas,” Desarrollo Económico 14, no. 56 (enero–marzo 1975).

40. On this point it is interesting to read Viana Filho, O Governo; he was one of President Castello Branco's most important civilian aides.

41. In this, too, the prior threat level seems important. Compare the U.S. State Department's ostensible opposition (not necessarily of other segments of that government) to the 1966 Argentine coup and the almost nil flow of American public funds for civilian use in this case, with the support given to the Brazilian and Chilean coups and the immediate aid granted from public funds to the recently emergent BAs in those countries.

42. As Roberto Campos says in Temas e Sistemas (Rio de Janeiro: APEC, 1968), “the remainder is sentimentalism” (p. 217).

43. This makes it possible to understand the phenomena analyzed by Lafer, “Sistema político brasileiro,” in the sense that the new decision-making knots, which are superimposed and horizontally cut across the formal faculties of preexisting agencies, imply concentrating actual decision-making power that counterbalances the parcelling out referred to in the text.

44. In my interviews with some of the most important officials of the Argentina BA, even those not too enthused by the policies of the orthodox considered that their near monopoly of “prestige” before foreign capital and their consequent possibility of attracting it for investment—which they also considered to be indispensable—were the principal reasons, at least for the moment, why only they could control the economic policy.

45. On the strict demands for orthodoxy of these organizations and the aid agencies of the U.S. government in Brazil, it is worthwhile to consult Viana Filho, O Governo. Also see Albert Fishlow, “Algumas reflexoẽs sobre a politicia económica brasileira após 1964,” Estudos CEBRAP 7 (enero–marzo 1974); the English version appears in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973).

46. See the “internal history” of the Brazilian armed forces, with the consequences of their participation in the Second World War and Castello Branco's strongly “internationalist” position (and the compatibility I suspect this generated with Roberto Campo's orthodoxy and that of his economic team) as it is presented by Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974). This contrasts with the attitudes of officers such as Onganía and Pinochet, much closer to the traditional version of rightist nationalism.

47. See, for example, Campos, Temas and Ensaios contra a maré (Rio de Janeiro: APEC, 1969, 2d ed.), and Adalbert Krieger Vasena's speeches compiled in Política económica Argentina, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Economía, 1968, 1969).

48. Above all, Fishlow, “Algumas reflexoẽs,” and Juan Carlos de Pablo, “La política antiinflacionaria argentina vista en perspectiva” (Buenos Aires: FIEL, 1973), mimeographed. Also see Juan Carlos de Pablo, Política inflacionaria en la Argentina 1967–1970 (Buenos Aires: Editores Amorrortu, 1972).

49. This refers to the mass riot that took place in Córdoba in May 1969. This was the culmination of similar incidents that had cropped up at the time in other cities in Argentina's interior.

50. See Ministerio de Economía, Informe Económico, IV Trimester 1969 (fourth quarter), Buenos Aires, 1970, among other sources.

51. In a speech read on 1 August 1975, Brazil's Minister Mario Simonsen, answering to the concerns for the “nationalism” and “statism” of the Brazilian BA, and at times of increasing frailness of the balance of payments, emphatically insisted that the “main attainment” since 1964—“international credibility”—was not to be imperilled and that for a long time it would continue to be necessary for Brazil to rely on substantial inflows of foreign capital (Movimento, 8 August 1975, p. 9). Similar statements and recent deeds of high Brazilian and Mexican officials seek the ratification of a “confidence” that, in spite of its triumphal hue, the BA of the trio cannot allow itself to lose. This dependence parameter continues to be in force, although it only appears at the level of official rhetoric when certain not too orthodox whims make it necessary that international capital be publicly told (and the “nationalists” too) that the rules of the game have not been forgotten.

52. Data on the Brazilian case may be found in Werner Baer, Isaac Kertenetzky, and Aníbal Villela, “The Changing Role of the State in the Brazilian Economy,” World Development 1, no. 11 (November 1973). As these authors note, a sizeable proportion of the increase of the Brazilian state's directly productive activities only took place around the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies—that is to say, when already substantial inflows of long-term foreign private capital were taking place.

53. On this, see Goodman, “The Social Organization.” This is implied by the “product cycle” theory as formulated by Raymond Vernon et al. in the Harvard Business School. See Theodore Moran, “Foreign Expansion as an Institutional Necessity for U.S. Corporate Capitalism,” World Politics 25, no. 3 (April 1973):369–86.

54. This apparently tends to be reinforced in cases, such as that of contemporary Brazil, in which the advances of the process require that the country matters not only because of its domestic market but also as an important center or “platform” for the TNCs' regional activities. The same seems to be true of the Mexican case.

55. The term is Charles Moraze's, El Apogeo de la Burguesía (Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1965).

56. The epitome of this institutional disintegration of the state in Argentina was President Lanusse's decision, in 1971, to suppress the Ministry of Economy with the explicit purpose of eliminating decision-making centers that “inconsiderately” imposed their decisions on the “sectors involved,” and to open the ministries to the entry of “representatives” of those sectors. The contrast with the centralizing efforts of the functioning BAs (even the Argentine one until shortly before) could not be stronger.

57. Concerning the first systematic attempt to study different inauguration modalities of political regimes, see Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation, and Opposition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971).

58. I thank David Collier for this observation. On these subjects, I must express my indebtedness to him, and to Abraham Lowenthal and Robert Kaufman.

59. The Chilean case presents complexities that cannot be dealt with in this work. The intensity of the threat during the Unidad Popular's government, together with much more acute concomitant processes of flights of international (and national) capital and inflation, led to an almost complete collapse of the working mechanisms of this capitalism. This also has to do with the significantly greater reduction of the income level of a sizeable part of the population, as well as with the numerous antieconomic consequences of the greater weight of the repressive apparatus entailed by this BA's particularly brutal implantation conditions. In such a situation, in spite of the almost fanatical orthodoxy of the managers of its economy—and the immense social costs it entails—the Chilean BA finds unprecendented difficulties in creating minimal working mechanisms for the economy and for the believable “final” extirpation of the threat. In these conditions—that suggest another bifurcation with which we cannot deal here—the Chilean BA seems to be making unsuccessful efforts to constitute the duet, insisting on an orthodoxy that punishes its society ever more harshly and at the same time is insufficient to attract foreign productive capital.

60. On the characteristics of this BA, Juan Linz, “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain,” in E. Allardt and S. Rokkan, ed., Mass Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1970). The Spanish Civil War may be considered as the precedent of maximum threat among those we have considered so far.

61. Evidence of this is plentiful; for example, see Robert Scott, “Mexico: The Established Revolution,” in Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 330–95.

62. This remark is inspired by Robert Kaufman, “Notes on the Definition, Genesis, and Consolidation of Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes,” Rutgers University, March 1975, mimeographed.

63. On the abundant relevant bibliography see, above all, Ricardo Cinta G., “Burguesía nacional y desarrollo,” and Julio Labastida, “Los grupos dominantes frente a las alternativas de cambio,” both in El Perfil de México en 1980 (México, D.F.: Siglo XXI, 1970), 3:165–99 and 3:99–164, respectively; Roger Hansen, La Política del desarrollo mexicano (México, D.F.: Siglo XXI, 1971); Morris Singer, Growth, Equality, and the Mexican Experience (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969); Carlos Baszdrech, “El dilema de la política económica actual,” Foro Internacional 14, no. 3 (enero 1974); Comisión Económica para la América Latina, CEPAL, Economic Bulletin for Latin America 12, no. 2 (October 1967); José Luis Ceceña, El capital monopolista y la economía de México (México, D.F.: Cuadernos Americanos, 1963); Miguel Wionzcek, “La inversión extranjera privada en México: problemas y perspectivas,” Comercio Exterior 20, no. 10 (octubre 1970); and Authoritarianism in Mexico, ed. José Luis Reyna and Richard Weinert (Philadelphia, Pa.: ISHI, 1977).

64. See Hansen, La política, for a comparison of the timing of the beginning of the deepening in Mexico in contrast with Argentina and Brazil.

65. In addition to the works cited in note 63, also see Ifigenia Navarrette, “La distribución del ingreso y el desarrollo económico en México,” in El Perfil 1:15–72

66. On this aspect of the Spanish case see Charles Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain: Policy-Making in an Authoritarian System (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970).

67. On this aspect, see Reyna in the forthcoming book by Reyna and Weinert. On the transformations of Mexican authoritarianism and their close connection with problems discussed herein, also see Cinta G. and Labastida in El Perfil; for a disagreement with some of the views I present here, Julio Labastida, “Proceso político y dependencia en México,” UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, México, 1976, mimeographed.

68. Among other revisions of the usages of the term “fascism” and convincing reasonings favoring a restricted use of it, see Renzo De Felice, Le Interpretazioni del fascismo (Bari: Laterza, 1969).

69. I cannot quote here the abundant relevant bibliography. The best general overview is Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1946). For general information on the economy of this region during this period, Frederick Hertz, The Economic Problem of the Danubian States (London: V. Gollancz, 1948); Wilbert Moore, Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe (Geneva: League of Nations, 1945); and Political and Economic Planning Group, Economic Development in South Eastern Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1945). Although further detail has to be left for another time, it is necessary to point out that I especially mention Poland and Hungary because their socioeconomic structure between the wars was that most resembling the Latin American BAs around the time of their implantation. It does not seem coincidental that the most “developed” country of the region (in terms of already having a high degree of vertical integration of its industry, of being the only important exporter of industrial products in the region, and of having an important agrarian middle class in the Czech zone) was Czechoslovakia, the one country in which political democracy survived until the German invasion. On the other hand, countries such as Yugoslavia, Greece, Rumania, Albania (and Portugal), less industrialized than Poland, Hungary, and Austria, in line with what I have argued generated “traditional” (not BA) patterns of authoritarian domination.

70. On these significant similarities, see Marian Malowist, “Croissance et régression en Europe, XIV–XVII siècles,” Cahiers des Annales (Paris), Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1972, especially pp. 176–215; Witold Eula, Les débuts du capitalisme en Pologne dans la perspective de l'histoire comparée (Roma: Angelo Signorelli, 1960) and “L'origine de l'alliance entre la bourgeoisie et les propiétaires fonciers dans la premiere moitié du XIXème siècle,” in La Pologne au XXème siècle (Warsaw: Congrés International des Sciences Historiques, 1955), pp. 217–33; Wallerstein, The Modern World System, especially pp. 300–345; Jersy Topolski, “La régression economique en Pologne,” Actas Poloniae Historica 7, no. 46 (1962); and Marian Malowist, “The Problem of the Inequality of Economic Development in Europe in the Latter Middle Ages,” Economic History Review, 19, no. 1 (April 1966).

71. Among others, see James Taylor, The Economic Development of Poland, 1929–1950 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952); Ferdinand Zweig, Poland between Two Wars (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1944); Leopold Welisz, Foreign Capital in Poland (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1938); Tibor Berend and George Ranki, Hungary: A Century of Economic Development (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1974); and Karl Rothchild, Austria's Economic Development between the Two Wars (London: Frederick Muller, 1947).

72. Andrew Janos calls them “bureaucratic regimes” to distinguish them from fascism; see “The One-Party State and Social Mobilization: East Europe between the Wars,” in Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore, ed., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Societies: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 204–35. Some fundamental works for the study of what I believe may be considered the BAs of Poland, Hungary, and Austria between the two world wars are: Alfred Diamant, Austrian Catholics and the First Republic: Democracy, Capitalism, and the Social Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960); Elisabeth Barber, Austria 1918–1972 (London: MacMillan, 1973); Félix Kresissler, De la révolution a l'annexion: La Austriche de 1918 a 1938 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971); Franz Borkenau, Austria and After (Faber & Faber, 1938); Charles Julick, Austria from Hapsburgh to Hitler, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948); Andrew Janos, “Hungary 1867–1939: A Study of Social Change and the Political Process,” Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1960; Carlile Macartney, October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, 1929–1945 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1957); Robert Machray, The Poland of Pilsudski (London: Allen & Unwin, 1936); and Antony Polonski, Politics in Independent Poland, 1921–1939: The Crisis of Constitutional Government (Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon Press, 1972.