1. See Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America, Ch. 4 (Princeton, 1967), for a model of political stability and the military's role from within the political system. Also, Elizabeth H. Hyman, “Soldiers in Politics: New Insights on Latin American Armed Forces,” Political Science Quarterly, 87:3 (1972), questions the use of the term and suggests that the military is one of several “non-party” forces operating from within the system.

2. Lyle N. McAlister, “The Military,” In: Continuity and Change in Latin America, J. J. Johnson, ed., 155 (Stanford, 1964).

3. Lyle N. McAlister, “Civil-Military Relations in Latin America,” Journal of Inter-American Studies, 13:3:348 (1960). José E. Miguens, “The New Latin American Military Coup,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 6:1:4–5 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1970–71), paraphrases McAlister's comments in his critique of the evaluative approach to the study of military intervention.

4. Talcott Parsons, The Social System, (Glencoe, Ill., 1951).

5. Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert, “Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America,” European Journal of Sociology, 2 (1961).

6. Robert D. Putnam, “Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics,” World Politics, 19 (1967). This article will be reviewed later in the present essay.

7. Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago, 1964). Janowitz did not include Latin American militaries in his original analysis because he did not believe they were concerned with political development and system change as were the African militaries. In light of present developments, specifically in Brazil, his feelings have changed. See Luigi R. Einaudi and Alfred C. Stepan, III, Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil, 125f (The RAND Corporation, R-586–DOS, Santa Monica, Calif., 1971).

8. Lyle N. McAlister, “Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review, 2:1 (Fall, 1966).

9. Charles D. Corbett, The Latin American Military as a Socio-Political Force: Case Studies of Bolivia and Argentina, Part 1 (Miami, 1972), stresses the distortions which have been caused by the value judgments and inherent biases of various authors.

10. Edwin Lieuwen's model can be found in several of his studies: Arms and Politics in Latin America (N.Y., 1960, rev. ed. 1961); Generals vs. Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America (N.Y., 1964); while a more recent restatement of his thesis appears in The Latin American Military (A study for the Sub-committee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., 1967).

11. José Nun, “A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle-Class Military Coup,” In: Latin America: Reform or Revolution?, James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds. (Greenwich, Conn., 1968). This article first appeared in 1965 and was discussed in McAlister's LARR article (1966: 15–16), but it is the most perceptive neo-Marxist interpretation in addition to being my model of the functional approach. Therefore, it is included in this study of the current literature. In addition, Nun has subsequently written Latin America: The Hegemonic Crisis and the Military Coup (Berkeley, 1969), which also summarizes the North American models of Latin American military interventions.

12. Miguens (1970–71).

13. John J. Johnson's model of the modern military in Latin America is defined in The Military and Society (Stanford, 1964).

14. Nun (1968), 153.

15. Nun (1968), 176.

16. Luigi R. Einaudi has written three articles for the RAND Corporation on the post-1968 Peruvian military: “The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis,” RM-6048–RC (Santa Monica, 1969); “Revolution From Within? Military Rule in Peru Since 1968,” P-4676 (Santa Monica, 1971); and in co-authorship with Alfred C. Stepan, III, Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil, R-586–DOS (Santa Monica, 1971).

17. Einaudi and Stepan (1971), 47.

18. Miguens (1970–71); Carlos A. Astiz, “The Argentine Armed Forces: Their Role and Political Involvement,” Western Political Quarterly, 22:4 (1969). Corbett (1972, Part 1), also proposes that young officers' frequent isolated tours, where the only society is totally dependent upon the military, as well as the years of intense study in the progression of military schools, account for the officers' adherence to institutional considerations and allegiances.

19. Astiz (1969), 873.

20. Richard L. Clinton, “The Modernizing Military: The Case of Peru,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, 24:4:51 (1971).

21. Miguens (1970–71), 4, 8–11.

22. Robert E. Dowse, “The Military and Political Development,” In: Politics and Change in Developing Countries, Colin Leys, ed, 227–232 (Cambridge, Eng., 1969).

23. Astiz (1969), 865.

24. Einaudi (1969), 11–14.

25. Janowitz (1964). For a brief discussion of Seton-Watson's schema see John H. Kautsky, “The Military in Underdeveloped Countries,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 12:4 (1964).

26. Miguens (1970–71), 12.

27. These articles are: Martin C. Needier, “Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America,” American Political Science Review, 60 (1966); Putnam (1967) (see note 6); and Norman A. Bailey, “The Role of Military Forces in Latin America,” Military Review, 51:2 (1971). I include Bailey's article, even though it is not well known, primarily because of its approach, which I believe too many scholars have adopted, and because of the audience for which he is writing.

28. Putnam (1967), 90.

29. McAlister (1966), 31.

30. Astiz (1969), 866.

31. For a similar situation, see Robert A. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928–1945, 3–5, 51–52, 96, 117–25, 170–74, 284 (Stanford, 1969). Potash discusses at length the influence of the German military mission on Argentina's military institution. But he questions its impact on and correlation to the military's political concepts, since in comparison to the Chilean military, on which “German military influence was much stronger than in Argentina” (284), political involvement by the Argentine military was much greater than that demonstrated by the Chilean military. Furthermore, that involvement lasted long after the German military influence ceased. Numerous other social scientists, such as Hyman (1972), discuss the effects of other foreign militaries' influence. She casts doubt, for example, on French military influence when looking at the differing political courses of Brazil and Peru (407f). The argument is not one-sided, however, for the United States is convinced that by spending several million dollars of military assistance funds each year to bring Latin American military officers to the United States, they will return to their countries imbued with the concepts of democracy.

32. Dowse (1969), 221.

33. Needier (1966), 618. Needier has written a more recent article on the subject of military intervention, entitled “The Latin American Military: Predatory Reactionaries or Modernizing Patriots?”, Journal of Inter-American Studies, 11:2 (1969). The article, however, is merely a re-statement of his previous position that “military intervention contributes to the retardation of the processes of political development,” which he insists upon defining in terms of mass participation.

34. Stepan (1971), 92–102.

35. The ten “dictatorships” include: Chile; Cuba; Haiti; Nicaragua, where the Somoza family dominates; Panama; Ecuador; Peru; Brazil; Bolivia (President Hugo Banzer has announced that Bolivia will hold a presidential election in 1974; however, it has already been postponed once); Paraguay. This listing is somewhat arbitrary, needless to say, but I suspect that Needier might concur with it. I am being kind to many of the other Central American and Caribbean states where a strong-man or group dominates the political system, and Uruguay, where the military continues to expand its new identity as the dominant political force.

36. These two quotes form the conclusion of Bailey's (1971), 72 analysis. Underline is mine.

37. See Anderson (1967), Ch. 4, for his model of political stability which is defined in terms of relationships between power contenders and their power capabilities. Hyman (1972), 410–11, discusses in some detail the military's role as a pressure group in a political system. She is critical of the term “pressure group” because it fails to convey the true power of the military institution, which she considers to be concerned with the centers of power. It therefore is more of an arbiter over the government—an attribute civilian pressure groups cannot hope to achieve. Brady Tyson, in a recent addition to the literature, “The Emerging Role of the Military as National Modernizers and Managers in Latin America: The Case of Brazil and Peru,” In: Latin American Prospects for the 1970s: What Kinds of Revolutions?, David H. Pollock and Arch R. M. Ritter, eds., 125–6 (N. Y., 1973), identifies the military's ability to dominate and its monopoly on the tools of violence.

38. Astiz (1969). In addition, he has recently published a study of the Peruvian military, “The Military Establishment as a Political Elite: The Peruvian Case,” Pollock and Ritter, eds. (1973).

39. Astiz (1969), 872.

40. Einaudi and Stepan (1971), 68–70. They acknowledge that in Peru and Brazil the military perceives of “Defense and Development” as components of national security. The difference between Peru and Brazil lies in where the emphasis has been placed.

41. Astiz (1969), 862.

42. Potash (1969). Other efforts utilizing a similar approach to define military involvement in political processes during a previous era include: José Ferrer, “The Armed Forces in Argentine Politics to 1930” (Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 1966); June E. Hahner, “Brazilian Civil-Military Relations, 1889–1898” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1966); R. L. Millett, “The History of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 1925–1965” (Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 1966); and Winfield J. Burggraaff, The Venezuelan Armed Forces: 1933–1959 (Columbia, Mo., 1972).

43. Potash (1969), 22.

44. Potash (1969), 200, 279, 281–82, hypothesizes that the course of history might have been significantly altered in October 1945, if General Eduardo Avalos, Acting Interior and War Minister, had ordered troops into Buenos Aires to quell pro-Perón labor unrest and demonstrations which ultimately propelled Perón to the Casa Rosada, but Avalos never issued the order. He was determined to avoid a confrontation and violence. He may have been motivated by a deep sense of guilt stemming from the 1943 golpe when his decision to enter the grounds of the neutral Naval Mechanics' School resulted in an altercation and the only loss of life (70 killed) in the entire affair.

45. Clinton (1971). For a listing of Einaudi's article under review see note 16. To get an insider's viewpoint I recommend Victor Villanueva, El CAEM: La revoluction de la Fuerza Armada (Lima, 1972), and Nueva mentalid militar en el Peru? (Lima, 1969). Although he is a retired army officer, not a trained social scientist, Villanueva's books provide a good insight into the Peruvian military's role-expansion during the last ten years.

46. Liisa North, Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile and Peru, (Berkeley, 1966). This brief, but excellent, study was one of the early attempts to identify institutional motivators, including the important role played by CAEM in Peru.

47. For an interesting insight into the role of Velasco in the 1968 coup, see Richard N. Goodwin, “Letter From Peru,” The New Yorker, 45:13 (1969). This perceptive article also suggests that the IPC controversy was utilized by the military as a rationale for intervening.

48. Clinton (1971), 58.

49. Clinton (1971), 62.

50. Potash (1969), 169–73 and 220–23, addresses the same dilemma. He discusses United States policy toward Argentina during World War II when Washington refused to sell arms to that nation, hoping to force the Argentines to accept the United States position and join the war against Germany. Recognition of his policy's complete failure was lost on our policy makers and lawmakers in the 1960s. They enacted numerous pieces of paternalistic legislation such as the Conte-Long Amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act, to force the Latin American nations “to do what is best for themselves.” These misguided North American perceptions and consequent interventions have had in nearly every case a disruptive influence on bilateral and regional relations. The most recent instance in which United States policy backfired was Peru's purchase of Soviet armor in 1973.

51. Astiz (1973) disagrees with the thrust of Einaudi's conclusion and suggests that the Peruvian military came to power for traditional reasons and only now after being in power for five years may their primary concern be with development.

52. Goodwin (1969), 68–72, deals extensively with the military's perception of its right to speak for the nation as a whole.

53. Einaudi and Stepan (1971), 59; Charles D. Corbett, “Politics and Professionalism: The South American Military,” Orbis, 16:4:932–6 (1973), traces the educational progression of the Latin American military officer and its effects on his institutional pattern in this companion article to his 1972 book (see note 9).

54. Stepan (1971).

55. Thomas G. Sanders, “Development and Security are Linked by a Relationship of Mutual Causality,” American Universities Field Staff, East Coast South America Series, 15 (1971), draws a similar conclusion: If change is recognized as a fundamental ingredient, development tends to absorb security, but if the process of change is neglected, then security may be overemphasized (3). Brazil has not disregarded economic development—quite the contrary, its economic growth rate is unmatched over the past few years—but it has not recognized the need for change, i.e., socio-economic development, which is a principal tenet of Peru's revolution. Thus Brazilian theorists apparently believe that improvement in the quality of life will be a natural fallout from economic development. But without a change in direction toward improving all Brazilians' living conditions, concurrent with economic improvement, security must be continually emphasized in order to preserve the military's approach toward development.

56. Stepan (1971), 45.

57. Corbett (1973), 939–41, identifies two different schools of thought: the “liberal-internationalist” is committed to democratic forms but views mobilization politics as detrimental; it does not object to aspects of statism but believes that ultimately private enterprise and foreign investment remain the driving force of the economy. On the other hand, the “authoritarian nationalists” believe that sweeping structural revisions of socio-economic patterns are required. The enemy is not internal subversion as is the case with the “liberal-internationalist” but rather economic imperialism. Corbett's models of the new military are too encompassing. His lumping of various attributes under one category may be too arbitrary. In actuality, different factions within the institution may be oriented around only a portion of one of his models or could cross the line between the two models.

58. Stepan (1971), 269.

59. Clinton (1971), 66.