Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-tf8b9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T15:26:51.188Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Electoral System, Coalitional Disintegration, and the Future of Chile's Concertación

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 October 2022

Peter M. Siavelis
Peter M. Siavelis*
Affiliation:
Wake Forest University
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

While there is much disagreement concerning the political effects of Chile's two-member district binominal election system, most agree that it provides strong incentives for the formation and maintenance of coalitions. This article takes on these assumptions, contending that the electoral system's coalition-inducing tendencies are actually quite context dependent. Focusing primarily on the governing Concertación coalition and relying on analyses of relative levels of electoral support among parties, a “reward” insurance policy for electoral losers, and the timing and sequencing of elections, this article outlines the conditions under which the coalition-enhancing tendencies of the electoral system are at their strongest and their weakest. It finds that these variables align to provide a less than propitious environment for the maintenance of the Concertación coalition in the lead up to the 2005 elections. In theoretical terms, the article challenges direct and mechanistic connections between electoral formulae and party outcomes, arguing that we should not be surprised when subtle contextual variations cause theorized outcomes not to occur. These findings contribute to an emerging consensus that many of the theorized rules on the connection between electoral and party systems are more complex and context dependent than is usually supposed and should be applied with greater caution.

Resumen

Resumen

Mientras los efectos políticos del sistema electoral binominal chileno (de dos escaños por distrito) han sido arduamente debatidos, la mayoría concuerda en que éste provee fuertes incentivos para la formación y el mantenimiento de coaliciones. Este artículo parte de estos supuestos argumentando que las tendencias de coalición inducidas por dicho sistema electoral son, en realidad, altamente dependientes del contexto. Centrándose principalmente en la Concertación (coalición gobernante) y basándose en análisis sobre valores relativos de apoyo electoral entre partidos, en una póliza de seguro en forma de “recompensa” para los perdedores electorales, y por último, en la sincronización y secuenciación de las elecciones, este artículo esboza las condiciones bajo las cuales las tendencias hacia el mejoramiento de la coalición en el sistema electoral se hallan en su punto más fuerte y más débil. El artículo encuentra que estas variables se alinean para proveer un ambiente menos que propicio para el mantenimiento de la Concertación en el poder hasta las elecciones del 2005. En términos teóricos, el artículo desafía asociaciones directas y mecánicas entre fórmulas electorales y resultados partidarios, argumentando que no debemos sorprendernos cuando mínimas variaciones contextuales desafían las predicciones teóricas. Estos resultados se suman al consenso emergente que sostiene que ciertas reglas teóricas sobre la conexión entre sistemas electorales y de partidos son más complejas y dependientes del contexto que lo usualmente reconocido, y por lo tanto, deben ser aplicadas con más cuidado.

Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Research Review , Volume 40 , Issue 1 , 2005 , pp. 56 - 82
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by the University of Texas Press

Footnotes

1.

Thanks to Evelyne Huber, Jonathan Hartlyn, Greg Weeks, Scott Morgenstern, and four anonymous reviewers from LARR for their useful comments and suggestions.

References

Carey, John C. 1994 “Los efectos del ciclo electoral sobre el sistema de partidos y el respaldo parlamentario al Ejecutivo,” Estudios Públicos 55:305–313.Google Scholar
Carey, John C. 2002 “Parties, Coalitions, and the Chilean Congress in the 1990's.” In Legislative Politics in Latin America, edited by Morgenstern, Scott and Nacif, Benito, 222–53. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Carey, John C. and Siavelis, Peter M. 2003 “El seguro para los subcampeones electorales y la sobrevivencia de la Concertación.” Estudios Públicos 90:5–27.Google Scholar
Coppedge, Michael 1997 “District Magnitude, Economic Performance, and Party-System Fragmentation in Five Latin American Countries.” Comparative Political Studies 30 (2): 156–185.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, Gary 1997 Making Votes Count. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, Anthony 1957 An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Duverger, Maurice 1963 Political Parties. New York: John Wiley.Google Scholar
Ensalaco, Mark 1994 “In with the New Out with the Old?: The Democratising Impact of Constitutional Reform in Chile.” Journal of Latin American Studies 26:409–429.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gutiérrez, Hernán 1990 Chile 1989: ¿Elecciones fundacionales? Documento de trabajo, serie estudios públicos, No. 3, FLACSO, Santiago.Google Scholar
Guzmán, Eugenio 1993 “Reflexiones sobre el sistema binominal.” Estudios Públicos 51:303–325.Google Scholar
Jones, Mark 1995 Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.Google Scholar
Lijphart, Arend 1994 Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945–1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Linz, Juan J. 1994 “Democracy: Presidential or Parliamentary: Does it Make a Difference?” In The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Vol. 2, edited by Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, 3–87. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Mainwaring, Scott and Shugart, Matthew, eds. 1997 Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Montes, Esteban, Mainwaring, Scott, and Ortega, Eugenio 2000 “Rethinking the Chilean Party System,” Journal of Latin American Studies 32 (3): 795–824.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Munck, Gerardo and Bosworth, Jeffrey 1998 “Patterns of Representation and Competition: Parties and Democracy in Post-Pinochet Chile.” Party Politics 4 (4): 471–493.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rabkin, Rhoda 1996 “Redemocratization, Electoral Engineering, and Party Strategies in Chile, 1989–1995.” Comparative Political Studies 29:335–356.Google Scholar
Reed, S.R. 1990 “Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case.” British Journal of Political Science 20 (3): 335–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shugart, Matthew 1995 “The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Government.” American Political Science Review 89 (2): 327–343.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siavelis, Peter 1997 “Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System: On the Transformational Effects of Electoral Reform.” Comparative Political Studies 30 (6): 651–674.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siavelis, Peter 2002 “The Hidden Logic of Candidate Selection for Chilean Parliamentary Elections.” Comparative Politics 34 (4): 419–438.Google Scholar
Taagepera, Rein and Shugart, Matthew 1989 Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Valenzuela, Arturo 1994 “Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile.” In The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Vol. 2, edited by Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, 91–150. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Valenzuela, J. Samuel and Scully, Timothy 1997 “Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile: Continuities and Changes at the Recovery of Democracy.” Comparative Politics 29:511–527.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weyland, Kurt 2002 “Limitations of Rational-Choice Institutionalism for the Study of Latin American Politics.” Studies in Comparative International Development 37 (1): 57–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar