1. For an overview of the literature on the Falklands that appeared up to the mid-1980s, see Joseph A. Tulchin, “The Malvinas War of 1982: An Inevitable Conflict That Never Should Have Occurred,” LARR 22, no. 3 (1987):123–41.

2. Classical treatises on the historical and legal arguments forwarded by the United Kingdom and Argentina to justify their rights to the islands are B. F. Boyson, The Falkland Islands (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924); M. B. Cawkell, D. H. Mailing, and E. M. Cawkell, The Falkland Islands (London: St. Martin's, 1960); Paul Groussac, Las Islas Malvinas (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del Congreso, 1936); and Ricardo Caillet-Bois, Una tierra argentina: Las Islas Malvinas (Buenos Aires: Jacobo Peuser, 1948). The most critical analysis of the British claims to the islands is found in Julius Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1922; reprinted 1982).

3. The depth and quality of the writings published by Argentine, British, and U.S. presses have improved noticeably since those that came out right after the conflict. Among the earlier works were Peter Calvert, The Falkland Crisis: The Rights and the Wrongs (London: Frances Pinter, 1982); M. Cawkell, The Falkland Story, 1592–1982 (Oswestry, Engl.: Nelson, 1983); Jeffrey Ethel and Alfred Price, Air War: South Atlantic (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1983); The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law, edited by A. R. Coll and A. C. Arend (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985); Max Hasting, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: Norton, 1983); A Message from the Falklands, edited by David H. Tinker (London: Junction, 1982); Max Hasting and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London: Michael Joseph, 1983); and Tarn Dalyell, The Sinking of the “Belgrano” (London: Cecil Woolf, 1983). Argentine bestsellers were Oscar R. Cardoso, Malvinas, la trama secreta (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana/Planeta, 1983); Bonifacio del Carril, El futuro de las Malvinas (Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1982); Daniel Kon, Los chicos de la guerra (Buenos Aires: Galerina, 1982); and Carlos H. Turolo, Malvinas: testimonio de su gobernador (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1983). For publications since 1988, see Edward Fursdon, The Falklands Aftermath: Picking up the Pieces (London: Leo Cooper, 1988); Lawrence Freedman, Britain and the Falklands War (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); Michael Charlton, The Little Platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands Dispute (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); George M. Dillon, The Falklands, Politics, and War (New York: St. Martin's, 1989); Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons of Modern War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990); and Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas: Argentine Forces in the Falkland Islands (New York: Viking, 1989). For a reasonable bibliographic compilation on the subject, see Eugene L. Rasor, The Falklands/Malvinas Campaign: A Bibliography (New York: Greenwood, 1992).

4. By the same authors separately, see Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Model for North-South Crisis Prevention (Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1987); and Lawrence Freedman, Britain and the Falklands War (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

5. Other works that have focused on the soldiers' behavior during the conflict include Middlebrook, Fight for the Malvinas; Nick Vaux, Take That Hill! Royal Marines in the Falkland War (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey 1986); David Brown The Royal Navy and the Falklands War (London: Leo Cooper, 1987); Hugh McManners, Falklands Commando (London: William Kimber, 1984); William Thompson, No Picnic: 3rd Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic, 1982 (London: Leo Cooper, 1985); Oscar L. Jofré, Malvinas: la defensa de Puerto Argentino (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1987); and Lilian Morelli, Malvinas: los héroes olvidados (Buenos Aires: Publicaciones Guardia Nacional, 1990).

6. The concurrent development of Argentine militarism and geopolitical thought has been outlined well by Roberto Russell in “Argentina: Ten Years of Foreign Policy toward the Southern Cone,” in Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and the Antarctic, edited by Philip Kelly and Jack Child (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988).

7. Particularly illustrative in this respect is the position of retired Admiral Jorge Fraga, La Argentina y el Atlántico Sur (Buenos Aires: Pleamar, 1983). Similar views about the geopolitical projections of their country still surface in the works of some postwar Argentine writers, including Oscar Arévalo, Malvinas, Beagle, Atlántico Sur: Madryn, jaque a la OTANOAS (Buenos Aires: Anteo, 1985).

8. See Fernando García D.C., El juez me robó dos islas (Buenos Aires: Almafuerte, 1970); Adolfo M. Holmberg, ¿Cree usted que los ingleses nos devolverán las Malvinas? Yo no (Buenos Aires: Leonardo Impresora, 1977); and Isaac F. Rojas, La Argentina en el Beagle y Atlántico Sur (Buenos Aires: Nemont, 1980).

9. How close this incident came to triggering a war is revealed by Jaime C. Lipovetzky in Disparen sobre el Beagle: en defensa de la mediación papal (Buenos Aires: Distal, 1984). The intimidating language used by Argentine militaries can be detected in the chapter “Cuestión del Beagle: negociación directa o diálogo de armas,” in El conflicto del Beagle, edited by Juan E. Guglialmelli (Buenos Aires: El Cid, 1978). This language also surfaces repeatedly in the writings of General Osiris G. Villegas, Argentina's chief negotiator during the Beagle crisis, when Argentina rejected the outcome of papal arbitration on the possession of three islands at the exit of the channel. See Villegas, La propuesta pontificia y el espacio nacional comprometido (Buenos Aires: Pleamar, 1982); and Villegas, Conflicto con Chile en la región austral (Buenos Aires: Pleamar, 1978).

10. Carlos Escudé, La Argentina: ¿paria internacional? (Buenos Aires: Belgrano, 1984).

11. The fact that the Malvinas Islands ranked high among Argentina's geopolitical goals during the 1970s should not be overlooked in assessing the reasons why the armed forces decided to move on the islands. This point is made in such works as Pablo Hernández and Horacio Chitarroni, Malvinas, clave geopolítica (Buenos Aires: Castañeda, 1977); Haroldo Foulkes, Las Malvinas, una causa nacional (Buenos Aires: Corregidor, 1978); Félix E. Cichero, Las Malvinas, grieta en el mapa argentino (Buenos Aires: Stilcograf, 1968); and Juan C. Moreno, La recuperación de las Malvinas (Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 1973).

12. In the context of Argentine-U.S. relations, Haig's efforts never had much chance of succeeding. The Jimmy Carter administration had distanced itself from the military regimes in Argentina in the late 1970s, and the incoming Ronald Reagan administration had little leverage over Argentine military leaders. It should also be remembered that Argentine national feeling was greatly inflamed by the role the United States played in the loss of the Malvinas in 1833. Two works have blamed the Monroe Doctrine enunciated by U.S. President James Monroe in the early nineteenth century for the British onslaught on the island. See Ernesto J. Fitte, La agresión norteamericana a las Islas Malvinas (Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1966); and Mario Tessler, Malvinas: cómo EE.UU. provocó la usurpación inglesa (Buenos Aires: Galerna, 1979). After the Falklands/Malvinas War, Argentine feeling against the United States remained hostile. See Elizabeth Reinmann, Las Malvinas: traición “Made in USA” (Mexico City: El Caballito, 1983).

13. Carlos Rivas, El complot internacional contra la patria en la guerra de las Malvinas (Buenos Aires: Rioplatense, 1982).

14. Camilo H. Rodríguez, Malvinas, última frontera del colonialismo: hechos, legitimidad, opinión, documentos (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1976).

15. An excellent, although often overlooked, monograph on the diplomatic dealings between the English and Spanish governments from 1766 to 1774, prior to abandonment of Port Egmont by the British is Manuel Hidalgo-Nieto, La cuestión de las Malvinas: contribución al estudio de las relaciones hispano-inglesas en el siglo XVIII (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1947).

16. Numerous Argentine works have criticized the way that the armed forces dealt with the Malvinas issue. The best among them are Alejandro Dabat, Argentina: The Malvinas and the End of Military Rule (London: Verso, 1984); and Juan C. Moneta, Fuerzas armadas y gobierno constitucional después de las Malvinas (Mexico City: Centro Latino-Americano de Estudios Estratégicos, 1986).

17. A short outline of the implications of creating a fortified enclave in the Falkland Islands to avert future attempts at seizure can be found in Rubén de Hoyos, “Malvinas/Falklands, 1982–1988: The New Gibraltar in the South Atlantic?” in Kelly and Child, Geopolitics of the Southern Cone, 237–49.

18. Compare the polls analyzed by Walter Little in his essay in Smith's Toward Resolution (pp. 55, 63–64).

19. The historical and legal bases for claiming sovereignty over the islands have been repeatedly stated in various Argentine sources. Concise primers are Ezequiel F. Pereyra, Las Islas Malvinas: soberanía argentina, antecedentes, gestiones diplomáticas (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Culturales Argentinas, 1969); and Alfredo B. Bologna, Los derechos de la República Argentina sobre las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur (Buenos Aires: Ediar, 1988). Recent contributions in English include Fritz L. Hoffmann and Olga Mingo-Hoffmann, Sovereignty in Dispute: The Falklands/Malvinas, 1493–1982 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984); and Lowell S. Gustaffson, The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).