1. Among comparative works, see Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), 17–32; Harold L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975); Frederic Pryor, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations (Nobleton, Ontario: Irwin-Dorsey, 1968); Philippe Schmitter, “Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness, and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950–1967,” in On Military Intervention, edited by Morris Janowitz and J. van Doorn (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971), 425–506. Among U.S. sources, see Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

2. The quoted phrase comes from Dwight Y. King, “Regime Type and Performance: Authoritarian Rule, Semi-Capitalist Development, and Rural Inequality in Asia,” Comparative Political Studies 13, no. 4 (1981):479. On education, see Joel G. Verner, “Socioeconomic Environment, Political System, and Educational Policy Outcomes: A Comparative Analysis of 102 Countries,” Comparative Politics 11, no. 2 (1979):165–89; and Alfred Diamant, “Editorial Correspondence,” Comparative Politics 12, no. 1 (1979):123–24. On Latin America, see Karen Remmer, “Evaluating the Policy Impact of Military Regimes in Latin America,” LARR 13, no. 2 (1978):39–54; and Robert L. Ayres, “Political Regimes, Explanatory Variables, and Public Policy in Latin America,” The Journal of Developing Areas 10, no. 1 (1975):15–36. On the United States, see, for example, Ira Scharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, “Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy,” American Political Science Review 63, no. 3 (1969):867–78.

3. Recent analyses of regime impacts in Latin America include Thomas John Bossert, “Can We Return to the Regime for Comparative Policy Analysis? or, the State and Health Policy in Central America,” Comparative Politics 15, no. 4 (1983):419–41; and Jonathan Hartlyn and Samuel Morley, “An Overview of Political Regimes and Economic Performance in Latin America,” in Latin American Political Economy: Financial Crisis and Political Change, edited by Jonathan Hartlyn and Samuel Morley (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986).

4. Guillermo O'Donnell, “Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State,” LARR 13, no. 1 (1978):6; and Guillermo O'Donnell, “Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State,” in The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, edited by David Collier (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 291–94. Collier observes that different “checklists” for characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarianism exist. See his essay “The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model: Synthesis and Priorities for Future Research,” in Collier, New Authoritarianism, 365; see also his glossary, 399–400. I cannot here summarize the debate on whether bureaucratic authoritarianism is best conceived as a regime, a state, a political system, or an approach to policy-making.

5. Another major critique relevant to policy treats the effects of the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism on subsequent policy. See, for example, Karen L. Remmer and Gilbert W. Merkx, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited,” LARR 17, no. 2 (1982):3–40; and Guillermo O'Donnell, “Reply to Remmer and Merkx,” LARR 17, no. 2 (1982):41–50; also Collier, New Authoritarianism, especially the second part.

6. On the first point, see Collier, “The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model,” 392; and Hartlyn and Morley, “Political Regimes”; on the second, see Remmer and Merkx, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited,” 3–40; and O'Donnell, “Reply,” 41–50.

7. Phrase from Collier, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model,” 369, 365; see also Remmer and Merkx, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited,” 27; and O'Donnell, “Reply,” 41; also O'Donnell, “Reflections,” 6.

8. Daniel C. Levy, “Comparing Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America: Insights from Higher Education Policy,” Comparative Politics 14, no. 1 (1981):31–52. In Argentina and especially in Chile, policy has been more “rationalized, exclusionary, and coercive” than in Brazil and Mexico; the comparison was made before Chile's policies in the early eighties pushed toward greater rationalization. The contrasts among four nations are interpreted partly in terms of “timing” and social class.

9. Remmer, “Evaluating the Policy Impact,” 50.

10. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America,” in Collier, New Authoritarianism, 52; O'Donnell, “Tensions,” 299. For a general definition of the political-economic question, see Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

11. On the pertinent characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarianism, see Manuel Antonio Garretón, “The Chilean Political Process, 1973–1980,” in Chile under Military Rule: Dictatorship and Opposition, edited by Arturo Valenzuela and Samuel Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). This volume will include several articles relevant to points made in this article. For an earlier application of the “demobilization” concept to Chile, see Karen L. Remmer, “Political Demobilization in Chile, 1973–1978,” Comparative Politics 12, no. 3 (1980):275–302. On policy change across Chilean regimes, see Barbara Stallings, Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958–1973 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), 154–205; and on education, Kathleen B. Fischer, Political Ideology and Educational Reform in Chile 1964–1976 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1979).

12. The Chicago Boys clearly have important university roots. Not all actually studied in the economics department of the University of Chicago, but they are united in their strong belief in limited public expenditures and great leeway for markets to work their wonders.

13. Carlos Huneeus, La reforma en la Universidad de Chile (Santiago: Corporación de Promoción Universitaria, 1973).

14. José Joaquín Brunner, Ideologías universitarias y cambios en la universidad chilena, FLACSO working papers series (Santiago: FLACSO, 1981), 108. I also interviewed scholars of contemporary Chilean higher education, including Brunner, Manuel Antonio Garretón, Iván Lavados, and Luis Scherz in Santiago, May 1982.

15. Quotation from Edgardo Boeninger, “Reflexiones sobre la universidad chilena,” Estudios Sociales 42 (1984):21. On ties to national parties, see Patricio E. Chaparro, “University Student Activism and Leadership in Two Chilean Universities,” Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1975; and Ben Burnett, Political Groups in Chile (Austin: University of Texas, 1970), 80–84. On ideology, see Iván Jaksić, “Philosophy and University Reform at the University of Chile: 1842–1973,” LARR 19, no. 1 (1984):57–86. On research, see Igor Saavedra, “Proposiciones acerca del plan de desarrollo nacional basado en la ciencia y la tecnología,” Estudios Sociales 43 (1985):131.

16. On interinstitutional variation, see Daniel C. Levy, Higher Education and the State in Latin America: Private Challenges to Public Dominance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 66–113. Although Chapter 3 deals with a long history of civilian rule, the sections on military rule focus on attempts to differentiate across institutions and private and public sectors.

17. The phrase “1981 legislation” is used here to refer to a series of decrees considered since 1979 and issued beginning in December 1980 but concentrated in 1981. Reports and analyses of junta policies on higher education in the early years include Galo Gómez, Chile de hoy, educación, cultura y ciencia (Mexico City: Casa de Chile, 1976); Manuel Antonio Garretón, Universidad y política en los procesos de transformación y reversión en Chile, 1967–1977, FLACSO working papers series (Santiago: FLACSO, 1979); Michael Fleet, “Academic Freedom and University Autonomy in Chile,” Newsletter of the Latin American Studies Association 23, no. 2 (1977):23–38; Richard Fagen Ernesto Schiefelbein, La investigación sobre la universidad chilena en 1977–81, FLACSO working papers series (Santiago: FLACSO, 1982). On the 1980s, see a fine source (published too recently to be incorporated into this article): La educación superior en Chile: riesgos y oportunidades en los '80, edited by María José Lemaitre and Iván Lavados (Santiago: Corporación de Promoción Universitaria, 1985).

18. Calculated from data in Rafael Echeverría, Evolución de la matrícula en Chile: 1935–1981, PIIE working papers series (Santiago: PIIE, 1981), 114.

19. For the eight traditional universities and the institutions created from them, Alejandro Jara and Héctor Contardo show a total of 120,178 students enrolled in 1980 and 122,755 in 1982. See Jara and Contardo, La reforma educacional neo-liberal, PIIE working papers series (Santiago: PIIE, 1983), 66. El Mercurio reported 118,000 for 1982 and 127,353 for 1984, plus 3,686 for the new private universities (not including the training centers); see Guillermo E. Martínez, “Educación superior privada,” 16 Oct. 1984.

20. The figures on vacantes come from Schiefelbein, La investigación, 66; Consejo de Rectores, Anuario estadístico 1980 (Santiago: Consejo de Rectores, 1981), 11, and Anuario estadístico 1982 (1982), 13. After 1980, vacantes for the entire reconstituted system of higher education increased. Ratios of vacantes to enrollment are found in the Anuario estadístico 1977 of the Consejo de Rectores (Santiago, 1978), 7–8; and in the Consejo's Boletín informativo interno (Santiago: Consejo de Rectores, 1974), 2.

21. On South America, see Levy, Higher Education, table 1.1, based on five-year periods but lacking data on Uruguay after 1977. The UNESCO projections are cited in Gómez, Chile de hoy, 52, but they rely unduly on linear regressions (whereas secondary school growth would slow). Similarly, Angel Bate Carter projected a figure exceeding five hundred thousand by 1980 in “El sistema educativo chileno,” in Universidad e integración andina (Santiago: Corporación de Promoción Universitaria, 1974), 303. See Ernesto Schiefelbein and María Clara Grossi, “Análisis de la matrícula escolar en Chile,” a CIDE working paper (Santiago: Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Educación, 1978), 20–21. For the 1981 data, Carmen Ortúzar, “En busca de un título,” Hoy, 25 Feb.–3 Mar. 1981; the data on applicants came from the Consejo de Rectores and the Universidad de Chile.

22. According to PDC leader and former rector of the Universidad de Chile Edgardo Boeninger, the phrase universidad para todos was a demagogic slogan never taken seriously by university policymakers, but one that contributed to a perceived threat. A widespread belief existed that the number of “nonacademic” students increased significantly during the UP era. Interview, New York City, June 1982.

23. Enrique Kirberg, Los nuevos profesionales: educación universitaria de trabajadores, Chile, UTE, 1968–1973 (Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara, 1981).

24. Adriana Abalos reports that in 1980, 45 percent of the graduates of private secondary schools entered universities but only 17 percent of the public school graduates did so. See “Universidades,” Ercilla, 6 Aug. 1980, p. 15.

25. The empirical account is Guillermo Briones, Las universidades chilenas en el modelo de economía neo-liberal: 1973–1981, PIIE working papers series (Santiago: PIIE, 1981), 45–53. The student body at the Universidad de Chile in 1966 was 8 percent upper class, 82 percent middle class, 8 percent lower class, and 2 percent undetermined; as late as 1969, only 2 percent of the students had worker or peasant origins. See Kirberg, Los nuevos profesionales, 63, 67, which uses figures based on averages from several faculties for 1966. I have not found comparable figures for the years 1970–1975, but no evidence suggests anything other than middle-class dominance at that time. I thank Enrique Kirberg for his help on assessments of socioeconomic status.

26. Figures from Echeverría, Evolución de la matrícula, 27–29, 42, 44, 72, 98, 119; and Jara and Contardo, La reforma educacional, 80, 85, 93, 105; on the demographics, see Echeverría, 27–29, and Schiefelbein and Grossi, Análisis de la matrícula, 2, 20–21, 33.

27. Fleet notes in Academic Freedom that estimates on purges “vary widely,” 30; Ignacio González cites a figure of 25 percent for the teaching staff in the immediate postcoup period (10–15 percent for nonacademics and 18 percent for students), “La universidad en ebullición,” Hoy, 8–14 July 1985. Also see Centro de Investigaciones Socioeconómicas (CISEC) del Centro Bellarmino, Sector universidad (D6), 6, 19. This publication is one of the Estudios Sectoriales de la Estructura Social Chilena 1978.

28. “Universidad: la drástica reorganización,” Ercilla, 20 Oct. 1973. Similarly, the regime named military officers as directors of every school district; see Fischer, Political Ideology, 129.

29. The Universidad Católica de Chile was finally turned over to a civilian rector in 1985. On the long-frustrated church intention, see “Universidades: tensa calma académica,” Hoy, 20–26 June 1979; also, personal correspondence from Enrique D'Etigny, 18 July 1984. On the general conflict over the Universidad Católica de Chile, see Levy, Higher Education, 98–99. Protected by the church, several research institutes have maintained substantial autonomy. Some were formed in response to the regime's 1976 crackdown. The Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, legally part of the church, holds various programs together. Its original purpose was to provide transitory employment and scholarship until universities regained their autonomy. Based on an interview with Enrique D'Etigny, then president (and now vice-president) of the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano in Santiago, January 1982. Also see Hugo Fruhling, Nonprofit Organizations as Opposition to Authoritarian Rule, a Program on Non-Profit Organizations working paper, Yale University, forthcoming.

30. “Universidad católica: crisis con la jerarquía,” Hoy, 13–19 June 1979.

31. Arturo Valenzuela, “The Political Crisis of the Pinochet Regime,” LASA Forum 14, no. 2 (1984):18.

32. Gómez, Chile de hoy, 15. But “true universitarios” of the civilian right were soon at odds with uncompromising loyalists to the regime, who continually tapped mediocre and opportunistic replacements for the fallen defenders of university values.

33. Luis Alvarez Baltierra, “Definiciones,” Ercilla, 21 Jan. 1976.

34. Statement of René Orozco Sepúlveda, interviewed in Santiago, November 1978. On into the eighties, this oscillating pattern continued between rectors at the Universidad de Chile who were more and less loyal to their own university personnel when confronting the regime.

35. Based on interviews with Boeninger and others with former or continuing ties to the Universidad de Chile, such as Ricardo Lagos and Francisco Cumplido, in Santiago, November 1978. Some PDC partisans suggest that a similar trajectory (initial repression-reinvigorated repression-relative relaxation) can be discerned at the Universidad de Concepción. Based on interviews at the Center for Research and Cultural Development in Concepción, November 1978.

36. Malú Sierra, “La renuncia de Jorge Millas,” Hoy, 17–23 June 1981; see also two good accounts by Ignacio González, “Otra etapa dura,” Hoy, 30 Jan.–5 Feb. 1980, and “Golpe a la cátedra,” Hoy, 9–15 Apr. 1980. For an analysis of how “neutrality” became decreasingly tenable, see Iván Jaksić, Chilean Philosophy under Military Rule, Occasional Papers in Latin American Studies, no. 10 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford-Berkeley Joint Center for Latin American Studies, 1985).

37. On Allende's admonition, see Fleet, Academic Freedom, 25; on the workers, see Henry Landsberger and Tim McDaniel, “Hypermobilization in Chile, 1970–1973,” World Politics 28, no. 4 (1976):502–41. Thus academic freedom was threatened by an uncontrollable politicization and challenge to ideological diversity and tolerance even though, as Patricia Weiss Fagen emphasizes, Unidad Popular took little direct action against university autonomy, whether for lack of desire or merely lack of power. See Fagen, Chilean Universities: Problems of Autonomy and Dependence (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973), 19–20, 40–41.

38. For example, the leadership of the Universidad Técnica del Estado elaborated this position clearly in “Informe comisión de estudios de proyecto de organizaciones estudiantiles universitarias,” mimeo, 1979. Also based on interviews with Oscar Garrido, who was first director of planning at the university, then a top higher education official at the education ministry, Santiago, Nov. 1978 and May 1982.

39. CISEC, Sector universidad, 26.

40. These are the respective views of the former rectors of the Universidad de Chile (Edgardo Boeninger) and the Universidad Católica de Chile (Fernando Castillo), both interviewed in Santiago, November 1978.

41. Quotations from Patricia Verdugo, “Pasos a la apertura,” Hoy, 15–21 Nov. 1978, and “FEUC impulsa nuevo sistema,” El Mercurio, 18 Nov. 1978. On opposition, see CISEC, Sector universidad, 25–26. Also see Odette Magnet and Jaime Moreno, “La nueva institucionalidad estudiantil,” Hoy, 3–9 May 1978.

42. This initiative reflected Milton Friedman's thesis about the economically and politically stultifying effects of guildlike monopolies even when disguised as modern professional organizations, and even when staunchly defended by middle-class groups. See the editorial in ¿Que Pasa?, 12–18 Feb. 1981. Complementary legislation limited the professions requiring university degrees to twelve, another blow to many colegios. See Levy, Higher Education, 76, 376 n.34.

43. On the rising student activism, see Maria Isabel Valdés, “El movimiento estudiantil en la Universidad de hoy,” APSI, 3–16 Aug. 1982.

44. On the plebiscites, see Odette Magnet, “Después de seis años,” Hoy, 2–8 May 1979. Additionally, many students apparently declined nomination to official leadership positions. Magnet and Moreno, “La nueva institucionalidad.” Also, see Daniel C. Levy, “Contemporary Student Politics in Latin America,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 14, no. 2 (1981):365. On the trends since 1980, see María Isabel Valdés, “Universidad prohibida,” APSI, 18–31 Oct. 1983; and Valdés, “El movimiento estudiantil.” For an updated account on variations in student organizations and opposition by universities, see Miguel E. Correa and Susan Lagudis, “Chilean Universities under Military Rule: 1973–1984,” paper given at the Latin American Studies Association, 18–20 Apr. 1985, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 13–15.

45. The views are those of the first military rector of the Universidad de Chile, as quoted in “Nueva reorientación,” El Mercurio, 2 Nov. 1973.

46. Briones, Las universidades chilenas, 38. Like admissions policy, the number of vacantes is a good indicator of policy intention in the early years whereas enrollments probably provide a more accurate measure after that because vacante figures may vary more erratically from year to year and give no hint about differential dropout rates by field. While Briones sees significant change between the 1973 and 1980 vacante figures (p. 37), I would emphasize the similarities. None of the nine fields changed by more than 4.4 percent and only two changed by more than 2.2 percent. Most of all, important vacante transformations would have made larger impacts on enrollment data. Also, comparing 1983 vacantes with 1982 enrollments suggests further continuity; see Consejo, Anuario Estadístico 1982, 14. The private training centers create uncertainty in drawing conclusions about continuity versus change.

47. CISEC, Sector universidad, 30, 39. Also see División de Admisión, Informativo no. 2, Universidad de Concepción, 1977, 18; and Consejo, Anuario Estadístico 1977, 8.

48. Simón de Asés, “El decaimiento de la Universidad de Chile,” Mensaje, no. 248 (1979), p. 174. Also see Manuel A. Garretón, Las ciencias sociales en Chile al inicio de los 80, FLACSO working paper series (Santiago: FLACSO, 1981), 28 and passim.

49. On the dire effects, I cite Máximo Pachecho, PDC education minister, whom I interviewed in Santiago, Nov. 1978. On revitalization, see the interview with Pablo Huneeus, “Los universitarios están inquietos,” Hoy, 12–18 Mar. 1980.

50. On the rigidity, see Garretón, Universidad y política, 47–48. On changes in a particular profession see Jaksić, “Philosophy and University Reform,” 57–86. Also, on the profesionalizante label, see CISEC, Sector universidad, 53.

51. Some images of a professionalist university were shaken, however, by the 1981 legislation on professional monopolies, cited above.

52. Based on my interviews with such key actors as Juan Gómez Millas and Fernando Molina (former vice-president of the Universidad Católica de Chile) in Santiago, Nov. 1978, and Viña del Mar in Nov. 1979. For more on the modernization process and dependency, see Edmundo Fuenzalida, “The Reception of ‘Scientific Sociology’ in Chile,” LARR 18, no. 2 (1983):95–112; and Fagen, Chilean Universities.

53. On the probably lesser, but still significant, changes in academic policy-making at other educational levels, see Fischer, Political Ideology, 128–29. Research policy would also corroborate basic findings on changes in process, control, and output. To cite just one example, market-oriented preferences for comparative advantage and the purchase of frontline knowledge reinforced motives of political control in attacking the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología.

54. Based on my interview with Jorge Claro, a top Chicago Boy advisor on education, Santiago, Nov. 1978, and on the data he provided.

55. According to interviews with Miguel Kast, head of the Oficina de Planificación Nacional (ODEPLAN), and Jorge Claro, Santiago, Nov. 1978. Also see “Universidades: ¿cómo financiarlas?,” ¿Qué Pasa?, 9 Aug. 1974. But the term university covered a good deal more ground in Chile than elsewhere. No nonuniversity technical institutes of higher education existed until 1981. Many subprofessional careers were taught at the university, national research was concentrated there, and “extension” programs (including those via television) were significant.

56. Gómez, Chile de hoy, 67.

57. Ministerio de Educación, “Borrador de anteproyecto para la operación de un sistema de cobro,” Santiago, Nov. 1976, mimeo.

58. I found it difficult to calculate the ratios of education allocations in the budget because of data discrepancies, such as those between the Ministerio de Hacienda's “Análisis” (p. 8) and Carmen Luz Latorre, “Recursos asignados al sector educación,” PIIE working papers series (Santiago: PIIE, 1981), table 1 and appendix 1. Generally, however, all sources indicate these trends: increases before the coup, declines associated with it, subsequent recoveries by 1977, and relative stagnation for a couple of years thereafter. Jara and Contardo show a slight increase between 1980 and 1982, following a fall in 1979–80. See La reforma educacional, 53. It appears that education other than higher education has more or less held its own, sustaining neither junta claims about the redistributive effects of its crackdown on higher education nor some critics' claims about across-the-board cuts.

59. On military rule at the Universidad de Chile, see Schiefelbein, “La investigación,” 6. The figures on tuition are drawn from several newspaper articles, such as “Rectora de universidad,” El Mercurio, 12 Jan. 1982. Fees varied more across fields than from institution to institution, according to “Aranceles 1983 en universidades,” El Mercurio, 14 Jan. 1983. But numerous newspaper stories in 1983 told of a startling obstacle to policy change through tuition: perhaps half the students were simply not paying! Meanwhile, plans to charge tuition at public secondary schools were neither implemented nor removed from the agenda.

60. A last measure of policy change is the percentage of private income for the higher education system. Using a generous definition of private (including tuition, fees, contract research, and international aid), the PDC-UP average was 12 percent; the 1976–1978 average was 22 percent, and that was before tuitions jumped and the subsidy freeze plan was initiated. See Levy, Higher Education, 80, 99.

61. Quotation from O'Donnell, “Tensions,” 294. Admittedly, I touched on only a few aspects of internationalism.

62. Notes 2 and 3 above identify some of these scholars.

63. On the middle class, see Levy, “Comparing Authoritarian Regimes,” 45–48.

64. Referring back to note 11, an obvious point is that researchers are less likely to emphasize policy change when they compare Chile's two last non-bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes than when they compare those two with bureaucratic authoritarianism. Stallings uses the first approach whereas Fischer uses both.

65. Jara and Contardo are less reserved than I about seeing a shift from state to market regulation, although they find that neoliberal institutionalization for education did not make much headway until 1979, and although they too note that implementation lags behind rhetoric {La reforma educacional, 2–4, 114, 130). For the decade as a whole, my conclusion is consistent with Alejandro Foxley's view on general economic policy that only small decisions were left to a free and decentralized market. See Foxley, “Chile: perspectivas económicas,” Mensaje, no. 301 (1981):414–15.