1. Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, “Visions of Chile,” LARR 10, no. 3 (1975):155–75.

2. In 1970 Unidad Popular was formed by six constituent parties or movements. This coalition was an expansion of the previous Socialist-Communist coalition, the Frente Revolucionario de Acción Popular (FRAP), which had formed in 1957 and twice fielded Salvador Allende as its presidential candidate. The parties joining the Communists and Socialists included the Radical party, purged of its right-wing element (which had been expelled several years earlier); MAPU (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria), which had formed in 1969 after splitting off from the Christian Democrats; the Partido Social Demócrata; and Acción Popular Independiente, essentially the creation of Senator Rafael Tarud. During the UP government, these six parties or movements were subject to great stress. MAPU split, although both wings remained within Unidad Popular. (The party divided in March of 1973. The faction agreeing with the moderate view within Unidad Popular had to change its name. It became MAPU-Obrero y Campesino, or MAPU-O y C, led by Jaime Gazmuri. The other faction was able to keep the official name MAPU and was headed by Oscar Guillermo Garretón.) The Radical party also divided, but one of the splinter groups, the Partido de la Izquierda Radical, abandoned Unidad Popular in April 1972 to join the opposition. One other group, the Izquierda Cristiana, split off from the Christian Democrats in late 1971 and joined Unidad Popular. At this point, a number of MAPU members changed party affiliation and entered the Izquierda Cristiana.

3. For a discussion of the ideological differences within the Left, see Lois Oppenheim, “The Quest for Unity on the Left: Allende's Chile and the Socialization of the Economy,” Ph.D. diss., Washington University, 1980. A large body of literature either reflects or examines ideological position among leftist parties. For the Socialist view, see Julio César Jobet, El Partido Socialista de Chile, 2 vols. (Santiago: Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana, 1971); Alejandro Chelen Rojas, Trayectoria del socialismo (Santiago: Editorial Austral, 1966); Pensamiento teórico y político del Partido Socialista de Chile, edited by Julio César Jobet and Alejandro Chelen Rojas (Santiago: Editorial Quimantu, 1972); and Raúl Ampuero, La Izquierda en punto muerto (Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1969). Carlos Altamirano, Secretary-General of the Socialist party during the Allende years, presents the radical Socialist view of the possibilities of the “peaceful route” in his Dialéctica de una derrota (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1977), although it should be noted that he has since repented of this position and taken a more social democratic line. Paul Drake analyzes the Socialist party in Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-1952 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978). For the Communist view, see these examples: Hernán Ramírez Necochea, Origen y formación del Partido Comunista de Chile (Santiago: n.p., 1965); and Luis Corvalán, Camino de victoria (Santiago: Impresora Horizante, 1971), and Nuestra vía revolucionaria (Santiago: Impresa Horizonte, 1971). Kyle Steenland examines the conflicts within Unidad Popular over the implementation of agrarian reform in Agrarian Reform under Allende (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977). Joan Garcés, a Spanish advisor to President Allende, analyzes intra-UP conflict, especially Socialist-Communist conflict in Allende y la experiencia chilena (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1976).

4. In late 1969 and early 1970, several agreements were reached during the negotiations that preceded the formation of the UP coalition. These agreements formed the core of UP rules for decision making, governance, and division of power. One was the political pact, which consisted of several major points. The first set up the Political Committee of Unidad Popular, consisting of one representative of each party and movement in the coalition. Second, to avoid the establishment of “zones of influence” in the bureaucracy, all UP parties were to be represented in each area of state administration, supposedly to act as a “check and balance” on other party functionaries. Last, ministerial posts were apportioned among the six parties by a fixed formula or quota in the following ratio: 3:3:3:2:2:1. The three largest vote-getters at the time, the Socialists, Communists, and Radicals, were to have three cabinet posts each. MAPU was to have two, and the remaining three positions were to be divided between the Social Democrats and Acción Popular Independiente.

5. See Oppenheim, “Quest for Unity.” In this study, I analyze the speed and scope of social-sector formation, the means used to socialize industries, and worker participation among socialized industries.

6. Fidel Castro on Chile (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1982).

7. For example, when referring to unresolved conflicts within Unidad Popular, Bitar states, “nor did there exist an authority strong enough to resolve the controversies” (p. 89).

8. Because of the lack of a relevant law, Unidad Popular relied on a series of administrative measures to socialize most industries. One of these measures involved the use of Decree-Law 520, dating from 1932 and further validated by later decree-laws. It permitted the government temporarily to intervene in, requisition, or expropriate an industry under well-specified conditions: in an attempt to alleviate any irregularity in the production or distribution of essential goods; in an industry suffering from severe labor problems; or in one whose normal production was disrupted, thereby creating serious supply problems. The Yarur textile mills constituted the first case where the government was forced to use these decree-laws because of worker-precipitated disruption in production, rather than owner desertion or sabotage. The important point to note about the use of intervention and requisition measures is that they did not constitute definitive socialization of the industry. Thus even if workers considered their factory to be part of the social sector, it was really in a kind of limbo status legally.

9. The issues raised by Winn and Spence about semiautonomous worker organization and self-government are somewhat analogous to the current debate in Chile over the degree of autonomy of contemporary grass-roots organizations, such as the organizaciones económicas populares (OEPs) and other similar organizations. While some laud these as examples of autonomous efforts by workers and pobladores, others note the links with social service organizations, academic institutes, and even foreign funding sources. The social service workers in private institutes and in the Vicaría de Solidaridad whom I interviewed raised the issue of grass-roots organizational autonomy. A large and growing literature on the topic of grass-roots organizations paints different pictures of their degree of autonomy. What follows is a brief, suggestive list: Luis Razeto Migliaro, Economía de solidaridad y mercado democrático, 2 vols. (Santiago: Programa de Economía del Trabajo, 1984, 1985); Clarisa Hardy, Estrategias organizadas de subsistencia: los sectores populares frente a sus necesidades en Chile, Documento de Trabajo 41 (Santiago: Programa de Economía de Trabajo, 1985); Eduardo Walker, Marisol Saborido, Carmen Tardito, Pablo Astaburuaga, and Ximena Valdés, Planificación desde la comunidad, ampliando el campo de lo posible (Santiago: Equipo de Vivienda y Gestión Local, CIPMA, 1987), especially the article by Ximena Valdés, “Metodología de planificación: una herramienta para la organización de pobladores,” 21–42; Bernardo Gallardo, Eas ollas comunes de La Florida como experiencia de desarrollo de la organización popular, Documento de Trabajo 248 (Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana de las Ciencias Sociales, 1985); Teresa Valdés E., El movimiento poblacional: la recomposición de las solidaridades sociales, Documento de Trabajo 283 (Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana de las Ciencias Sociales, 1986); Rodrigo Egana B., Las instituciones de apoyo y las OEP: problemas y dilemas que emergen en esta relación, Documento de Trabajo 50 (Santiago: Programa de Economía del Trabajo, 1986).

10. There have been dramatic changes in the structure of agriculture since the 1973 coup. The cultivation of crops, especially fruit, for exportation has transformed the countryside. A number of studies have been published on women in agriculture and in the rural sector. See, for example, the issue of Agricultura y Sociedad entitled Organizaciones femininas del campo: problemas y perspectivas (Santiago: Grupo de Investigaciones Agrarias, May 1987).

11. One of the most impressive developments in Chile since the coup has been the emergence of a strong women's movement. Many groups formed to help solve the daily problems that women faced—housing, food, employment, and human rights. Feminist and more overtly political groups also formed, as well as groups that fit into both categories. There are currently two women's houses in Santiago where women's groups meet and classes are held. The latter cover such issues as sexuality, male-female relations, and acquiring employment skills. Also, many teams or individuals studying women operate within the numerous private social science institutes in Santiago, and the Centro de Estudios de la Mujer (CEM) is dedicated entirely to this project.

12. See, for example, Joan Garcés, 1970: la pugna política por la presidencia en Chile (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1971).

13. Freed and Landis describe a process of U.S.-fomented psychoterror in which horrifying stories were planted in the newspapers to create a sense of unease and fear. See Donald Freed and Fred Landis, Death in Washington: The Murder of Orlando Letelier (Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1980). One such story was that of the descuartizado, a “quartered man” whose discovery was recounted in right-wing newspapers. Although this thesis is highly speculative, articles describing the descuartizado did appear in the Chilean right-wing press. Moreover, the CIA is known to conduct disinformation campaigns.

14. Davis notes laconically a change in Eduardo Frei's attitude toward military intervention in 1973 but does not comment further: “By the time of the coup it had become clear that Frei and his party had concluded that a military solution was the only possible way out of the crisis. … Frei never advocated a coup to me in our talks, however, and I never supported the idea in talking to him” (p. 147).

15. I should also note here that since the coup, pobladores as well as academics have participated in a process of reevaluating the Allende experience. For example, those who still live in Nueva Habana (now renamed Nuevo Amanecer) are divided in their assessment of this experience in self-government. Some look back on it with nostalgia, but others feel that the highly ideological leadership prevented the campamento from becoming truly democratic. This information comes from my interviews with pobladores in Nuevo Amanecer and from a team of social workers who are conducting a project there.

16. There were also cases of obreros having their legal classification changed to empleado once their factory had been transferred to the social sector. For a discussion of this phenomenon in two industrial enterprises, see Lois Oppenheim, “Quest for Unity,” 339–46. These cases also conflict with Winn's more positive assessment of worker attitude, as presented in Weavers of Revolution and in “Loosing the Chains: Labor and the Chilean Revolutionary Process, 1970–1973,” Latin American Perspectives 3, no. 1 (Winter 1976):70-84; and “Oral History and the Factory Study: New Approaches to Labor History,” LARR 14, no. 2 (1979): 130–40.

17. In attempting to analyze the attitudes of subsets of the survey sample, such as Christian Democrats and UP workers, Fleet was left with very small numbers in some cells, ranging from six to twenty individuals. Cognizant of this problem, Fleet used tau beta instead of chi square to determine levels of significance. Nevertheless, some of the levels of significance provide very weak support for Fleet's generalizations.

18. Pollack's essay also contains some debatable points. He appropriately raises the question of how the party system absorbed the spectacular increase in new voters, especially in the period after 1958. His answer is that new parties arose and existing parties had to restructure themselves. But his conclusions are speculative and not well supported, even by his own data.

19. Robert Alexander, The Tragedy of Chile (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1978).

20. See Robert Moss, Chile's Marxist Experiment (Newton Abbot, England: David and Charles, 1973). This book was also published in Spanish.

21. Secretaría del Gobierno, Libro blanco del cambio de gobierno en Chile: 11 sep. 1973 (Santiago: Empresa Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral, n.d.). This work was published shortly after the coup by the Chilean junta in order to justify its military intervention and the brutality that followed.

22. Davis cites Freed and Landis's Death in Washington erroneously throughout chapter 10, which chronicles the day of the coup. Davis cites it where Chavkin's book should have been listed, an apparent mix-up. But in other notes, both Chavkin and Freed and Landis are cited. Thus the misciting of Freed-Landis cannot be explained as a mechanical error. In all cases, the information cited is not in Freed and Landis's book. This repeated error is surprising in an otherwise carefully footnoted work, unless Davis perhaps wanted to show greater support for his description among writers sympathetic with the Left.

23. For example, Unidad Popular created the Partido Federado de la Unidad Popular to confront the opposition electoral coalition, the Confederación Democrática (CODE), in the March 1973 elections. The Partido Federado de la Unidad Popular was constituted in July 1972, complete with officers. But aside from drawing up a single electoral slate for the 1973 parliamentary elections, this new party gained few party prerogatives from UP member parties. Perhaps more significant was its much-postponed first congress held in 1973 to discuss creating a more integrated party. The congress was held in late June of that year, preceded by regional meetings in May. But the UP Congress was overshadowed by the attempted coup of 29 June and the worsening political crisis after that date.

24. Under the Chilean Constitution of 1925, in cases where no candidate received an absolute majority of the popular vote, Congress was empowered to select the president by choosing between the two highest vote-getters. Because of Chile's multiparty system, this recourse was not uncommon. But an unwritten norm applied in these cases, which was that the Congress would choose the individual who had received the most votes to be president, even though it had the constitutional authority to choose either.