That indigenismo — in the sense of a sympathetic awareness of the Indian by social scientist, essayist, and creative writer – came into full flower in the two decades following the Mexican Revolution is amply confirmed by the most cursory survey of Mexican intellectual and artistic activity of this period. Interest in the Indian and in his halfbrother, the mestizo, is well-attested by the activities of José Vasconcelos as Minister of Education during the early twenties; by the appearance of Vasconcelos’ popular essays, La raza cósmica (1925) and Indoiogía (1927); by the anthropological and ethnological investigations of Manuel Gamio and Alfonso Caso, by the strikingly nativist orientation of the graphic arts; and finally, by the creation of the Indianist novel in the thirties.

The liberal reform programs that developed in Spanish America following independence almost invariably included as one of their major objectives radical changes in the educational system. An outstanding example of this is the educational program proposed by Dr. Mariano Gálvez, Chief-of-State of Guatemala. Protected from foreign problems by virtue of the existence of the Central American Federation and its Liberal leader, Francisco Morazán, Gálvez had seven years (1831–1838) to develop far-reaching reforms. While the lack of Gálvez papers makes discussion and analysis of his domestic reforms difficult, it is possible to assess his role by an analysis of his public speeches, decrees, laws, archival records, and similar materials.

Do Caribbean Basin states influence U.S. immigration policy? Although the terrorist attacks of September 2001 eventually derailed migration talks, before that time Mexico and the United States appeared poised to negotiate a major bilateral agreement, largely on Mexico's terms. Drawing on 88 detailed interviews conducted with Mexican and other Caribbean Basin elites, this article examines sending-state preferences for emigration and their capacity to influence policy outcomes. The informants considered migration to be the most problematic issue on the bilateral agenda, but also saw migration policy as relatively open to source-state influence. A case study of Mexican emigration policymaking details the national and transnational changes that make migration increasingly an inter-mestic policy issue.

This Article addresses some of the key issues involved in understanding current trade negotiations between Mexico and the United States, as well as their significance for the process of economic integration in North America. These issues derive from the new setting produced by (a) Mexico's trade and investment liberalization in the 1980s, (b) the incentives which underlie the drive towards integration, as well as (c) those factors which will condition the final content of the current negotiating process.

A free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States could be seen as the logical conclusion of the process of trade and investment liberalization carried out by the Mexican government ever since the mid-1980s. At the same time, it also represents a shift in Mexico's initial trade strategy, from multilateralism to bilateralism, or from globalization to regionalization, as a consequence of the global trend, toward the end of the 20th century, to create large regional economic blocs.

Why do some candidates prefer to use clientelistic strategies to mobilize voters while others do not? Building on existing explanations that highlight the importance of voters’ demand for particularistic goods and parties’ capacities to supply goods and monitor voters, this article focuses on candidates’ political careers. It argues that how candidates begin mobilizing voters to participate in rallies and elections becomes crucial in explaining their preferences to use clientelism. Candidates who receive a salary based on their ability to mobilize voters—paid party activists—are more likely to use clientelism than candidates who are not paid for their political work, unpaid party activists.

Racial politics in Brazil have changed dramatically: the nation-state that once denied racism now enacts racial policies for Afro-Brazilians. The discourse of race has also changed: it is now common for the media to discuss Afro-Brazilians as a voting bloc. Using qualitative methods, this article tests the hypothesis that Afro-Brazilian politicians seek a racial vote from the Afro-Brazilian electorate. Analyzing campaign advertisements from select candidates in Salvador and São Paulo, this study finds that most Afro-Brazilian politicians use racial cues, and interviews show that most Afro-Brazilian politicians address racial issues during their campaigns. Not all of them seek racial votes, however: at the federal level, Afro-Brazilian politicians believe that this strategy would not get them elected. Many use campaigns nevertheless to raise racial consciousness among the electorate.

Although it is of importance for any understanding of the Peronist regime as a whole, little is known in detail about the social character of the popular support upon which the regime was based. This state of affairs is not as paradoxical as it might at first seem. In part it is a reflection of the fact that the continued political importance of the Peronist movement has meant that until recently the debate over Peronism has been polemical in nature and that opportunities for dispassionate analysis have been correspondingly restricted. For example, to apologists for Peronism, the popular support that it enjoyed is evidence merely that it represented a profound revolution in social and economic priorities which was fully understood and appreciated by the people themselves. To its detractors it is evidence of little more than the manipulation of the ignorant, corruption of the venal, and coercion of the educated. To both groups it has been a premise for further argument rather than an object worthy of study in its own right.

Using original data from the period 1999–2011 on federal infrastructure investment for all subnational units in two federations, Argentina and Brazil, and a unitary nation, Colombia, this study shows that in developing federal countries with strong governors, presidents use nonearmarked transfers as a tool to compensate governors for sizable and secure territorial political support. The study argues that in these cases, resources do not make electoral power but chase it. In the unitary case, conversely, governors do not influence distributive politics. Variation also was found in the relevance of Congress, legislative overrepresentation, and programmatic criteria across cases. The article discusses possible reasons for these results and their implications for the comparative debate on distributive politics.

One of the more recent and interesting contributions in the field of development has been the theory of dependence. This theory seeks to explain the most pressing problems of the less-developed world in terms of the relations between the developing and developed areas. Stagnation, unemployment, income inequality, and regional disequilibria are all seen as directly related to a less-developed country's position vis-à-vis the developed and capitalist world. Unfortunately, the theory of dependence has become something of a cause célèbre. It is either eagerly accepted or scornfully rejected as a matter of faith—primarily because of its political implications and overtones. Those who accept it embrace it willfully and rally to defend it against any possible detractors. Those who reject it generally choose to ignore it as either not serious or unworthy of careful attention and consideration.

In the 1980s and 1990s, economic crisis produced ideological convergence in many Latin American party systems. Much scholarship explores how this convergence frequently provoked system change that enabled renewed ideological differentiation, but little research examines instances where convergence persisted without destabilizing the system. Through comparative historical analysis of Dominican continuity amid regional change, this study identifies factors that sustain or challenge party systems. Then, through analysis of Americas Barometer surveys, it assesses the causal mechanisms through which these factors shape support for the traditional Dominican parties. The findings demonstrate that maintaining programmatic and clientelist linkages facilitates continuity. In addition, the article argues that the threats political outsiders pose to existing party systems are constrained when people excluded from the system are divided and demobilized. In the Dominican case, Haitian immigration divides the popular sector while Dominicans abroad sustain ties to the parties, with both migration flows facilitating party system continuity.

If a medal were to be struck in commemoration of Latin America's successful survival of the 20th century, la cava might bear a representation of democracy and el sello that of authoritarianism. These alternatives have characterized all attempts to arrive at political consensus for the past hundred years and more.

The current version of the region's perpetual dichotomous nature has been called (re)democratization. In South America it has replaced professional militarism, the most recent representation of authoritarianism, and threatens to affect traditional democratic practices in countries spared the military incursions of the 1964-1989 quarter-century. To the north, (re)democratization challenges both traditional authoritarianism and Marxism-Leninism.

(Re)democratization is a transitional process in which the polity shifts from one with minimal partisan and popular participation back to one based on (ever more maximized) pluralistic participation, usually characterized by meaningful elections, separation of state powers, constitutional order, rule of law, respect for human rights, and civilian regulation of armed force.

“Rarely In History has an innovation in economic and financial policy caught on as quickly in as many different countries as privatization,” trumpeted the Financial Times (1987) recently. In Europe and the United States in the 1980s, victorious conservatives led an assault on the state (both its welfare and productive arms), but the movement included more than just conservative free marketeers. Spanish socialists were privatizing, and Communist party leaders in China and the Soviet Union introduced farreaching market reforms. Privatization also became a constant theme in policy debates in the Third World, though the ratio of discussion to implementation was low except in cases such as Chile and Togo.

The persistence of long-term poverty among sectors of the urban and rural population in less-developed countries (LDCs), as well as in the so-called developed world, has resulted in the formulation of a diversity of interpretations by theoreticians and policy-makers seeking to comprehend the life of the poor, and for political, economic, and moral reasons to develop solutions to alleviate poverty. Recognition of the failure of the Accelerated Growth Model to produce adequate redistribution of resources and income throughout society through the “filter down” effect has led to changes in emphasis in poverty-related research during the past two decades. There has been a shift in focus away from measurements of absolute poverty, the insufficiency of basic needs to ensure survival, toward the clarification of the determinants of relative poverty, the social inequality experienced by those in the bottom segment of the income distribution within a given society.

Emphasis today is on the political and economic factors in social change in undeveloped countries. This approach, combined with the wholehearted acceptance of the role of the middle class as a psychological leavening agent in such countries, tends to obscure the presence of other factors. Especially are there other categories of human beings who are responding to the forces put into play by world changes and by the increasing pressures exerted upon the social systems of which they are a part. Recently, some of these groups have been given more notice, such as students, intellectuals, labor union members, etc. Another such important category is the servant class which for the most part has been ignored and yet which appears significant, even though not as a political group, in terms of both the effects it has on changes being attempted in social organizations and on the personality development of nationals in such countries.

Throughout Latin America, democratic political structures reflect liberal conceptualizations of democracy. Since the election of Hugo Chávez, Venezuela has emerged as an exception, with President Chávez sponsoring initiatives designed to foster participatory democracy. This article draws on the Venezuelan case in an effort to gain insight on the malleability of citizens' definitions of and attitudes toward democracy. Two key findings emerge. First, in data gathered ten years into the Chávez presidency, the vast majority of Venezuelans still define democracy in liberal terms, whereas relatively few have embraced participatory conceptualizations. Second, although Venezuelans as a whole are highly supportive of democracy as a form of government, no evidence is found that either support for Chávez or defining democracy in terms of participation corresponds with higher favorability toward democracy. Together, these findings suggest that Venezuela's political transformation has produced little or no discernible effect on mass sentiment regarding democracy.

The Caribbean Basin surged into political prominence shortly before the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1981. Growth throughout the region had collapsed under the weight of the second round of oil price hikes, recession in the United States and other industrialized countries, falling commodity prices, and rising interest rates. Public policy responses in most countries compounded these difficulties by failing to adjust rapidly enough to the external situation or to adopt the structural reforms needed to ensure broadly based growth on a sustainable basis. In the eyes of the administration, improving the economic situation was central to defusing the security threat it perceived in the political developments of several countries in the region.

Events Since 1979 have steadily softened the long-dominant tone of rivalry in Brazilian-Argentine relations; and the two countries have established mutual levels of confidence, and institutional mechanisms, sufficient to support increased degrees of cooperation. The mutual understanding, formally confirmed during a landmark visit, in May 1980, by Brazilian President Joâo Figueiredo to Argentine President Jorge Videla, in Buenos Aires, is attributable to the pragmatic perception, in both capitals, that accumulated, but unaddressed, small grievances could mount into major, unnecessary points of attrition capable of sapping more important efforts.

During the past twelve years almost half a million Cubans have sought refuge in Miami. Among them were over 14,000 unaccompanied children between 6 and 18 years of age. This article tells for the first time the story of how the children's exodus began. It covers the period between the middle of November 1960, when we first became aware of the need, and 1 February 1961, when I met with the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare to brief him on the plight of the unaccompanied children among the refugees. Two days later, President Kennedy announced a government aid program for Cuban refugees which included money for the care of unaccompanied children, “the most troubled group among the refugee population.”

About 4:30 p.m. on 26 December 1960, Pan American World Airways Flight 422 from Havana touched down at Miami International Airport. There were few passengers, if any, on that flight who did not experience a real sense of relief as they descended from the airplane. Events in Cuba were rapidly moving toward a climax and those who could were joining the increasing exodus to Miami.

One of the most significant developments in Latin American democracies since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization is the rise to power of political outsiders. However, the study of the political consequences of this phenomenon has been neglected. This article begins to fill that gap by examining whether the rise of outsiders in the region increases the level of executive-legislative confrontation. Using an original database of political outsiders in Latin America, it reports a series of logistic regressions showing that the risk of executive-legislative conflict significantly increases when the president is an outsider. The likelihood of institutional paralysis increases when an independent gets elected, due to the legislative body's lack of support for the president and the outsider's lack of political skills. The risk of an executive's attempted dissolution of Congress is also much higher when the president is an outsider.

For much of the twentieth century, Third World economies that were based upon import-substitution industrialization (ISI) were dominated by authoritarian regimes. When economic liberalization began to overtake many of these countries, however, as happened in recent years, the question arose as to whether authoritarian rule had not become anachronistic in mediating the relations between state and economy in the Third World.

The experience of Mexico strongly suggests that authoritarian rule remains a potent force in this era of economic change. Although Mexico's authoritarian government continued to retain power even in the presence of a liberal economic agenda, adopted during the early 1990s, it did find it expedient to make some adaptations in the system. The most significant of these, by far, was to make alterations in the ruling coalition that had governed the country since the early 1930s, rather than to embark upon a transition to democracy. These changes represented the regime's most critical initiative in attempting to meet, if not reconcile, the conflicting claims of authoritarianism on the one hand with the demands of economic liberalization on the other.