It is frequently argued that the key to “successful” economic liberalization is to marginalize interest groups that profit from existing regulatory regimes. This paper contends that some established interests can craft public policies to protect their rents in the new market setting. The state may shape the interests of social actors and create proreform constituencies out of old populist and interventionist groups. In Argentina, this coalition building was achieved by constructing reform policies that granted rents in new markets to business and organized labor and by deliberately avoiding unilateral deregulation in sectors where reform would hurt traditionally powerful actors. This argument is developed through a comparative analysis of policy reform in the labor market institutions and protected industrial sectors, areas where the costs of deregulation are said to be unavoidable for the established actors.

Most of the countries of South America experienced two notable institutional phenomena during the 1990s: the reform or rewriting of constitutions and the emergence of direct democracy mechanisms. This paper examines the latter process through a cross-national comparison. The introduction of direct democracy mechanisms is typically driven by traditionally excluded political interests. It takes two forms, both involving the failure of representative democratic institutions. In most cases, these traditionally excluded interests win control over the constitutional reform and rewriting process, although this is not a necessary condition for the emergence of direct democracy. Drawing illustrations from 12 cases of constitutional reform, this paper links arguments about direct democracy in the United States and Western Europe, institutional change, neopopulism, and the decline of the party system in Latin America.

This study focuses on Nicaragua's transition from a revolutionary state to one oriented toward democracy and the market, through the political lens of agricultural property rights. The national agenda on property rights after 1990 was dominated by elaborate arrangements to accommodate kinship-based factions of the agroindustrial elite, core Sandinista constituents, rural labor groups, and demobilized peasant combatants. Bargains, legislative initiatives, and constitutional reforms failed to clarify legal ambiguity over coveted assets. Persistent conflict thereby became embedded in official efforts to design a robust property regime. The case of Nicaragua suggests comparisons with other countries where protracted confrontation and social violence over property rights pose serious threats to unconsolidated democratic institutions.

Suspecting that his electoral campaign had received contributions from the Cali drug cartel, the U.S. government considered Colombian president Ernesto Samper (1994–98) an enemy in the drug war. U.S. antidrug policy accordingly targeted not just illicit crop cultivation, traffickers, and money laundering but also the democratically elected president himself. In many ways, U.S. policy became obsessed with bringing down Samper, an “explicit narcotization” that had severe consequences for the two countries' relationship. This case study analyzes the often complex interactions between dominant and subordinate states, especially when the dominant state's involvement in the subordinate state is driven by domestic political concerns.