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Mavericks versus Party Insiders: A Survey Experiment on Candidate- and Partycentric Attitudes of Voters

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 August 2019

Isabella Alcañiz Open the ORCID record for Isabella Alcañiz [Opens in a new window] ,
Ernesto Calvo Open the ORCID record for Ernesto Calvo [Opens in a new window]  and
Marcelo Escolar Open the ORCID record for Marcelo Escolar [Opens in a new window]
Isabella Alcañiz*
Affiliation:
Isabella Alcañiz is an associate professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland.
Ernesto Calvo*
Affiliation:
Ernesto Calvo is a professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland.
Marcelo Escolar*
Affiliation:
Marcelo Escolar is a professor of politics and government at the Universidad Nacional de San Martín.
*
[email protected].
[email protected].
[email protected].
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Abstract

This study examines the extent to which priming voters on the trustworthiness of candidates or that of their parties elicits candidatecentric or partycentric attitudes. The analysis provides evidence of the trade-off for voters between mavericks and party insiders in presidential elections. It shows that voters are sensitized to the risks of electing a candidate with no party support, but in the particular case of Argentina, they still consider the candidates’ qualities to be more important than those of their parties. The results show that priming on the trustworthiness of candidates elicits stronger responses from low-income voters, who already have prior candidatecentric inclinations. The findings also reveal statistical differences in vote choice when respondents are primed with party- or candidatecentric frames.

Keywords

survey experimentframingelectionspolitical parties
Type
Research Notes
Information
Latin American Politics and Society , Volume 61 , Issue 4 , November 2019 , pp. 118 - 134
Copyright
© University of Miami 2019 

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