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Informal Coalitions and Legislative Agenda Setting in Mexico’s Multiparty Presidential System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 February 2022

Yann P. Kerevel Open the ORCID record for Yann P. Kerevel [Opens in a new window]  and
Sergio A. Bárcena Juárez Open the ORCID record for Sergio A. Bárcena Juárez [Opens in a new window]
Yann P. Kerevel
Affiliation:
Yann P. Kerevel is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA. [email protected].
Sergio A. Bárcena Juárez
Affiliation:
Sergio A. Bárcena Juárez is a professor and researcher at the Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey, Mexico City, Mexico. [email protected].
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Abstract

To what extent can presidents exert gatekeeping power in opposition-led legislatures? Drawing on a study of roll rates in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, where presidents lack legislative majorities and often face a legislature controlled by the opposition, this article argues that gatekeeping power is divided among multiple actors. It finds that presidents exert weak gatekeeping power over the agenda. While presidents and their parties are rarely defeated in votes related to presidential initiatives, they generally create stable, informal coalitions with opposition parties to pass their bills. Moreover, the agenda-setting power of the president and the president’s party is weaker with bills that originate in the legislative branch, where the party is occasionally rolled on legislative initiatives and during the amendment stage if it is not also the median party.

Keywords

Agenda settinglegislative coalitionsroll rateslegislative organizationcartel theorycommittees
Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Politics and Society , Volume 64 , Issue 1 , February 2022 , pp. 1 - 22
Copyright
© The Authors 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the University of Miami

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Footnotes

We, Yann Kerevel and Sergio Bárcena, declare no conflict of interest.

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