We apply the largest-chunk segmentation algorithm to texts consisting of syllables as smallest units. The algorithm was proposed in Drienkó (2016, 2017a), where it was used for texts considered to have letters/characters as smallest units. The present study investigates whether the largest chunk segmentation strategy can result in higher precision of boundary inference when syllables are processed rather than characters. The algorithm looks for subsequent largest chunks that occur at least twice in the text, where text means a single sequence of characters, without punctuation or spaces. The results are quantified in terms of four precision metrics: Inference Precision, Alignment Precision, Redundancy, and Boundary Variability. We segment CHILDES texts in four languages: English, Hungarian, Mandarin, and Spanish. The data suggest that syllable-based segmentation enhances inference precision. Thus, our experiments (i) provide further support for the possible role of a cognitive largest-chunk segmentation strategy, and (ii) point to the syllable as a more optimal unit for segmentation than the letter/phoneme/character, (iii) in a cross-linguistic context.

Variation in the passage of time is perceived against the backdrop of standard temporal units. Under certain conditions, we perceive time to be passing slowly. In other settings, our subjective temporal experience is roughly synchronized with the objective time of clocks or calendars. And given different circumstances, we perceive time to have passed quickly. Drawing from 740 narratives that depict distortion in the perceived passage of time, I formulate a theory that accounts for the full range of variation in temporal experience. This theory can be represented by an S-shaped figure. According to this theory, variation in the perceived passage of time reflects variation in the density of experience per standard temporal unit. In turn, the density of experience per standard temporal unit is conditioned by the dynamics of social interaction. In its original form, however, this theory assumes that one’s circumstances shape one’s temporal experience in deterministic fashion. Consequently, based upon interviews with 406 disparate people, I conceptualize time work (or temporal agency) as one’s efforts to control, manipulate, or customize one’s own temporal experience or that of others. I conclude with some directions for future research.

Certain verbs tend to elicit explanations about either their subject or their object. The tendency for one of the verb’s arguments to be rementioned in explanations is known as the implicit causality bias. In this paper we investigate the conditions underlying implicit causality remention biases by means of sentence and story completion studies. On one account of implicit causality, remention biases are the product of a combination of a particular lexico-semantic structure with a causal coherence relation. According to a competing account, the biases arise from a perceived lack of information in the discourse, and thus depend on knowledge about the world and the discourse context. To distinguish between the two accounts, it first needs to be established that information that potentially competes with implicit causality, such as relevant information from the discourse context, can reliably influence remention biases. We provide evidence that a violation of implicit assumptions underlying the standard use of implicit causality verbs leads to different inferences, and an alteration of the remention bias. We thereby lay the groundwork for future studies to distinguish between the two accounts.

Natural language syntax has previously been thought to reflect abstract processing rules independent of meaning construction. However, grammatical categories may serve a functional role by allocating attention towards recurrent topics in discourse. Here, we show that listeners incorporate grammatical category into imagery when producing stick figure drawings from heard sentences, supporting the latter view. Participants listened to sentences with transitive verbs that independently varied whether a male or a female character (1) was mentioned first, (2) was the agent or recipient of an action, and (3) was the grammatical subject or object of the sentence. Replicating previous findings, we show that the first named character as well as the agent of the sentence tends to be drawn to the left in the image, probably reflecting left-to-right reading direction. But we also find that the grammatical subject of the sentence has a propensity to be drawn to the left of the object. We interpret this to suggest that grammatical category carries discursive meaning as an attention allocator. Our findings also highlight how language influences processes hitherto thought to be non-linguistic.

Words can be matched with the concept of sign (correspondence of a signifier to a signified) as long as they act as symbol-words endowed with some semantic self-sufficiency. But in discourse, they lose their wholeness as symbol-words and metamorphose into wording-symbols. They, suddenly, appear as mere signifier entities with a more or less loose allusion to their status as cultural symbols. In discourse, words are no longer signs but tools covering ephemeral collections of neurosemes: the link of the sign breaks as soon as discourse takes over. The referential potential is no longer the schematic meaning issued from culture, but the universe of discourse under construction. This is why any attempt to account for meaning in language must integrate the neural process of meaning creation. It is now established that meaning is not the result of language activity but the result of cognition. However, what language does, via discourse, is to make this meaning communicable. For all these reasons, the task of linguistics should be to investigate the relationship between cognition and linguistic output in order to shed light on all the cognitive traces left within the surface strings. The role of morphosyntax thus has to be re-evaluated in this light.

When children tell stories, they gesture; their gestures can predict how their narrative abilities will progress. Five-year-olds who gestured from the point of view of a character (CVPT gesture) when telling stories produced better-structured narratives at later ages (Demir, Levine, & Goldin-Meadow, 2014). But does gesture just predict narrative structure, or can asking children to gesture in a particular way change their narratives? To explore this question, we instructed children to produce CVPT gestures and measured their narrative structure. Forty-four kindergarteners were asked to tell stories after being trained to produce CVPT gestures, gestures from an observer’s viewpoint (OVPT gestures), or after no instruction in gesture. Gestures were coded as CVPT or OVPT, and stories were scored for narrative structure. Children trained to produce CVPT gestures produced more of these gestures, and also had higher narrative structure scores compared to those who received the OVPT training. Children returned for a follow-up session one week later and narrated the stories again. The training received in the first session did not impact narrative structure or recall for the events of the stories. Overall, these results suggest a brief gestural intervention has the potential to enhance narrative structure. Due to the fact that stronger narrative abilities have been correlated with greater success in developing writing and reading skills at later ages, this research has important implications for literacy and education.

I discuss the perspectival nature of temporality in discourse and argue that the human concept of time can no more be dissociated from the perspectival thought than the concept of the self can. The corollary of this observation is that perspectival temporality can no more be excluded from the semantic representation than the notion of the self can: neither can be reduced to the bare referent for the purpose of semantic representation if the latter is to retain cognitive plausibility. I present such a semantic qua conceptual approach to temporal reference developed within my theory of Default Semantics. I build upon my theory of time as epistemic modality according to which, on the level of conceptual qua semantic building blocks, temporality reduces to degrees of detachment from the certainty of the here and the now. I also address the questions of temporal asymmetry between the past and the future, and the relation between metaphysical time (timeM), psychological time (timeE, where ‘E’ marks the domain of epistemological enquiry), and time in natural language (timeL), concluding that the perspective-infused timeE and timeL are compatible with timeM of mathematical models of spacetime: all are definable through possibility and perspectivity.

Implicature interpretation is sensitive to many contextual factors. This experimental study investigates two:

1. (A) instructions to think carefully about exactly what is said

2. (B) access to the verbatim form of what has been said

Participants encountered (1) below, which can give rise to the contradictory relevance implicature in (2), as feedback during a decoy task:

1. (1) I’m not suggesting that you’re responding too slowly, but it’s important to give the first response that comes to mind.

2. (2) (I am suggesting that) you’re responding too slowly.

When participants were questioned post-task, (B) significantly reduced rates of agreement that the speaker of (1) had said (2), whether the verbatim form provided was written (Experiment 1) or audio (Experiment 2). (A) had no such effect. In Experiment 3, we added a final task for participants: to recall (1) verbatim. One-third had forgotten it, typically substituting the implicature (2). We argue that this memory loss can explain the lower implicature rates associated with verbatim access: verbatim access reminds forgetful participants of (1)’s compositional interpretation, and that interpretation is inconsistent with the implicature in (2). Consequently, verbatim access reduces the chances of endorsing (2), thus introducing an inherent literal meaning bias in interpreting previous conversation.

Oral language in individuals with nonverbal learning disabilities (NLD) has been described as empty of meaning, despite apparently average word knowledge. The present study explored the hypothesis that depth but not breadth of semantic representations would be reduced in NLD, and that depth but not breadth would be related to nonverbal gestalt perception. A cross-sectional design compared breadth and depth of vocabulary in 50 adults with or without a diagnosis of NLD. Vocabulary results were also compared with a visual closure test. Participants with NLD had reduced vocabulary depth in comparison with controls. The NLD group also had lower scores for gestalt perception, the ability to perceive a meaningful whole from unrelated parts. Across the sample, this measure predicted scores for vocabulary depth, but not breadth. The NLD group was also less able than the Control group to estimate the size of unknown, physical features of everyday objects. Results supported clinical observations that semantic representations are unconventional and imprecise in individuals with NLD, and suggested specific cognitive underpinnings for such difficulties. Results were also compatible with separate theories of embodied and lateralized semantics. A proposal uniting these theories in a designation over elaboration model is presented.

This paper studies two types of cognitive factors which have been assumed to underpin people’s interpretation of conditional promises and threats: logic and socio-cognitive assumptions about what conditional promisors and threateners are obliged and permitted to do. We consider whether the logic of conditionals is compatible with the socio-cognitive assumptions underlying their interpretation or whether the two come apart. From the classical logical accounts of conditionals, almost all modern theories have inherited a constraint which specifies that a conditional cannot be true if its antecedent is true and consequent false. This logical constraint is widely assumed to constitute, at least partially, a conditional’s semantics, or ‘core meaning’. A replication of Beller et al.’s (2005) study, reported in this paper, calls for revisiting this long-standing, cross-theoretically assumed constraint. As predicted, we have found that, in English, conditional promises are generally consistent with this logical constraint, but threats are not. Our findings provide evidence for the existence of a new usage-based category of conditional threats, and support the claim that the observed logical asymmetry in the interpretation of conditional promises versus threats is just an epiphenomenon of a socio-cognitive symmetry which pertains to people’s assumptions about the deontic commitments of both conditional promisors and threateners. Based on (i) the observed lack of uniform application of the logical constraint and (ii) a consideration of individual variation in the interpretation of conditional promises and threats, we argue that an exemplar approach to conditionals is a plausible option.

How do we communicate our pain to others? The challenge of conveying such a highly individual experience in words is faced daily by many sufferers of chronic pain and their doctors. Moreover, such linguistic strategies are especially relevant in situations where no obvious reference to physical injuries or tissue damage can be made. Neurolinguistically, this question is directly linked to understanding the brain mechanisms behind the encoding, storage, and comprehension of word meanings. An influential view posits that comprehension involves mentally simulating sensorimotor experiences which words refer to. Here, we test the hypothesis that both pain word comprehension and first-hand experiences of pain rely on a common neural substrate, leading to a prediction that word processing should modulate the perception of noxious stimuli. We used a priming task and asked neurotypical and chronic pain participants to read sentences containing literal or metaphoric pain descriptors, and then rate the intensity of thermal pain stimuli. We found that pain language comprehension modulated participants’ ratings of pain intensity. Furthermore, this effect depended on linguistic context as well as individual pain history. We discuss our findings within the larger theoretical debate on the nature of semantic representations, and point to their potential relevance for clinical practice.

In this study we chart the aspectual characteristics of performative utterances in a cross-linguistic sample of sixteen languages on the basis of native-speaker elicitations. We conclude that there is not one single aspectual type (e.g., perfectives) that is systematically reserved for performative contexts. Instead, the aspectual form of performative utterances in a given language is epistemically motivated, in the sense that the language will turn to that aspectual construction which it generally selects to refer to situations that are fully and instantly identifiable as an instance of a given situation type at the time of speaking. We use the method of Multidimensional Scaling to demonstrate this: whatever the exact value of a given aspectual marker, if it is used to mark performatives, then it also commonly features in the expression of states and habits, which have the subinterval property (they can be fully verified based on a random segment), demonstrations, and other special contexts featuring more or less predictable and therefore instantly identifiable events. On the other hand, our study shows that performative contexts do not normally feature progressive aspect, which is dedicated to the expression of events that are not fully and instantly identifiable.

Individuals differ in how frequently they gesture. It is not clear whether gesture frequency is related to culture, since varied results have been reported. The purpose of this study was to test whether the frequency of representational gestures is linked with story-telling style. Previous research showed individual and cross-cultural differences in story-telling style, some preferring to tell a chronicle (how it happened) or an evaluative story (why it happened). We hypothesized that high gesture frequency might be strongly associated with using a chronicle style, since both rely on visuospatial imagery. Four groups of bilinguals, English as their second language (L2) participated. Their first language (L1) was one of: Mandarin, Hindi, French, or Spanish. Participants watched a cartoon and told the story, once in English, once in L1. The results showed group differences in the rate of gesture use: the Chinese and Hindi L1 participants gestured less frequently than the French and Spanish L1 participants. The participants from Asian cultures were more likely to tell an evaluative story and the Romance-language L1 participants a chronicle. We conclude that these culture/language groups differ in story-telling style. A chronicle style is associated with more gesture production than an evaluative style.

This paper investigates the extent of second language (L2) use in four cognitive domains including mental calculation, planning (action plans), note-taking, and shopping lists. Participants include 149 highly educated L2-competent sequential Polish–English bilinguals who relocated to the UK1 in early adulthood, and underwent processes of acculturation. The independent variables in this study include acculturation level, social network profile, predicted future domicile, and length of residence. The study employed both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Participants completed an online questionnaire and 14 were interviewed by the researcher. The study included the Complementarity Principle (CP) into the operationalisation and measurement of language use in bilinguals (Grosjean, 2010). The results show that acculturation level, social network profile, and predicted future domicile are strong predictors of the extent of L2 use in cognitive domains. Effects of context-specificity and language-dependence were also found, the latter specifically in the domain of mental calculation.

Spoken testimonials on Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) constitute the data for this study, which considers contrastive construal as evoked by conditional constructions (if, unless, what if) and antonymous uses of lexical items (bad–good, guilt–innocence). Unlike conditional language use for the expression of hypothetical scenarios, doubt, and catastrophizing, antonyms have not been a focus of OCD research. In the data, antonymous lexical items establish experiential dichotomies (e.g., good–bad, guilt–innocence, cause–prevent) that reinforce and specify the nature of evoked contrast. Meaning making in the data, it is proposed, evokes contrastive construal according to bundles of integrated quality dimensions such as modality, morality, and emotion that make up incompatible conceptions of reality. Tied to contrast in the data is also the notion of balance, and contrast is considered alongside force-dynamic actions that are experienced as effecting balance. While the overriding concerns for the study are linguistic–conceptual, the study’s findings can have implications for research on OCD and a cognitive semantic perspective can potentially complement both content- and process-oriented psychological approaches to this disorder.

Conceptual metaphor research has benefited from advances in discourse analytic and corpus linguistic methodologies over the years, especially given recent developments with Natural Language Processing (NLP) technologies. Such technologies are now capable of identifying metaphoric expressions across large bodies of text. Here we focus on how one particular analytic tool, MetaNet, can be used to study everyday discourse about personal and social problems, in particular, poverty and cancer, by leveraging reusable networks of primary metaphors enhanced with specific metaphor subcases. We discuss the advantages of this approach in allowing us to gain valuable insights into cross-linguistic metaphor commonalities and variation. To demonstrate its utility, we analyze corpus data from English and Spanish.

This paper presents a cross-linguistic investigation of a constraint on the use on intrinsic frames of reference proposed by Levelt (1984, 1996). This proposed constraint claims that use of intrinsic frames when the ground object is in non-canonical position is blocked due to conflict with gravitational-based reference frames. Regression models of the data from Arabic, K’iche’, Spanish, Yucatec, and Zapotec suggest that this constraint is valid across languages. However, the strength at which the constraint operates is predicted by the frequency of canonical intrinsic frames in the particular language. The ratio of the incidence of intrinsic usage with canonical vs. non-canonical orientation appears to be remarkably uniform across languages, which suggests the possibility of a strong cognitive universal.

Spatial descriptions such as “The spider is behind the bee” inform the listener about the location of the spider (the located object) in relation to an object whose location is known (i.e., the bee, also called the reference object). If the geometric properties of the reference object have been shown to affect how people use and understand spatial language (Carlson & Van Deman, 2008; Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1994), the geometric features carried by the located object have been deemed irrelevant for spatial language (Landau, 1996; Talmy, 1983). This view on the (ir)relevance of the located object has been recently questioned by works showing that presenting the located object in misalignment with the reference object has consequences for spatial language understanding (Burigo, Coventry, Cangelosi, & Lynott, 2016; Burigo & Sacchi, 2013). In the reported study we aimed to investigate which geometric properties of the located object affect the apprehension of a spatial description, and to disentangle whether the information concerning its orientation (axis), direction (front/rear), or a combination of the two gives rise to conflict. The outcomes of three placing tasks suggest that only the information concerning the direction of the located object is critical for spatial language use.

We investigate how German and Korean speakers describe everyday spatial/motion events, such as putting a cup on the table. In these motion events, the moving object (e.g., cup) and the non-moving reference object (e.g., table) take on the roles of Figure and Ground, respectively. Figure(F) and Ground(G) thus have distinct perceptual properties and assume conceptually asymmetric roles (entity moving along a trajectory vs. stationary reference frame). We examine the degrees to which speakers distinguish between F and G semantically (spatial/Path terms, e.g., on, in) and syntactically (grammatical roles, e.g., subject, object). Participants described events involving two objects that switched their F-G roles (put cup(F) on board(G) and put board(F) under cup(G)). German speakers use distinct Path terms (e.g., auf, in) for differential F-G relations, thus encoding the F-G asymmetry. In contrast, Korean speakers use the same terms (e.g., kkita ‘fit.tightly’) and the same syntactic constructions regardless of switches in F-G roles. These cross-linguistic differences are evident for Non-typical events (Put board(F) under cup(G)), showing that the encoding of the asymmetry interacts with speakers’ everyday experiences of motion events. We argue that the differences reflect the interactions between the Path lexicon and spatial syntax, and language-specific viewpoints of the F-G relation.

Human language offers rich ways to track, compare, and engage the attentional and epistemic states of interlocutors. While this task is central to everyday communication, our knowledge of the cross-linguistic grammatical means that target such intersubjective coordination has remained basic. In two serialised papers, we introduce the term ‘engagement’ to refer to grammaticalised means for encoding the relative mental directedness of speaker and addressee towards an entity or state of affairs, and describe examples of engagement systems from around the world. Engagement systems express the speaker’s assumptions about the degree to which their attention or knowledge is shared (or not shared) by the addressee. Engagement categories can operate at the level of entities in the here-and-now (deixis), in the unfolding discourse (definiteness vs indefiniteness), entire event-depicting propositions (through markers with clausal scope), and even metapropositions (potentially scoping over evidential values). In this first paper, we introduce engagement and situate it with respect to existing work on intersubjectivity in language. We then explore the key role of deixis in coordinating attention and expressing engagement, moving through increasingly intercognitive deictic systems from those that focus on the the location of the speaker, to those that encode the attentional state of the addressee.