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Schopenhauer, Kant and Compassion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2012

Paul Guyer*
Affiliation:
Brown University

Abstract

Schopenhauer presents his moral philosophy as diametrically opposed to that of Kant: for him, pure practical reason is an illusion and morality can arise only from the feeling of compassion, while for Kant it cannot be based on such a feeling and can be based only on pure practical reason. But the difference is not as great as Schopenhauer makes it seem, because for him compassion is supposed to arise from metaphysical insight into the unity of all being, thus from pure if theoretical reason, while for Kant pure practical reason works only by effecting a feeling of respect (in the ‘Critical’ works) or by cultivating, i.e. affecting, natural dispositions to moral feeling (in the ‘post-Critical’ works). I argue that Kant's is the more realistic theory on this point.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2012

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