Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dk4vv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-24T17:40:23.137Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Reply to Edward Kanterian

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 June 2013

Graham Bird
Graham Bird*
Affiliation:
University of Manchester Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The reply to Kanterian offers a rebuttal of his central criticisms. It reaffirms the difference between Kant's arguments in the Aesthetic and at B 148-9; it rejects the alleged error of logic in Fischer's (and my) arguments; and it rejects Kanterian's reading of passages in the Preface (A xx-xxii) and of the Amphiboly. Beyond these specific points Kanterian assumes that Kant's project in the first Critique cannot be understood as a ‘descriptive metaphysics’ and so begs the question at issue.

Keywords

neglected alternativeTrendelenburgFischerdescriptive metaphysicsscepticism
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , July 2013 , pp. 289 - 300
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2013 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bird, Graham (2003) ‘Kant's and Strawson's Descriptive Metaphysics’. In Hanjo Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 67–86.Google Scholar
Bird, Graham (2006) The Revolutionary Kant. Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court.Google Scholar
Bird, Graham (2010) A Companion to Kant (paperback edn. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell).Google Scholar
Bennett, Jonathan (1966) Kant's Analytic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
James, William (1912) Essays in Radical Empiricism. London: Longmans Green.Google Scholar
James, William (1918) The Principles of Psychology. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Strawson, P. F. (1959) Individuals. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Strawson, P. F. (1966) The Bounds of Sense. London: Methuen.Google Scholar
Strawson, P.F. (1985) Skepticism and Naturalism. London: Methuen.Google Scholar
Stroud, Barry (1984) The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar