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Nonconceptualist Readings of Kant and the Transcendental Deduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2015

Thomas Land
Thomas Land*
Affiliation:
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

I give an argument against nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s First Critique, according to which one can enjoy a Kantian intuition without possessing any concepts, and present an alternative reading. The argument is that nonconceptualist readings are forced to construe the Transcendental Deduction in one of three ways, none of which is acceptable: The Deduction is seen either (i) as inconsistent with the Transcendental Aesthetic; or (ii) as addressing a question of fact rather than a question of legitimacy; or (iii) as articulating a position that Kant himself criticizes as a form of scepticism. Consideration of the third alternative, in particular, shows that a more promising construal of the Deduction must be based on a different interpretation of Kant’s claim that intuitions and concepts constitute two distinct kinds of representation than is assumed by proponents of nonconceptualist readings. I present such an interpretation and outline the alternative reading of the Deduction that results.

Keywords

intuitionsynthesisconceptualismnonconceptualismTranscendental Deductioncategoriesobjective purport
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 2015 , pp. 25 - 51
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2014 

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