Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-tf8b9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T19:29:19.715Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Kant’s Non-Positivistic Concept of Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 November 2019

Robert Alexy
Robert Alexy*
Affiliation:
University of Kiel
*
Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The main thesis of this article is that Kant’s concept of law is a non-positivistic one, notwithstanding the fact that his legal philosophy includes very strong positivistic elements. My argument takes as its point of departure the distinction of three elements, around which the debate between positivism and non-positivism turns: first, authoritative issuance, second, social efficacy, and, third, moral correctness. All positivistic theories are confined to the first two elements. As soon as a necessary connection between these first two elements and the third element, moral correctness, is established, the picture changes fundamentally. Positivism becomes non-positivism. There exist two kinds of connections between law and morality: classifying and qualifying connections. This distinction stems from different sorts of effects that moral defects give rise to. A classifying connection leads to the loss of legal validity, whereas a qualifying connection leads only to legal defectiveness. In Kant’s theory of law both connections are found. The qualifying connection is conspicuous throughout Kant’s theory of law, whereas the classifying connection, by contrast, is rare and well hidden. This will suffice to consider Kant as a representative of inclusive non-positivism.

Keywords

positivism and non-positivismclassifying and qualifying connections between law and moralityKant’s qualifying and classifying connectionsKant as an inclusive non-positivist
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 24 , Special Issue 4: Special Issue on Kant & Law , December 2019 , pp. 497 - 512
Copyright
© Kantian Review, 2019 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alexy, Robert (2002) The Argument from Injustice. A Reply to Legal Positivism (1st publ. 1992). Trans. Paulson, Bonnie Litschewski and Paulson, Stanley L.. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Alexy, Robert (2005) ‘Ralf Dreiers Interpretation der Kantischen Rechtsdefinition’. In Alexy, Robert (ed.), Integratives Verstehen. Zur Rechtsphilosophie Ralf Dreiers (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck), pp. 95–109.Google Scholar
Alexy, Robert (2006) ‘Kants Begriff des praktischen Gesetzes’. In Behrends, Okko (ed.), Der biblische Gesetzesbegriff (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, 3rd ser. 278) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), pp. 197–216.Google Scholar
Alexy, Robert (2008a) ‘A Defence of Radbruch’s Formula’. In Freeman, Michael D.A. (ed.), Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence. 8th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell and Thomson Reuters), pp. 426–43.Google Scholar
Alexy, Robert (2008b) ‘On the Concept and the Nature of Law’. Ratio Juris, 21(3), 281–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alexy, Robert (2010) ‘The Dual Nature of Law’. Ratio Juris, 23(2), 167–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alexy, Robert (2012) ‘Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights’. Ratio Juris, 25(1), 2–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alexy, Robert (2015) ‘Legal Certainty and Correctness’. Ratio Juris, 28(4), 441–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alexy, Robert (2017) ‘The Ideal Dimension of Law’. In Duke, George and George, Robert P. (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 314–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Augustinus (2006) De libero arbitrio. Der freie Wille. Trans. and ed. Brachtendorf, Johannes. Paderborn: Schöningh Google Scholar
Beyleveld, Deryck, and Brownsword, Roger (2001) Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Coleman, Jules (2001) The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gardner, John (2001) ‘Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths’. American Journal of Jurisprudence, 46(1), 199–227.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kant, Immanuel (1991) Political Writings. Trans. Nisbet, H. B. and ed. Reiss, H.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kant, Immanuel (1996) Practical Philosophy. Trans. and ed. Gregor, Mary J.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kant, Immanuel (1997) Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. and ed. Guyer, Paul and Wood, Alan W.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Radbruch, Gustav (2006) ‘Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law (1946)’. Trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 26(1), 1–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raz, Joseph (2003) ‘About Morality and the Nature of Law’. American Journal of Jurisprudence, 48(1), 1–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raz, Joseph (2009) The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Ripstein, Arthur (2009) Force and Freedom. Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stone, Martin J. (2017) ‘Kant’s Apparent Positivism’. In Kisilevsky, Sari and Stone, Martin J. (eds), Freedom and Force: Essays on Kant’s Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Hart Publishing), pp. 165–80.Google Scholar
Waldron, Jeremy (1996) ‘Kant’s Legal Positivism’. Harvard Law Review, 109(7), 1535–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar