Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-tf8b9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T06:21:23.087Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Kant's Empiricism in his Refutation of Idealism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2011

Adrian Bardon
Adrian Bardon
Affiliation:
Wake Forest University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In the preface to the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant laments that

it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us … must be accepted on faith, and if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof. (B xl n.)

The two editions of the Critique each contain a celebrated refutation of epistemological scepticisms like those of Descartes and Hume. The first edition refutation has been widely decried as relying on an objectionable sort of idealism. The refutation of the second edition, though rather more difficult to interpret than the first, has usually been read as a mere reworking of the first.

Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 8 , March 2004 , pp. 62 - 88
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Allison, H. (1983). Kant's Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press).Google Scholar
Bennet, J. (1966). Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broad, C. D. (1923). Scientific Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).Google Scholar
Brueckner, A. (1983). ‘Transcendental Arguments I’, Nous, 17: 551–76.Google Scholar
Descartes, A. (1984). Meditations, from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 2, trans. J., Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Ewing, A. C. (1983). A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).Google Scholar
Grunbaum, A. (1967). ‘The status of temporal becoming’, in Gale, R. M. (ed.), The Philosophy of Time (New York: Anchor Books).Google Scholar
Guyer, P. (1983), ‘Kant's intentions in the refutations of idealism’, Philosophical Review, 92: 329–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guyer, P. (1987). Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Hume, D. (1978). A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Hume, D. (1975). Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 (New York: Henry Holt).Google Scholar
Kant, I. (1933). Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd edn, trans. Norman Kemp, Smith (New York: St Martin's Press).Google Scholar
Kant, I. (1900). Kants gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and predecessors).Google Scholar
Kemp Smith, N. (1962). A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd edn (New York: Humanities Press).Google Scholar
Lipson, M. (1987). ‘Objective experience’, Nous, 21: 319–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Loemker, L. E. (1969). Gottfried Wilhem Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters (Dordrecht: Reidel).Google Scholar
Melnick, A. (1973). Kant's Analogies of Experience (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).Google Scholar
Mundle, C. K. (1966). ‘Augustine's pervasive error concerning time’, Philosophy, 41: 165–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Russell, B. (1927). An Outline of Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin).Google Scholar
Strawson, P. F. (1966). The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen & Co.).Google Scholar
Stroud, B. (1984). The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press).Google Scholar