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Kant on Moral Dilemmas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2022

Carol Hay
Carol Hay*
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts Lowell, Lowell MA, USA
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

The standard attribution of ought implies can rules out the possibility of Kantianism permitting the existence of moral dilemmas. Against this, I argue that Kantianism both can and should permit the existence of moral dilemmas. This new take on moral dilemmas should be of particular urgency to those hoping to radicalize Kant, I argue, because the work of oppression theorists shows that moral dilemmas are particularly likely to strike those who are already most vulnerable. The insights of oppression theory also suggest that the heretofore overlooked social and political implications of moral dilemmas are just as philosophically significant as the metaethical and ethical implications.

Keywords

moral dilemmasoppression theoryought implies canmoral residuemoral gapsmoral lucknon-ideal theory
Type
Article
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 27 , Special Issue 4: Special Issue: Radicalizing Kant? , December 2022 , pp. 557 - 572
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

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