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Freedom from Autonomy: An Essay on Accountability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 December 2020

Brian O’connor*
Affiliation:
University College Dublin

Abstract

Neo-Kantian philosophers see accountability as a key property of autonomy, or of social freedom more broadly. Autonomy, among those theorists, is, I contend, implicitly co-conceived with responsibility, producing a quasi-juridical conception of autonomy and a limiting notion of freedom. This article criticizes the connecting of freedom with accountability on a number of grounds. First, various conceptions of autonomy not only operate without a notion of accountability, but, in fact, would be impaired by an accountability requirement. Second, the neo-Kantians are unable to defend the freedom enhancing properties that are supposedly brought about by the giving of reasons for one’s beliefs and actions. Third, the project of accountability is indifferent to personal outlooks, not because it takes a holistic perspective, but because of its interest in social convergence.

Type
Articles
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

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